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                                             ABSTRACT 
 
 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE TURKISH LEFT: AN UNFINISHED DREAM
 
 
                                                      Berk Esen 
 
                                      Political Science, M. A. Thesis, 2005 
 
                               Associate Professor Hasan Bulent Kahraman 
 
Keywords: Social Democratic Populist Party, Republican People’s Party, Turkish 
Left, Kemalism and Social Democracy 
 
 
        One of the primary debates in Turkish political science literature is the 
surprisingly weak and rigid character of the center-left parties which caused social 
democracy to become a generic name for a progressive political culture and attitude 
instead of a fully-fledged ideology. This is more clearly seen when Turkish 
mainstream left parties are juxtaposed to their European counterparts. This is mainly 
an epistemological problem that revolves around the question of whether Turkish 
mainstream left ideology is compatible with the universal norms of social democracy. 
       The aim of this study is to examine the roots and parameters of the inability of 
Social Democratic Populist Party to reformulate its static organizational body in 
accordance with societal demands and reinvigorate its ideology and political 
programme to better address the contemporary problems. A comprehensive analysis 
of the intra-party debates that occurred in this period is conducted by linking them 
with the important developments in the Turkish political landscape to detect 
epistemological causes of the question at hand. The ideological crisis of Turkish 
social democracy during the early 1990s is thoroughly discussed to get a full account 
of the intra-party attempts for renewal and understand why they have failed. 
      The study has revealed that the failure of the SDPP leadership to more closely 
adopt the universal norms of social democracy is closely tied to the demise of statism 
that restrained the organizational structure and mission of the party, the crisis of 
Turkish modernity that distanced the party administration from the constituent groups 
and decline of Kemalism that challenged the ideological framework of Turkish 
center-left. 
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                                                              ÖZET 
SOSYAL DEMOKRAT HALKÇI PARTİ VE TÜRK SOLUNUN DONÜŞÜMÜ: 
BİTMEYEN RÜYA 
 
                                                            Berk Esen 
                                              Siyaset Bilimi, M. A Tezi, 2005 
                                            Doç. Dr. Hasan Bülent Kahraman 
Anahtar sözcükler: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Türk 
solu, Kemalizm, Sosyal Demokrasi 
 
         Türk siyaset bilimindeki ana tartışmalardan biri, merkez sol partilerinin zayıf ve 
kati karakterlerinin sosyal demokrasinin tam vücut bulmuş bir ideoloji olmak yerine, 
ilerici politik kültür ve tutumları genel olarak tanımlayan bir jenerik kavram haline 
gelmesine neden olmasıdır. Bu durum Türkiye’deki merkez sol partilerin Avrupa’daki 
karşıtları ile yan yana konulmasıyla daha açık görülebilir. Bu Türk merkez sol 
düşüncesinin evrensel sosyal demokrasinin değerleri ile ne kadar uyuştuğu ile ilgili 
epistemolojik bir sorundur. 
         Bu çalışmanın amacı, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Partisinin durağan/devletçi 
örgütünün toplumsal talepler ve sorunlar karşısında ideolojisini ve programını, bu 
beklentiler ve taleplerin doğrultusunda yenileyememesin altındaki sebepleri ve 
çerçeveyi açıklamaya çalışıyor. Bu esnada, parti içersinde olgunlaşan tartışmaları, 
güncel Türk siyasetinin ana noktaları ile kapsamlı bir şekilde inceleyip ve bağdaştırıp, 
epistemolojik nedenselleri gün ışığına çıkarılmaya çalışıldı. Türk sosyal 
demokrasisinin 1990’larda girmiş olduğu ideolojik krizi, partiler arasında ve içersinde 
neden yenilenemediğini ve başarısızlığa uğradığını anlamak için, detaylı bir şekilde 
incelenmektedir.  
         Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, SHP yönetiminin evrensel soysal demokrasi 
normlarını benimseyememesinin arkasında yatan temel faktörlerin başında, partinin 
ideolojik misyonunu ve örgütsel yapısını sınırlayan devletçi unsurların, parti 
yönetimini seçmen gruplarından uzaklaştıran Türk modernite krizinin ve Türk 
solunun ideolojik yapısını sarsan Kemalizmin gerilemesinin geldiğini göstermiştir. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
        One of the primary academic discussions in the Turkish political science 
literature is the surprisingly weak and rigid character of the mainstream left parties 
under whose control social democracy has become a generic name for a progressive 
political values and attitude instead of an ideology. This ideological poverty and lack 
of an authentic source of Turkish social democracy are clearly seen when Turkish 
center-left parties are juxtaposed to their European counterparts, which have found 
ways of resisting the New Right hegemony in the course of the 1990s by undertaking 
ideological openings with the discourses of the ‘liberal left’ and ‘third way’. 
       Resting on the primary tenets of the founding ideology of the state, indeed 
Turkish social democracy significantly diverges from the universal social democratic 
norms and, therefore, lacks the pragmatic approach of the aforementioned ideology. 
And in this parochial nature, Turkish social democracy has resisted to the inner 
attempts of an ideological reconfiguration despite the rapid transformation of the 
society along the lines of economic development and politico-cultural change. In 
other words, Turkish social democracy continued to act and was seen by the masses, 
first and foremost, as a state ideology that could establish few ties with the existing 
social groups.   
       This relatively compact and uniform political culture, feeding of the Kemalist 
discourse of Turkish modernity and the state-centric Turkish political order could 
survive in the pre-1980 period by remaining apart from the society and acting in the 
name of transforming that body. Even the radical break with the past that occurred in 
the 1960s and 1970s by the left of center movement was a revision attempt within the 
hegemonic Kemalist paradigm. The recent political, economic and social changes, 
however, brought the problematic position of Turkish social democracy to light by 
challenging the three main pillars upon which its ideological framework is 
constructed. A full discussion of the crisis of Turkish social democracy, then, first 
requires the exploration of the symbiotic relationship of Turkish social democracy 
with these three sources, namely the Kemalist hegemonic discourse, state-led 
modernization and statism, as a political model.  
       In the immediate years following the 1980 coup, the former RPP ranks were 
disintegrated faced with the restrictions of the coup generals and the movement, left 
without its natural leader, was divided among, at one time, three different parties as 
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well as many opposing intra-party factions and small cliques. Nevertheless, it is in 
this period that the concept of social democracy was used in its own right by a 
political party, thereby creating much of a dispute within left-wing politics in the 
coming years. This attempt of seeking a clear break with the primordial tenets of 
Kemalism also entailing a separation from the state-led Turkish modernity with its 
authoritarian elements is unique in the republican history and, therefore, needs a more 
detailed analysis than it has so far received. 
       In contrast to many foreign researches and studies conducted on the function and 
significance as well as the history of political parties, there are only a limited number 
of credible and objective academic sources on Turkish parties in the political science 
literature. Nevertheless even by Turkish standards it is appalling to find that not a 
single book was written specifically on the social democratic parties in spite of the 
important role played by, first, SDP and, after the merger, SDPP which managed to 
gather most of the former RPP ranks under its body and represented the views, ideals 
and aspirations of the Turkish mainstream left even under the tight framework of the 
September 12 regime for a decade in the post-1980 Turkish politics. While the SDP-
SDPP period is ignored and omitted from the history of the Turkish left, it is assumed 
that the sole purpose and mission of these parties were to become a temporary resting 
stop for the former RPP ranks and continue the RPP tradition when the natural bearer 
of this task was gone. Hence with the return of RPP to Turkish politics in early 1990s 
it was expected and, even, demanded by quite a substantial number of leftists that 
SDPP return to its roots and dissolve under the newly opened party.  
      It is in these conditions that the Turkish social democracy, despite some inner 
attempts and programmatic demands of some groups in SDPP, missed the opportunity 
of redesigning itself in light of the emergence of neo-liberal economic policies and 
development of alternative modernities and failed to challenge the hegemonic 
discourse of the state and carry the democratization demands of the society against the 
tight political framework envisaged by the coup architects. This is mainly an 
epistemological problem that needs to be explored in terms of disclosing the 
parameters of Turkish social democracy. A comprehensive analysis of the soul-
searching process in SDPP during this period, significant for revealing the 
epistemological limits of the Turkish social democracy, would also entail us to better 
situate the ideological course of the Turkish left in the post-1965 period encompassed 
by RPP.  
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       In this thesis the ideological crisis of Turkish social democracy in the early 1990s 
represented by SDPP will be analyzed by focusing on the background of these intra-
party conflicts and ideological debates to demonstrate a full account of the attempt for 
renewal in the post-1980 period on the basis of the universal principles of social 
democracy. The scope of this debate could be followed from the large literature of 
theoretical books written by the prominent figures of the Turkish social democracy at 
the time with the purpose of altering the ongoing struggle and factional conflicts 
within SDPP. Focusing on the roots and parameters of the intra-party debates on the 
conditions of Turkish social democracy with its close ties to the state and its founding 
ideology from a micro-level by mainly limiting the scope of this study to a political 
party, namely SDPP, one could also reveal some important aspects of the general 
crisis of Turkish social democracy on a macro level and come closer to understand its 
failure in the Turkish context. This thesis, then, also covers in its background the 
political discourse prevalent in Turkish politics in the 1980s and early 1990s, covering 
a wide scope of events characterized by, first, a relative liberalization of the economic 
and the political system and, then, a resurgence of the nationalist tide. 
      The constant declines in the amount of popular support for the social democratic 
parties and the tendency of the Turkish electorate to vote for center-right parties could 
not provide us with adequate explanations as they are only the results rather than the 
causes of this problem. Moreover, as the political turn of events in the 1980s have 
shown, given the right conditions, even a center-left party could gain popularity with 
the masses and win an election. Alas, this crisis is mainly an epistemological problem 
whose roots are historically and organizationally established. My efforts in this thesis 
have focused on the roots of this epistemological crisis which have rendered all 
attempts of ideological renewal in SDPP futile.  
      The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze the roots and causes of the inability of 
SDPP to renew its static body in accordance with societal demands and reinvigorate 
its ideology to better address the contemporary problems. In doing so, however, this 
thesis explores the multi-dimensional crisis of the Turkish social democracy, 
experienced by SDPP in the post-1980 period. The thesis argues that the failure to 
break from RPP heritage and the Kemalist framework could neither be attributed to 
one dominant factor nor explained by pointing out the leadership and organizational 
problems experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is for this reason that a 
comprehensive analysis of the Turkish social democracy in the post-1980 period 
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needs to be made by focusing on the demise of statism in light of the economic 
liberalization during Ozal era, the crisis of Turkish modernity with its state-centric 
model and the crisis of Kemalism which has lost its hegemonic control over the 
society. 
     In the first chapter a theoretic framework which explains the techno-economic 
developments in the last quarter of the 20th century is presented. The purpose of this 
chapter is to analyze the multi-faceted changes, paving the way for the demise of 
Keynesianism accompanied by the rise of New Right politics. In addition a full 
account of the crisis of modernity and retreat of the nation-state model is given. The 
crisis originates from the major structural changes in the techno-economic realm 
which contributed to the restructuring of global capitalism and the collapse of 
centrally-planned economies as well as reflexive transformation of modernity that 
caused radicalization of democracy. Hence, it is indicated that with the exhaustion of 
the forces propelled by French and Bolshevik revolutions, social democratic ideology 
has undergone a transformation to break apart from its reliance on an authoritarian 
notion of modernity and its corporatist ties with the state, thereby appealing to the 
new social and political movements in the society and endorsing the rising 
multicultural and pluralistic views of the globalization process.  
       In the second chapter a detailed analysis of the economic developments in the 
post-1980 period is conducted to summarize the demise of statism in the Turkish 
context and the relative liberalization of the economic and, later, political spheres. 
This issue would be mainly explored taking into consideration the symbiotic 
relationship between the state and the Turkish social democracy. It will be shown that 
the rejection of a genuine social democratic ideology and reliance on a state-centric 
model disabled SDPP from presenting a credible alternative to the neo-liberal agenda 
of Motherland Party.  
      In the third chapter, the crisis of Turkish modernity in the post-1980 period with 
the recent economic changes in the society is explored. This period has witnessed the 
development of alternative modernity challenging the state-led process and the 
emergence of identity politics in accordance with the increasing social and economic 
power of ethnic, cultural and sectarian groups in the society. The central argument is 
that the rise of identity politics which have emancipated Alevi and Kurdish groups 
from their previous boundaries led many groups within SDPP to make demands from 
the party administration that could not be met. In consequence, SDPP would be 
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increasingly insulated from the societal demands and pressures as the ties with these 
groups were broken, thus paving the way for the melting of the party in terms of 
popular support. 
       In the fourth chapter, the main liberal and Islamic challenges to Kemalism in the 
early 1990s are analyzed from the point of view of the SDPP ranks. These debates 
which have been publicized to the society thanks to the emergence of private media 
had a profound impact on the intra-party debates in SDPP and some of these 
Kemalism criticisms were indeed shared by some party members. The concern of this 
chapter will be the results and repercussions of these debates for the soul-searching 
process in the party. It is argued that these criticisms, once voiced by many 
intellectuals with close ties to the party, are omitted, ignored and even resisted by the 
party ranks following the rise of the Welfare Party, political assassination of Ugur 
Mumcu and the rise of neo-Kemalism.   
       In the last, concluding, chapter of the thesis a very short summary of the 
arguments in the thesis would be provided from a general framework to underscore 
the connections between the three main causes of the crisis of Turkish social 
democracy. Hence, the unprepared status of the Turkish left with its idiosyncrasies, 
contradictions and paradoxes would be displayed by emphasizing the main political 
events that came to pave the way for the decline and collapse of SDPP. Doubtless the 
argument that the difficulties faced by SDPP in terms of adjusting to the economic, 
political and social changes are a result of the epistemological crisis of Turkish social 
democracy will be put forward.   
       In the thesis, a two-level analysis would be presented by first discussing the 
political, economic and social changes caused by the main element discussed in the 
chapter and then a detailed account of their effects on the conditions of SDPP would 
be given. Hence the thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of the changing nature of 
the Turkish society in the post-1980 period with an eye towards their consequences 
for SDPP. It is, however, important to note that the thesis is neither a political nor a 
historical analysis of the party itself, though there is a great need for academic studies 
on both topics. SDPP is mainly used to have a greater access to the Turkish social 
democracy at that period. 
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                                                       CHAPTER 1 
                            GLOBAL CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY:  
                                            THE END OF HISTORY? 
 
          World economy is undergoing a process of restructuring that has profoundly 
reshaped capital-labor relations, socio-spatial contexts and the role of the state in an 
effort to overcome the structural crisis, prevalent since the early 1970s. This 
development has occurred simultaneously but also somewhat fueled by the revolution 
in the information technologies. The revolution in the techno-economic realm has 
profoundly changed the material foundation of  the society by updating the scientific 
and technological framework of our civilization and, as a consequence, by bringing 
the demise of statism with the sudden collapse of Soviet Communism and China’s 
incorporation into global capitalism and the disintegration of national development 
schemas of the developing countries with their shift from import substitution 
industrialization to export-oriented economic models and restructuring of capitalism 
in response to the erosion of economic Keynesianism and social welfarism to be 
replaced by informational or managerial capitalism. The rise of this new form of 
capitalism would connect the global financial markets through the internationalization 
of capital and prompt the globalization process in the 1990s. The restructuring of 
capitalism, however, have also taken place simultaneously with the rise of libertarian 
values and the emergence of new social movements since the late 1960s which, 
together with the economic developments, propel the completion of modernity and 
introduce a new politico-cultural phase of radical form of modernity, taken as far as 
post-modernity. Based upon these radical socio-economic changes and political 
transformations, the last few decades have witnessed the occurrence of three related 
developments which have profoundly shaken the primary roots of social democracy 
and triggered its structural crisis. Thus, this chapter aims to analyze these 
developments and explain how the demise of Keynesianism, retreat of the nation state 
model and the crisis of modernity came to have an impact on social democratic parties 
at large.  
1.1 Keynesianism and the Developmental State 
        For nearly over thirty years after the Second World War, Keynesianism, based 
on the premise that capitalist economies are subject to structural weakness in 
generating sufficient demand which could only be resolved through public spending, 
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constituted the dominant paradigm in the field of economics.1 Profoundly influenced 
by the disastrous experiences of the Great Depression and the Second World War, 
during which faith in the rationality of the markets stood at a historic low, a 
generation of economists, journalists and policymakers came to embrace Keynesian 
economics and supported the development of the welfare state.2 The primary elements 
of Keynesianism have been the economic centrality of the mass production, the 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of capital and wage labor achieved by the 
socio-political compromise established among economic classes in the post-war 
period.3 This was the period in which governments have assumed a primary role in 
the management of economic policies to ensure the protection of citizens against 
social risks as a relief from the market forces.4  
         In the initial decades of the post-war period, state interventionism, in general, 
whether centrally planned economies in socialist countries, import-substitution 
models in the post-colonial and Third World countries, 5 or export-promotion 
industrialization in East Asia,6 and Keynesianism in the European context, in 
particular, proved to be highly successful in building and expanding cities, developing 
new industries, undertaking large-scale development projects, managing social 
security, health care and education issues.7 However, this Keynesian era came to a 
halt in the mid 1970s, when the world economy, faced with economic dislocations 
associated with the Vietnam War and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, resulting in the 
decline of the growth and profit rates, reached its historical limits.8 
                                                
1
 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 
London: Harvest Book, 1994 
2
 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Challenge and Hidden Promise of 
Globalisation, London: William Heinemann, 2000 p. 16 
3
 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 140 
4
 Douglas E. Ashford, The Emergence of the Welfare State, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986 
5
 Nigel Haris, The End of the Third World, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986 
6
 Mohamed Arif and Hal Hill, Export-Oriented Industrialization: the ASEAN 
Experience. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995 
7
 One of the most useful sources that analyze the history of the relationship between 
governments and markets is Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding 
Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That is Remaking the 
Modern World New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998 
8
 Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, The Neoliberal Counter-Revolution, in 
Neoliberalism A Critical Reader, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnson (eds.), 
London: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 9-19 
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          In response to the stagnant growth, spiraling inflation and balance-of-payments 
crises, only made worse by the practice of Keynesian fiscal methods, many 
governments have resorted to the strategy of shifting from fixed to floating exchange 
rates, signaling the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system. Due to its inability to 
deal with the stagflation of the 1970s, many have articulated that Keynesianism is the 
primary cause of the economic crisis.9 Faced with the prospect of declining profits 
and rising interest rates, many large-scale firms sought way to restructure their 
production processes and balance their accounts by better utilizing their technological 
capabilities and exploiting the ongoing scientific innovations. Indeed, as Manuel 
Castells notes, “in periods of crisis the logic of capitalist development tends towards 
the reorganization of the bases for accumulation such that better and indeed new 
opportunities for accumulation can become possible in the future”.10 As a result, 
simultaneously with the breakdown of the post-war financial system, converging set 
of technologies in microelectronics, computing, telecommunications and optic-
electronics in the late 1960s and 1970s induced the eruption of an information 
technology revolution.11  
        The drastic technological advances in the information, transportation and 
communication sectors have rapidly reduced the cost of information processing12 and 
transformed the existing material culture with this new techno-economic paradigm. 
More importantly, these new developments have commercialized knowledge and 
increased the speed of its diffusion among various social groups, eroding the control 
of the state over their transfer channels.13 Altering the entire production mechanisms 
of the capitalist economies and the socio-economic and political relationship between 
capital and labor, information technology facilitated the transition from industrial to 
                                                
9
 Frans Buelens (ed.) Globalisation and the Nation-State, Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2000 p. 103 
10
 Manuel Castells, Techno-economic restructuring, socio-political processes and 
spatial transformation: A Global Perspective, in Jeffrey Henderson and Manuel 
Castells (eds.), Global Restructuring and Territorial Development, London: Sage 
Publications, 1987, p. 9  
11
 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture, vol III, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2001, p.367 
12
 Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, pp. 39 
13
 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, in Malcolm Waters (ed.), 
Modernity: Critical Concepts (vol IV), London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 
161-177 
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post-industrial society14 with the emergence of a new development mode of post-
industrialism.15 Under this new mode of development, source of productivity lies in 
the technological development oriented towards knowledge generation and 
information processing and communication.16 
         In the coming two decades, economies undergoing the process of transition into 
post-industrial stage have experienced an expansion of the service sector at the 
expense of the manufacturing sector with an extraordinary rise of professional, 
technical and managerial employment. Moreover, labor theory of value was replaced 
by knowledge theory of value relying on the primacy of human capital.17 The surge in 
transnational capital movements, exchange rates and credit flows, coupled with 
growing technological opportunities and management techniques, precipitated 
capitalism to undergo a period of restructuring characterized by greater flexibility in 
the production stages, resurgence of entrepreneurship18, decentralization of economic 
units, strengthening of capital vis-à-vis labor and global integration of financial 
markets. Peter Drucker notes that the multi-faceted transformation of capitalist 
economies of the industrial countries have facilitated the uncoupling of the primary-
products economy from the industrial economy, the uncoupling of the industrial 
production from employment and capital movements becoming the driving force of 
the economy.19 Moreover, the rise of a managerial or ‘soft capitalism’20 adopting a 
softer approach by taking advantage of the psychology literature to improve the 
management techniques,21  particularly based on the development of a management 
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know-how by business schools, management consultants and gurus.22 This had 
symbolized the demise of Fordism replaced by a new form of ‘flexible 
specialization’23 and altered the mass production system by decentralization.    
        The constructive and symbiotic relationship between the state and the market in 
the post-war period came under strain in accordance with the developments in the 
techno-economic realm that challenged the central and hierarchical economic units. It 
is inevitable that the dissolution of the central authority systems including the state 
agencies, and the erosion of the collective bargaining process between employers and 
employees through decentralization of all hierarchical political and social 
organizations loosened Keynesianism. This has paved the way for the emergence of 
monetarism with its claim that economies have a tendency for automatically self-
adjusting to full employment, so that any use of monetary or fiscal policy to reduce 
the unemployment beyond its natural rate generates inflation.24 Based primarily on the 
writings of Hayek in the post-war period and later popularized by neo-liberal 
economists of the Chicago School of Economics, among others Friedman and 
Buchanan, in the 1960s and 1970s, monetarism was more suitable to this period of 
capitalist restructuring,25 thanks to its pro-market premises. 
 1.2 The Emergence of New Right Hegemony 
         The neo-liberal paradigm has gradually restored the confidence towards the 
rationality of the markets and, thereby, challenged the central tenet of the Keynesian 
economics that free markets have a tendency to fail more frequently than the 
governments. Moreover, questioning the notion that the state is primarily responsible 
for the social welfare of the society, neo-liberal economists and policymakers aspired 
to uncouple the political duties of the state from the economic tasks it assumed over 
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the decades.26 The political priorities of the state shifted from the maximization of 
welfare to the promotion of the free market enterprises and the capital markets. The 
individualist and rationalist market-based model centered on a program of 
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of trade and destatisation of the economy 
rendered competitiveness at all levels of the society supreme.      
       Politics of the neo-liberal project devalued democracy as a political currency 
following the retreat of the welfare and developmental state models because market 
functions increasingly disable the state from interfering with the economic affairs of 
the society. Indeed, despite the efforts of a diverse coalition of pressure groups and 
political organizations to oppose liberalization measures to maintain a degree of 
protectionism, multinational companies and international investors have mostly 
succeeded in overcoming these obstacles and managing to level the playing field as to 
ensure same level of treatment for domestic and international actors in the economy.27 
In order to survive in a world of increasing trade, governing parties, regardless of their 
political affiliations, had to resort to the political mantra of competitiveness and 
follow the neo-liberal agenda. State-business-labor relations underwent profound 
changes by the rapid increase of international economic agents in the domestic market 
so that domestic firms were faced with heightened competition from outside without 
the opportunity of enjoying protection of the high tariffs.28   
        In conjunction with the new form of capitalism associated with the neo-liberal 
paradigm, United States and Europe have witnessed the rapid rise of the New Right 
politics, whose agenda has effectively developed a hegemonic discourse, stretching 
beyond the political sphere during the 1980s. The New Right ideology flourished in 
Western industrialized countries during the transition to post-Fordist model of 
production and came to fill the vacuum created by the hegemonic crisis of American 
liberalism29 which could not be addressed by any other political ideology, including 
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social democracy.30 New Right political movements sought to reverse the economic 
trend of the past thirty years by shrinking the role of the state in economic activities 
and transfer power from labor unions and political organizations sympathetic to their 
interests to corporations. The central political tenet of the new-right agenda is “the 
negative unity of the disempowerment of government” that stand on the way of the 
operation of the market by rolling back the frontiers of the welfare state and eliminate 
the institutions, ideas and practices which were put in place by the “post-war 
consensus” 31 or, in Thatcher’s words, “the progressive consensus” 32. Tracing their 
policies to the writings of influential neo-liberal thinkers such as F. A. Hayek and 
Milton Friedman, new right administrations aimed nothing short of limiting the state 
to the minimal and advocated extremely individualist and libertarian norms, sharply 
distinguishing them from the post-war conservatives. 1980s witnessed the emergence 
of a greater political space for free-market views and, indeed, have been the era of the 
conquest of conservatism by the ideas and doctrines of the New Right in a Gramscian 
fashion.33 In fact, the Socialist Mittterrand government that came to power in France 
in 1981 aspired to go on with the classical Keynesian model one more time - the so-
called "Keynesianism in one country" , which utterly failed and, even before going 
down, Mitterrand had to cut back on his economic policies. This last and instigating 
blow would suspend the electory road for most of the socialist parties in Europe in 
that decade.                   
       The rapid growth in worldwide trade and growing mobility of capital has 
undermined the autonomy of the domestic economies by connecting them to the web 
of global financial networks. The ascendancy of the free market mechanisms, 
symbolized under the slogan that ‘there is no alternative’, voiced frequently by 
Thatcher, came to be gradually accepted by governments, competing against one 
another to preserve their level of competitiveness.34 Hence, many industrial societies 
experienced a shift from the welfare state model to “competition state” which is 
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“aimed at making economic activities located within the national territory, or which 
otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international 
development terms”.35 Under this model, states could enhance the competitiveness of 
domestic firms more by indirect and infrastructural intervention than by subsidy or 
trade protection which has many macroeconomic repercussions in a global market 
economy.36 Welfare-state reform, deregulation of key sectors and 
recommodification37  of the labor market climbed up the agenda of governments in 
their efforts to improve the macroeconomic conditions and attract foreign 
investment.38  In light of these economic developments, public expenditures are not 
lowered to a great extent but the government resources are increasingly allocated to 
those services that enhance overall productivity and secure investment environment 
instead of the non-productive elements in social expenditure. The necessity of staying 
competitive in the world economy drew even the social democratic states into a race 
to the bottom in terms of social provision and the wages.39  
 
1.3 The New Labor and the End of Class Politics  
        The demise of Keynesianism and transition into a post-industrial mode of 
development signaled the disintegration of the rigid class structure and barriers of the 
industrial society and provided ample opportunities of social mobility. As a result, the 
dominant issues of the old political paradigm such as distribution, security and 
economic growth could no longer galvanize masses as in the 1960s and 1970s and 
came to replaced by issues related to body, health and sexual identity, ethnic and 
cultural heritage and environment. 40  Hence, political actions and processes began to 
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be increasingly decoupled from the production relations of the economy and thereby 
lost their class appeal. 41 Major segments of the new middle class grew uneasy with 
the continuous demands and the militancy of the labor unions since the 1970s42 and 
much preferred to tolerate some reductions in the welfare programs in return for 
experiencing a higher degree of economic instrumentalism and more economic 
opportunities. Moreover, welfare programs in the advanced industrialized societies 
achieved most of their objectives and provided masses with a decent standard of 
living, facilitating the emergence of a “culture of contentment”.43 This led some to 
argue that welfare state has been undermined by its own successes because those 
rising to the middle class conditions were less disposed to support the continuation of 
these programs. In addition, the rise of a post-industrial economy required a 
fundamental restructuring of the manufacturing sector by relocating the manufacture 
production away from the advanced industrial states to the newly-industrialized 
economies,44 while those jobs that were left were increasingly taken by immigrants. 
These changes in the techno-economic realm weakened the bargaining power of the 
trade unions, made it increasingly difficult to sustain solidarity among worker groups 
and thereby brought the era of electoral socialism to an end.45  
        Traditional working class parties across Europe experienced serious difficulties 
in appealing to the ’class-aware but not class-conscious’ segments of the new middle 
class and could not successfully compete with the neo-liberal parties that managed to 
base their campaign platforms on a popular version of this new middle class politics. 
These parties experienced successive election defeats against neo-liberal parties and 
removed from power in some countries for over a decade due to their failure to 
comprehend the complex changes in global economy and address the ensuing socio-
economic problems. Relying on the New Right hegemonic discourse, right has 
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become radical while the left generally assumed a conservative position, mostly 
struggling to preserve some of the functions of the welfare state. Hence, by the late 
1980s, it was clear that social democracy had to either revise its political program in 
accordance with the surmounting market challenges and the neo-liberal economic 
paradigm or face electoral defeat in successive elections to become relegated to the 
permanent opposition status. 46   
        Faced with the new-right challenge, social democratic parties came to the 
conclusion that old ways of doing politics by relying on a system of redistribution was 
no longer possible and maybe not even desirable.47 As a consequence, during the 
course of the 1990s, social democratic parties across the globe began to revise their 
strategies, programs and political agendas to cope more effectively with the recent 
economic developments and emerge as a viable alternative to the neo-liberal parties.48 
Many social democratic parties began to distance social democracy from the 
Keynesian welfare state model and establish a compromise or, in other words, find a 
Third Way to recognize some unavoidable economic developments without 
surrounding all principles.     
         The economic slowdown that followed the disintegration of the Bretton Woods 
system has particularly harmed developing countries that employed national 
development strategies centered on import substitution industrialization. The potential 
drawbacks of the import substitution model i.e. production of costly and outdated 
goods, corruption, over-bureaucratization, inefficiency and high inflation could no 
longer be ignored by the governments faced with fiscal, financial, industrial crises and 
runaway inflation.49 It is in this gloomy period characterized by devastating effects of 
the oil crisis in the 1970s and debt crisis in the 1980s that United States government 
together with IMF and World Bank, otherwise known as the Washington Consensus, 
advised these countries to adopt the neo-liberal agenda to integrate more closely into 
                                                
46
 For more information on the transformation of the Labor Party see Joshua 
Muravchik, Heavan and Earth The Rise and Fall of Socialism, San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, p. 301-320  
47
 John Gray, After Social Democracy, London: Demos, 1996 
48
 D. Held, Global Social Democracy, in Giddens, A. (ed.) The Progressive 
Manifesto, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003 
49
 Tom Kemp, Industrialization in the non-Western World, Harlow, Essex: Longman, 
1983 
 16 
the global economic order.50 To ensure a continuous flow of capital and service the 
outstanding debt, governments had to accept these reform demands of international 
finance institutions to introduce internal budget constraints, liberalize trade regime, 
ensure the convertibility of currency, and open the domestic market for foreign 
investment.51 Structural adjustment program they implemented under the aegis of 
IMF came to encourage policymakers in these countries to mitigate their economic 
problems such as budget deficits, imbalances in external accounts and high inflation 
by taking austerity measures, among them, including privatization and trade 
liberalization, which posed a counter-movement to the growth of the public sector in 
the post-World War II period.52 Moreover, as a condition of the grants they received 
from international monetary organizations, governments of developing countries were 
required to limit public spending on welfare programs, impose tight budgetary 
controls, privatization of services and tax cuts to shift the economy along the lines of 
neo-liberal economic doctrines.53 
1.4 The Collapse of the Centrally-Planned Economies 
       Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, state interventionism, 
whether in the form of centrally planned economies in Soviet Union and China or in 
the Keynesian model of social democratic system, was confronted with grave 
economic problems, as has already been mentioned, due to the demise of Fordist mass 
production process, escalating energy prices, stagflation and, labor militancy.54 While 
the Western economies had responded to these grave structural problems with market 
flexibility, technological innovation to raise the profit margins and disciplining of the 
market, centrally planned economies could not manage to survive. Failure to adapt to 
the rapid and unprecedented innovations and developments ensued by the techno-
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economic realm inflicted a large blow to centrally planned economic structure and 
facilitated the collapse of socialist regimes around the globe.55  
       Soviet system was based on a centrally planned economy that was primarily 
conducted by the administrative plans and decisions coordinated between planning 
agencies and ministries with no attention paid to the supply and demand relationship. 
The purpose of the planners was to undertake a very rapid economic growth based on 
the expansion of heavy industry and collectivization of agriculture which would 
squeeze the products of the peasants and ensure the flow of cheap products for the 
urban masses. Soviet economic policy-making was along the lines of Harrod-Domar 
model56 with its emphasis on the saving level and the capital-output ratio to generate 
economic development. Granted that the economic growth was attributed to the 
function of the size of capital and labor inputs with little room for productivity gains 
and technology innovations, sustainable economic growth could only be possible with 
continuous increases in capital or labor supply.57 Indeed, many economists have 
argued that the socialist experiment was doomed to collapse from the start due to the 
structural deficiencies of the economic model. Just three years after the October 
Revolution, in 1920, Ludwig von Mises, the Austrian neo-classical economist, argued 
that the system could not properly function because it lacked an adequate price 
mechanism necessary for generating knowledge and providing initiative to all the 
agents in the market.58  
       Despite proving effective in mobilizing resources on key industrial projects and 
generating very high growth rates in the initial stages of the modernization, the 
centrally planned economy began to face systemic dysfunctions in carrying out its 
economic plan, arising from bureaucratic rigidities and difficulties. The “cybernetic 
model” 59 of economic planning and regulation implicit in socialism, as Giddens 
notes, worked very successfully in the initial stages of industrialization during which 
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economic decisions of the state agencies could be effectively carried out. Theoretical 
objections developed by authors such as Mises and Hayek against the major 
limitations and dangers of central planning, centered on the importance of freely 
established monetary price for goods, as he notes, began to become valid following 
the information technology revolution which have restructured the entire production 
processes and, thereby, made successful planning an “epistemic impossibility”60 from 
1970s and onwards.61 
        By the beginning of the 1970s, Soviet economy had exhausted its labor and 
capital resources, experiencing declining productivity on both accounts; indeed, this 
had signaled the completion of the period of extensive economic growth. Abel 
Aganbegyan, the celebrated economic advisor of Gorbachev, attributes the slowdown 
in the economic growth, after three decades of rapid economic expansion, to the 
limitations of the industrialization program based entirely on the extensive use of 
capital and labor. 62 As the economy became more complex and diversified, both in 
terms of organization and production63 and a shift to intensive economic growth64 was 
absolutely necessary to upgrade production processes and raise productivity level of 
inputs through scientific and technology advances. The structural crisis faced by the 
Soviet Union with its many political, social and, more importantly, economic 
consequences was triggered by the inability of the Soviet economy to manage the 
transition to the new mode of development based on advancing information 
technologies in accordance with the process taking place in the rest of the world.65 
While the bulk of the manufacture production of capitalist economies shifted towards 
the fields of electronics, biotechnology and chemical products, Soviet economy had 
totally missed the revolution in the information sector66 and experienced an expansion 
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in the technology gap with the West. This mainly arose from the fact that its incentive 
structure was unable to encourage technological change and innovations.67 
         Moreover, aside from the structural deficiencies of the centrally planned 
economic model, Soviet economy had to deal with a number of exogenous factors 
such as the demise of Fordism, European recession triggered by the two oil shocks, 
reducing the bilateral trade volume and the changing foreign policy of the capitalist 
countries68, especially following the victory of Ronald Reagan in US presidential 
election in 1980. By adopting a more assertive and confrontational foreign policy and 
initiating an high-tech arms race, US president Ronald Reagan exposed the 
technological weakness of the Soviet Union and drained her economy by forcing her 
to increase military spending, which, according to David Lane, proved to be the “last 
straw that broke the back of the camel”.69 After coming to power, Gorbachev sought 
ways to reform the Soviet socialist regime and alleviate some of the structural 
problems and deficiencies of the economic order without changing the political 
structure by partially introducing some of the principles of the market economy. 
Gorbachev70 aimed to free the state enterprises from the heavy hand of government 
ministries, which plan every aspect of the production process, and give more 
autonomy to managers to encourage them to behave like private firms.71 
        Despite the introduction of the perestroika program and political liberalization, 
however, the stagnant Soviet economy failed to recover,72 plunging into a deep 
economic crisis with massive shortages, rising prices, and growing levels of 
unemployment,73 for many reasons not least the lukewarm support given to the 
reforms by a considerable number of the party nomenclature, top state bureaucracy 
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and state company managers, retrenching themselves in the state agencies.74 The 
relative liberalization of the economy has expanded the shadow economy with its 
cohort of mafia and corrupt officials, taking advantage of the new opportunities, and 
disorganized the planned economy even further.75 As a result, while the economic 
rationale of the socialist system was delegitimized, 76 the perestroika created “a kind 
of limbo economy” which worked neither like a functioning market system nor like a 
planned economy.77   
        Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms, entailing to provide development 
of a more pluralistic structure and the growth of markets, undermined the leading role 
of the party together with the system of central planning.78 Public dissatisfaction with 
the standard of living and deteriorating economic conditions has already paved the 
way for the legitimacy crisis of the socialist rule. This had encouraged the radical 
reformers to openly challenge Gorbachev administration and use the relatively liberal 
political environment to seek support of the people and even come to power through 
popular elections.79 Counter-culture against socialism, especially among the young 
generation, disillusioned with the increasing gap between the West and their countries 
and in search of a more democratic and pluralistic society led to the growth of civil 
society emerging to challenge the leadership of the communist party based on popular 
support and aim for the overthrow of the authoritarian regime. 80 The centrifugal 
pressures paved the way for the rise of the national awakenings across the Soviet 
Union, as primordial ethnic identities and national heritages have reemerged after 
decades of repression.81 The collapse of the communist party as an organization 
together with the disintegration of the Soviet Union82 have been triggered by the 
collapse of the centrally planned economy, which, as the proudest and most 
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impressive achievement of the communist party, was initially designated to avoid the 
chaotic, wasteful and dangerous competition of capitalism and facilitate rapid 
development of industrial production.83 
         The collapse of the Soviet Union came to affect politics at large as it signified 
that the recent socio-economic developments led the propelling forces of the French 
Revolution to worn itself out and bring about the end of organized, bureaucratic and 
centralized ideological movements. Moreover, the political events surrounding the 
demise of the Soviet regime signaled the end of Leninist party model designed around 
a hierarchical organizational structure and authoritarian decision-making process. 
Hence, the revival of the left depended on a new formulation of its ideological 
framework and political premises after the collapse of the “actually existing 
socialism”.84 Left political identity has been associated so far with homogeneity, 
equality and harmony but the coming challenge would be to transform these values to 
pluralism, difference and heterogeneity in the struggle against the ills of capitalism.85 
One proposed solution has been to redefine the left project as the extension of 
democracy not only limited to political relations but also incorporating demands of 
the new social movements and assume the function of an emancipator. This would 
give rise to a project of plural and radical democracy which is well suited to solve 
some of the newly emerging problems facing humanity.86 In other words, what is 
needed is to inherit a tradition of associational socialism linked with democratic and 
communitarian values.87 There is a growing need for socialist and social democrat 
parties to place more emphasis on preserving their differences and to adopt a more 
horizontal and pluralistic organization structures, enabling them to incorporate new 
issue groups to their membership profile. The most dramatic change has taken place 
in Spanish, Italian and French communist parties which have declared in the early 
1980s that they will no longer pursue attainment of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
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as a policy and target democratic stabilization,88 which gradually evolved in a new 
model called Mediterranean socialism. 
1.5 Globalization Phenomenon and the End of History 
          The collapse of the Soviet Union following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
erosion of the post-war consensus based on the notion of state interventionism and 
principle of national sufficiency in the early 1990s removed the two main barriers that 
have prevented further integration of world markets. The internationalization of 
capital and production processes were not only the driving mechanisms behind the 
drastic socio-economic and political changes of this coming era but also the 
constitutive element of globalization, otherwise known as ‘the new world order’. 
Catching the mood of this period, Francis Fukuyama, in his widely discussed article, 
relying on a Hegelian dialectic notion of social mechanisms, argued the ‘end of 
history’89 in which liberal democracy based upon capitalism is considered to have 
prevailed over its alternatives. The most radical aspect of globalization, however, as 
inherent in the following definition given by Giddens, is the new configuration it 
brought to the time-space relationship carried out by the significant advances in the 
transportation and communication sectors:  
       Globalization is “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vise versa”.90  
 
        This definition given for globalization closely resembles the one put forward by 
David Held who argues that globalization arises the speeding up of worldwide 
patterns of interconnectedness and stretching of connections, relations and networks 
between communities.91 It is no wonder that in both definitions the primary element 
of the globalization process is caused by the lowering of the unit cost and time of 
information transfer with respect to distance as a consequence of ‘time-space 
compression’. This “perpetual search to annihilate space through time”92 precipitated 
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globalization to denote universalizing properties to modernity in its encounters with 
institutions, beliefs systems and practices of not only the traditional society but also 
those of the modern society, containing a plethora of secular dogmas arising from the 
invention and reinvention of mass-mobilizing grand traditions. 93  Granted that 
modern world is configured through the combination of capitalism, industrialism and 
the nation-state model,94 also considering Marxism as a distinct version of 
modernity,95 globalization, as will be explained further in this chapter, represents the 
completion of modernity.96 
       This notion of globalization represents a break with the basic elements of 
modernity, structured around the intellectual premises of the Enlightenment project 
and implies the transformation of modernity either into the phase of post-modernity, 97 
as argued by many critical theorists and post-structuralists, or into a new phase of 
modernity, albeit in a more complex and radical form,98 defined by Beck and Giddens 
as the reflexive modernity. 99 Undertaken by a process of creative self-destruction, 
dissolving the contours of industrial society, reflexive modernization aspires to 
mobilize new socio-political groups affected by the individualization process and 
transforms modernity to better adapt the multi-faceted consequences of the 
globalization.100 Radicalization of modernity assumes the dynamism of modern 
institutions and shares the notion of human emancipation promoted by the early 
phases of modernity but not only to move away from the dogmatic aspects of tradition 
but also to become free of the existing constraints and rigidities of the modern age.101 
As the foundation of modernity, based upon the industrial-military complex and 
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concentrated organization of the labor force, is gradually replaced by more flexible 
and decentralized ties of the information age,102 old bureaucratic systems which have 
come to symbolize the rigidity and routinization of the modern age began to 
disappear. This makes room for more imaginative and creative social structures103 in a 
process characterized as “modernization coming to understand itself and the 
reflexivity inherent itself”.104 Although no single date could be given to mark the 
beginning of the processes of change redefining modernity and producing new social 
forms, the early phase of the transformation, according to Lash and Urry, began in 
Britain and USA around the end of 1960s, in France and Germany around the early 
1970s and in Sweden around the late 1970s and early 1980s.105 
       In the simple phase of the modern era, the primary function of the modern 
institutions has been to emancipate various groups from the dogmatic imperatives of 
pre-existing constraints such as tradition and religion; in other words, it has meant 
overcoming oppressive social relations through the use of a hierarchical notion of 
power.106 In a reflexively ordered environment, emancipation comes to mean 
autonomy, in a larger sense, both from the constraints of the tradition and the 
conditions of hierarchical domination, involving a politics of self-actualization and 
choice.107 This can only be provided by a shift from emancipatory politics to life 
politics referring to “radical engagements which seek to further the possibility of a 
fulfilling and satisfying life for all, and in respect of which there are no others”.108 
This effectively transforms modernization project into a process of human 
development. 109 
       As the foundational grounds on which modernity managed to develop its sense of 
certainty and hegemony began to break down in response to the complex changes in 
                                                
102
 Daniel Bell, The Axial Age of Technology Foreword in Daniel Bell, The Coming 
of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. [1973] 1999. NY: Basic 
Books, ix-cv  
103
 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, 29-32 
104
 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 48  
105
 S. Lash and J. Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity, 1987, p. 
7 
106
 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 210-213 
107
 Ibid., 214-215 
108
 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 156 
109
 Christian Welzel, Individual Moderinty, in Dalton, Russell J. And Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann (eds.), Oxford Hnadbook of Political Behaviour, Oxford: Oxford 
University Pres, 2006 (forthcoming) 
 25 
the techno-economic realm, a notion of ambivalence related to the emergence of a 
discursive void emerged to make room for the particularistic conflictualities110 to 
increasingly determine the political agenda and discourse of the late modern era. This 
development paved the way for the emergence of politics of identity and culture wars 
during which constructed identities became the primary factor of conflict, as seen in 
the ethnic warfare in the Balkans, the rise of political Islam mainly in the Muslim 
countries and the citizenship debates of the West. The theoretical framework of 
identity politics was partially constructed by postmodern discourse that situated itself 
as a radical critique of modernity as an anti-humanist emancipation project and called 
for a radical democratization of social relations based on the recognition of 
difference.111 On the other hand, feelings of powerlessness against an increasingly 
diverse and complicated world and the rapid value changes seek people to search for 
their roots in a transnational world in an attempt to find a place bound identity. This 
quest for security by the marginal segments of the population excluded from most of 
the benefits of the society need to be juxtaposed to the search of identity visible in the 
emerging social groups. It is only by a combination of two simultaneous social 
processes one can begin to understand the conflicts, risks and contradictions of the 
post-industrial society, which can no longer be resolved through political regulation, 
etatism and intervention of the bureaucratic authorities. 
         In this new era defined by increasing control of the market in daily life and 
weakening of the political systems engulfed in a structural crisis of legitimacy, a 
growing number of people feel disempowered, alienated and, more importantly, 
threatened by the coming challenges. This brave new world of uncontrolled and 
confusing change push many people to search for identity which becomes the 
fundamental source of social meaning as people increasingly organize their meaning 
around what they are rather than what they do.112 Especially following the collapse of 
Soviet Union, there was a significant shift in focus on political issues from ideology 
to culture and identity, which became a source of conflict among various groups, 
demanding recognition by the state. This increasing need for a sense of belonging 
provide groups with an incentive to ask for recognition and establish avenues for 
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politics of identity.113 The globalization of the capital, increasing interdependency of 
world markets and the rise of a diversified labor force arising from new economic 
opportunities at informal sectors of the economy have improved the socioeconomic 
conditions of some marginal groups in the workforce such as women, racial 
minorities and immigrants and elevated their status in society.114 These groups have in 
return used their newly acquired positions in the society to strengthen their cultural 
and political identities and demand the state to recognize them as distinct groups with 
equal status. 
      During this new environment of globalization, new social movements began to act 
as political agents in pursuit of new issues not reflected in the party programs and thus 
have undertaken, what Beck terms, a reinvention of politics.115 These new social 
movements engaged in ‘unconventional political participation’ sought to politicize the 
institutions of civil society at times in defiance of the representative-bureaucratic 
political institutions and thereby organized elite-challenging mass activities through 
their loosely knit networks. 116 Relying less on the communication channels of the 
current political institutions and mechanisms, these activists precipitated a rapid 
growth of civic action in many Western societies following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In response to the changing form of citizenship and notions of identity, the 
new social democrat ideology sought the recognition of cultural rights and active 
participation of these new groups in the political sphere. Hence through the 
accommodation of these diverse communities, social democratic parties managed to 
expand their electoral and social base and transformed the notion of social justice to 
gain a cultural component so that social democracy gradually evolved into 
participatory democracy with a commitment to the principles of multi-culturalism.117 
       Late modern era is characterized by a radical questioning of providential reason 
together with the recognition that the recent scientific and technological advances 
have reconfigured the parameters of risk and danger, while also offering new 
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opportunities for mankind. 118 This sharply contrasts with simple stage of modernity 
during which reason had become the driving force of all social and political life and 
certainty arising from science was paramount. 119 Social insurance mechanism of the 
welfare state, a security umbrella designed to alleviate risks arising from the market 
economy, can no longer address the hazards and risks of the new period in which the 
high-consequence dangers are not only human-made but also occur in a global scale. 
Thus, it is argued that in this new world order, global and uncontrollable systematic 
threats that are generated by people, firms, state agencies and politicians120, 
transgressing national boundaries, pose a universal challenge which can no longer be 
contained or solved by nation-states, which are anyway losing their ability to remain 
as the primary locus of security121. Beck argues this process to signify the transition 
from” the industrial society with institutions, which can neither monitor nor solve the 
ensuing problems, to the risk society, characterized by the return of uncertainty122 or 
the recognition of ambivalence. 123 It is at this point necessary to relate the emergence 
of risk society in response to the rise of post-industrial mode of development to the 
crisis of the nation state due to its inability to embody institutions which provide 
ontological security to the individuals. 
1.6 The Retreat of the Nation-State and the Global Crisis of Social Democracy                                                                  
       Globalization in the 1990s, as the ramification of a process initiated by post-
modernist and post-structuralist arguments, has put the nation-state model developed 
as part of the modernization project by the 16th century124 under a critical questioning 
and led many to reconsider alternative political designs for the new international 
regime. Their proponents of this view argue that nation-state has become an 
inadequate unit for organizing human activity and managing the complex and 
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interdependent ties between societies.125 While it is difficult to argue that nation-states 
will collapse in the existing world order, though there are many who would prefer a 
universal government to emerge, their sovereignty is considerably limited in 
accordance with the erosion of the centralizing state structure linked with the notions 
of citizenship, national culture and, even, territoriality. Hence, in light of the socio-
economic developments and technological changes, the nation-state model, in charge 
of undertaking the welfare of the society, defending the borders, regulating the 
economy and managing the fiscal affairs, have begun to be transformed into post-
sovereign state.126 Although state agencies continue to regulate political, social and 
economic activities using all the resources at their disposal, they have to determine 
their policies within the rules of the new global order, taking into consideration the 
complex processes and transnational linkages of the rapidly globalizing financial 
markets. 127  Hence, governments are increasingly forced to cede some of their 
sovereignty128 and share power with multinational companies, transnational bodies 
and non-governmental organizations which are struggling to fill the vacuum129 at the 
heart of the international political economy.130 This competition between inter-
governmental institutions, multinational corporations and national governments is not 
yet determined, contributing to the gradual increase of the ungovernance, resulting in 
the “progressive loss of real authority” in international politics.131 Indeed, there has 
been a recent trend in international relations field to construct a new international 
system, 132 which would move beyond the static nation-state model and thereby get 
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out of the “philosophical discourse of modernity”133 by demonstrating its historically 
constructed nature. 
        Indeed the fundamental problem for the social democrat parties has been the 
notion that nation state has lost its centrality as the political, cultural and economic 
regulator of societal affairs.134 These parties have been negatively affected by this 
development as their post-war programs have relied on the practice of forging 
national settlements by which governments tie capital into corporatist arrangements 
with the trade unions in order to receive a favorable outcome for the working classes. 
The ability of the social democratic governments to control national economies and 
deliver an extensive system of social security to citizens is challenged by the 
heightening mobility of capital and growing interdependency between economic 
units.  In response social democratic parties began to formulate the framework of an 
effective and democratic state which transcends the liberal minimal state and manages 
to regulate the market as much as removing some of its negative consequences.135 
        In conclusion, the complex changes occurring in the techno-economic realm 
since the late 1960s exhausted the Keynesian model by revealing its deficiencies and 
paved the way for the rise of a new mode of development, gradually creating the 
foundations of post-industrial stage. This technological revolution, otherwise known 
as the Third Industrial Revolution, profoundly affected the social democratic ideology 
by challenging its premises based on the notion of modernity, Keynesian welfare 
model and nation-state system. This fundamental challenge weakened the traditional 
base of the social democratic parties, temporarily distanced them from the electorate 
and in many countries removed them from power. The prospect of social democracy 
was maintained only with a revisal of the ideological framework and political agenda 
of these parties in the 1990s.  
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                                                       CHAPTER 2 
                THE CRISIS OF STATISM: A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
 
      A new model of capitalist development linked with a reorganization of the 
production processes have been put forward in the industrialized capitalist countries, 
as explained in the previous chapter, but rapidly transferred to the rest of the world 
through the global use of capital by means of transnational organizations. This global 
restructuring of the capitalist system revealed the weaknesses of import substitution 
strategy of the Turkish economy in accordance with the national development 
schema, exhausting the economic capabilities of the country in the late 1970s. These 
developments brought Turkish economy to the brink of collapse and rendered an 
economic policy change urgently necessary. Hence, January 24 structural adjustment 
program and the neo-liberal agenda put in place by the military administration and, 
later, followed by the Motherland governments in that decade brought the demise of 
statism, driving leftist politics into a deep-rooted political crisis. However, unlike its 
western counterparts, mainstream Turkish leftist parties failed to undertake a 
programmatic renewal of their ideology and could not revive alternative policies to 
the new-right hegemony prevailing in the government. Hence, this chapter explores 
the multi-faceted changes that have occurred in Turkey since the late 1970s and 
analyze the formation and development of the center-right parties under this new form 
of global capitalism. Moreover it explores the resulting developments within the left 
of the political spectrum and observes how social democrats, in general, and SDPP, in 
particular, reacted to these developments.   
2.1 The Disintegration of Import Substitution Model 
        Statism corresponds to a socio-political system based on the allocation of the 
economic surplus produced in society by the power holders in the state apparatus with 
the goal of power-maximization.136 Hence it promotes the state as an active agent of 
change and facilitates intervention to a great number of social, economic and cultural 
issues. Indeed many developing countries in the previous decades came to experience 
statist experiments with the purpose of filling the void caused by the weakness of the 
urban bourgeoisie and undertaking a rapid process of socioeconomic and political 
                                                
136
 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture, vol III, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2001, p. 8 
 31 
development to ensure national sovereignty, industrial development, high literacy and 
alleviation of poverty.137 The commanding position that the state enjoyed in the 
Turkish economy was a direct consequence of the etatist138 policies of the 1930s, 
when the republican leaders prepared an interventionist economic program in 
response to the growing recession139 but statism in Ottoman-Turkish polity could be 
traced back to the bureaucratic coalition led by the modernizing Ottoman sultans in 
the Tanzimat period. The strength of the Ottoman bureaucracy, absorbed to the ranks 
of the republican elites, possessing a very strong ethos to command the fate of the 
nation and the absence of a bourgeoisie perpetuated the existence of vertical links 
between the state and the masses.140  
        This strong, centralized and bureaucratic state141 inherited by the republican 
regime was kept intact to be used for the political and cultural reforms imposed to the 
society. Moreover, influenced by the writings of Friedrich List142 and the school of 
German national economy and the rapid economic development of Japan, the 
republican elites continued the economic policies of their predecessors who 
emphasized the necessity and importance of the creation of a Turko-Muslim 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.143 Etatist policies during this period were 
pursued in an instrumental fashion to strengthen the statist structure directed by the 
upper echelons of the military and civilian bureaucracy whose legitimacy was derived 
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from their ability to ensure national development.144 Statism in the Turkish context, 
however, should not be perceived solely in its capacity to determine the economic 
affairs but rather in its aim to construct a political framework which would establish 
the autonomy of the state against all political and social groups constrained by the will 
of the strong bureaucracy in the absence of a strong class structure.145  
          State intervention in economic affairs became more pronounced and visible 
following 1960 coup with the adoption of a planned economy that financed import 
substitution industrialization. Under this model, the regulation of investment and 
distribution of resources were primarily organized by the State Planning Agency on 
the basis of popular consent around the goal of national development.146  Serving as 
the primary component of etatism, import substitution policies targeted the goal of 
rapid industrialization and self-sufficiency in consumer durables. It was planned that 
the state economic enterprises would produce their way out of their initial debt and 
produce enough surplus to finance their investment scheme and, in due process, 
expand the overall economy by providing enough work opportunities for the masses 
and redistributing wealth to various social groups. This was conducted by an inter-
class alliance between various socio-economic groups that benefit from economic 
growth, full employment and redistribution of resources to alleviate economic misery 
and poverty.  
       After high levels of growth experienced in 1960s and early 1970s, these 
enterprises147 could no longer stay productive and competitive and as a result 
accumulated crippling debts which were assumed by the government.148 One primary 
factor behind the low performance of these enterprises was the fact that they have 
become employment sources for political parties which, especially from 1973 
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onwards, exercised unrestrained patronage and high levels of nepotism and filled the 
ranks of the bureaucracy with partisan members in a process Kalaycioglu described as 
“amoral partyism”149. In addition, high-level civil servants were frequently replaced 
by the governing parties seeking to achieve closer control of the state apparatus.150 
Rapid growth of the industrial production required the import of large quantities of 
technological equipment and thereby raised the dependency on international markets 
for the continuous flow of these goods which exacerbated the trade balance and the 
value of the domestic currency. Faced with growing budget deficit and high levels of 
import bills, particularly aggravated by two oil shocks during the 1970s, Turkish 
economy experienced the most severe payment crisis of the Republican period151 
followed by a collapse of its creditworthiness in international markets.152 Indeed this 
decade has been marked by all the signs of a systemic breakdown including political 
unrest, erosion of governmental authority, civil violence arising from sectarian and 
ideological differences, recession and drastic shortages. All the economic signs 
indicated the necessity of transforming the Turkish economy to solve the balance of 
payments crisis and reduce the overall national debt and the budget deficit before 
import-substitution model would totally collapse.153 
          The turning point came with the adoption of the stabilization program154, also 
known as the January 24 decisions, by the JP government under the aegis of IMF and 
World Bank155 in order to address the problem of chronic shortages and fix the 
                                                
149
 In Heper, The State Tradition, p. 114 cited from Ersin Kalaycioglu, Elite Political 
Culture and Regime Stability: The Case of Turkey (paper represented at the 
conference on ‘the Centennial of Mosca’s Theory of the Ruling Class’ at the Northern 
Illiniois University. Dekalb, Illinois, September 7-9, 1981) p. 20. 
150
 William Hale, The political and economic development of modern Turkey, 
London: Croom Hell, 1981, p. 200 
151
 Henry Barkey, The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey, Boulder: 
Westview, 1990 
152
 A. Cecen, S. Dogruel and F. Dogruel, Economic Growth and Structural Change in 
Turkey 1960-88, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1994, 
p. 44  
153
 Ziya Onis, Turgut Ozal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-liberalism in 
Critical Perspective, unpublished paper, 2004, p. 9 
154
 For a critical assesment of the stabilization program, see Korkut Boratav 
Contradictions of Structural Adjustment: Capital and the State in Post–1980 Turkey, 
in edited by Ayse Oncu, Caglar Keyder and Saad Edin Ibrahim, The American 
UNiversity in Cairo Press, Cairo, p 155-173 
155
 For a more detailed discussion of the support given to the Turkish stabilization 
program by World Bank and IMF, see Peter Wolff, Stabilization Policy and Structural 
 34 
structural deficiencies of the Turkish economy.156 The primary essence of the program 
was to restructure Turkish economy by shifting from an import-substitution to a 
growth-led and export-oriented strategy. 157 The new economic model aimed to 
reduce the inflation rate and ease the balance of payment difficulties in the short run 
and restructure the economy to finance sustainable growth in the long run. However it 
also challenged primary aspects of the etatist model which has served as the driving 
force of the Kemalist modernization project and sought to reduce the scale of state 
intervention in the economy. The political implications of this new economic strategy, 
as Kahraman rightly argues, indicated that Justice Party has finally proclaimed its 
preference for the urban bourgeoisie instead of the provincial powers.158 The new 
position of the Justice Party vis-à-vis the class structure of the Turkish society 
triggered a modest transition to economic liberalism replacing statism. However, this 
ambitious goal seemed difficult to be achieved under the contemporary power 
structure in the Grand Assembly and within the democratic political order due to 
popular backlash. And it is under these circumstances that the military stepped up to 
assume its new role.159 
        The military authorities have undone the work of their predecessors and removed 
most of the socio-economic gains made by the masses which included smashing the 
domestic coalition arrangements taken under the import-substitution model.160 
Concerned with the excessive politicization of the citizen body that extended beyond 
the restrictive legal/constitutional and political/cultural environment, the generals 
assumed that task of reconstructing the transcendental state. Anti-democratic 
measures taken by the military administration removed all opposition groups to the 
January 24 adjustment program and restored the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis 
various segments of the society. Taking advantage of the stable political environment 
and the degree of autonomy, Ozal, Minister of Economics, undertook the difficult but 
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long-waited task of disintegrating the corporatist elements of the state and was 
assisted by massive financial support from abroad161 and ranks of the military.162 
2.2 The Rise of the Turkish New-Right 
        The representative of the New Right movement in Turkey was the Motherland 
Party163 which, in accordance with the global economic trends and relying on the 
political framework and constitutional structure imposed during the coup period, 
managed to stay in power between 1983 and 1991 and should be considered as the 
constitutive agent of the era.164 MP, as the party of the New Right, initiated a political 
campaign to solve the ongoing hegemonic crisis of the Turkish economy 
characterized by the collapse of the political order in pre-1980 period, struggle 
between extreme right and left organization, growth of social democracy and the 
inability of parties to express the economic-corporate interests of the bourgeoisie.165 
In other words, MP administration sought to establish an expansive hegemony in 
Turkish politics by forging a coalition cutting across the fundamental cultural 
cleavages in Turkish society based on a synthesis of liberalism, far right nationalism, 
Islamism and social democracy. Due to the deteriorating economic conditions and 
ideological feebleness of the bourgeoisie no such hegemony could be formed by 
center-right parties before the implementation of the stabilization program in the 
previous decades.                  
         Following the establishment of civilian politics and multi-party democracy in 
November 1983 elections, MP government continued to press for the reforms in the 
stabilization program and accelerated the pace of the transition to a market-oriented 
economy by undertaking trade and capital-account liberalization successively in 
                                                
161
 For more information on the issue of the 1980 program and the size of 
international financial support see Ziya Onis, State and Market: The Political 
Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective, Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 
1998, p. 125-148 
162
 For the political background of the 1980-1983 period, see Muammer Yasar Pasalar 
Politikasi İstanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1990 and Yalcin Dogan Dar Sokakta Siyaset 
(1980-1983) İstanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1985 
163
 For a detailed analysis of the MP and Ozal’s personal dominance of the party in 
the 1980s, see Ersin Kalaycioglu, “The Motherland Party: The Challenge of 
Institutionalization in a Charismatic Ledera Party”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
Spring 2002, p 41-61. 
164
 Kahraman, The Making, 191 
165
 Muharrem Tunay, The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony, in A. Eralp, 
M. Tunay and B. Yesilada (eds.) The Political and socioeconomic Transformation of 
Turkey, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993, p. 17-8 
 36 
December 1983 and January 1984.166  The first term of the MP government in the 
1983-87 period witnessed rapid economic development, generated by high levels of 
GDP growth and an export boom167 thanks to repression of relative prices of 
agricultural goods and the disciplining of the labor market. The successful 
implementation of the structural adjustment program168 was also ensured by the 
unique role played by Turgut Ozal169 within the course of the 1980s, first serving as a 
technocrat under the Demirel minority government and the military administration 
until his resignation and later emerging as a charismatic politician after the transition 
to civilian politics.170 His professional background, involving an exposure to public, 
private and international organizations enabled him to possess the necessary 
experience and know-how to undertake crucial reforms and proved highly essential in 
generating confidence among international as well as domestic financial community 
on behalf of his economic agenda. Indeed, Ozal171 with his effective leadership has 
been instrumental in directing the whole economic process, albeit a brief interval, 
generating the support of the international financial community and developing a high 
level of trust with a sizeable part of Turkish society.172 The electoral success of MP 
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during this period was also due to the novel election system that was formulated, 
which favored the emergence of single party governments. Thus although the first 
signs of decline were coming after 1985, the MP, was able to secure its place by 
adding other new measures onto the system, such as the new local district threshold. 
The economic liberalism of the Turkish right is still replete with crony and illegal 
policy applications in market governance, putting an even harder burden on the 
Turkish economy. In other words, Turkish politics has yet to see a truly liberal party 
that also incorporates political liberalism next to market economy.  
        A number of holding companies which has accomplished a diversified grip on a 
range of commercial, financial and industrial activities in the 1970s stood to gain from 
the liberal economic environment and became the driving force of the export boom 
during this period. 173 Liberalization of trade and capital markets facilitated the 
strengthening of the bourgeoisie and witnessed the rise of a group of entrepreneurs 
with pragmatic values, benefiting from the liberal economic environment and relying 
on market opportunities to financially grow. Indeed, Turkish bourgeoisie, a creation 
of the Turkish state after a slow and ambivalent process, made a genuine attempt to 
achieve political and ideological emancipation from the control of the state. 
Furthermore, Turgut Ozal’s moderate Islamic leanings enabled him to enjoy close 
relations with the small and middle size Anatolian businesses operating increasingly 
outside the control of the state and paved the way for the emergence of “a 
countercultural bourgeoisie class with Anatolian roots” by developing a synthesis 
between the pragmatism of the market order and their traditional and religious values. 
174
 The developments in post-1980 Turkey, according to Ahmet Evin, reflect the 
disappearance of the chief cultural cleavage between the center and periphery and 
witnessed the rise of a class-based society parallel with the replacement of the long 
tradition of distributive patrimonialism with market economy.175 Hence, MP has 
managed to restructure center-right politics and change the parameters of Turkish 
politics through a combination of moderate political discourse, a pragmatic 
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engineering ideology, and conservative social values. 176 Thus liberalization remained 
on the political agenda for the rest of the decade and especially affected right wing 
politics in Turkey that has historically been statist, traditional and collectivist.  
       On the other hand, 1980 coup and the political events that followed fragmented 
left of the political spectrum and rendered a restructuring of the existing organizations 
necessary. Indeed in direct contrast to the mainstream right, the left entered the 
decade in catastrophic conditions, plagued with divisions and rupture between 
prominent politicians who were left without a party after the dissolving of RPP by the 
military junta. The situation became even more dramatic when Bulent Ecevit in the 
immediate aftermath of his resignation from the chairman of RPP told his Party 
Council members that RPP had completed its mission as a bourgeoisie party and that 
he feels responsibility neither for the party nor for its administrative bodies.177 This 
statement signaled the beginning of a division among the ranks of the left as the two 
groups parted ways to go on their separate paths that were to never cross again. In 
addition Ecevit’s decision to distance himself from the former members of RPP was 
interpreted as leaving the leftist cause in turmoil and put those who had taken place in 
the ranks of RPP in disarray.178  
        The first party to be founded on the left by the consent and, probably, insistence 
of the Council members was the Populist Party headed by Necdet Calp, a former 
cabinet secretary of Ismet Inonu during his last prime minister term.179 However PP 
was not able to gather most of the politicians, active in RPP during the pre-coup era to 
its ranks due to its conciliatory attitude towards the generals.180 As a result most of the 
important politicians, cadres and grassroots activists of former RPP gathered together 
to form a new party under the title Social Democracy Party, embracing the legacy of 
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RPP but also, for the first time in the history of Turkish left,181 emphasizing the 
principle of social democracy as a symbolic move to balance the hegemony of the 
neo-liberal agenda.182 However in the party program the references were rarely 
directed to the universal principles of social democracy but mostly to the parochial 
populist elements with the purpose of reflecting the bureaucratic opposition to MP 
parties. Banned from participating in the 1983 elections, SDPP made a very 
successful entry into Turkish politics in 1984 local elections in which it managed to 
receive 23,4 percent share of the votes against 8,8 percent of PP and won over two 
hundred munipalities mostly in the traditional strongholds of RPP. In the following 
months, due to the fact that it was not represented in the parliament, SDP focused on 
its local activities and ran a very active opposition campaign from the grassroots level 
by organizing publicized trips of chairman Erdal Inonu to SDP controlled 
municipalities across the country.183  
          The effective political strategies of SDP and the declining popular support for 
PP made it easier for both parties, originating from the same ideological source and 
historical heritage, to unite for carrying out a stronger opposition movement against 
the Motherland government. The merging of the two parties took place on November 
3, 1985 under the name of Social Democratic Populist Party,184 thereby creating the 
main opposition party to MP both in national and local level, but only after serious 
opposition from some SDP politicians who considered PP to lack grassroots cadres 
and effective local organizations necessary for showing a real political character.185 
As the main opposition party, SDPP worked to normalize the political system, 
undertake a democratization movement and liberalization of the 1982 Constitution by 
seeking gradual improvements.186 SDPP was further strengthened by the entry of a 
large number of former RPP politicians into the new party, contributing to the 
perception that SDPP was the successor of RPP in the new political landscape. The 
celebrated merger between the parties, however, proved to be an inhibiting factor for 
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the development of social democratic ideals within Turkish left since the new party 
had to inherit the principle of six arrows from the PP programme.187 The 
establishment of SDPP, however, did not end the fragmented structure of leftist 
politics as Ecevit and his friends founded the Democratic Left Party on November 14, 
1985 after more than three years of grassroots restructuring going back to his days in 
Arayis journal.188 In sharp contrast to SDPP with its close relations with the 
intelligentsia and based on urban support, DLP was a sui generis party, hoping to 
depend upon the charisma and cult personality of Ecevit who, accusing the former 
RPP cadres for intervening between him and the masses, attempted to develop a new 
organizational model with a weak party organization.  
2.3 The Emergence of Civil Society 
         Economic reforms associated with the structural adjustment program shifted the 
center of gravity from the state to the society by developing an autonomous social 
sphere189 and contributed to the liberalization of socio-economic, political and cultural 
activities. MP,190 as the initiator of this process, was more successful than its rivals in 
seizing the political opportunities of the post-1980 era and interpreting the complex 
socioeconomic and political changes taking place both in the domestic and 
international contexts. Among the new parties formed, as Ayse Ayata notes, only MP 
could incorporate the new social and economic groups into its party network and rely 
upon the societal cleavages flourishing thanks to the liberal economic environment.191 
In that sense, MP managed to mobilize a large part of the electorate in the 1980s in 
accordance with its search for a more civil oriented politics and developed a new 
discourse whose basic tenets consisted of decentralization, debureaucratization and 
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destatism.192 The destatism in Turkey, in spite of all its inadequacies and limitations 
managed to change the parameters of the Turkish right wing politics and provided it 
with a liberal basis.193  
        In accordance with the anti-bureaucratic campaign linked with the smaller state 
demands of global capitalism, the liberal economic program of Ozal argued in favor 
of large scale privatization of state economic enterprises and decentralization of the 
state and made efforts to bolster civil society, representing a sharp break from the 
traditional Ottoman-Turkish polity. Many intellectuals in the post-1980 era accused 
this statist tradition as the main obstacle for democratization and began to consider 
civil society as a counterforce to the dominant authoritarian which could strengthen 
the democratic system by developing a civic culture in contrast to the dominant 
militaristic one.194 In response to the September 12 period, which silenced and 
repressed an otherwise highly politicized and polarized society, social movements in 
the Turkish context saw the establishment of civic groups as the best way to organize 
against the illiberal regime within the strict limits of the undemocratic 1982 
constitution.  In the past, absence of associational organizations that could serve as a 
buffer zone between social classes and the state apparatus prevented the bureaucratic 
elites from their “lingering fear”195  that particular interests of social classes and 
associative groups could threaten both the unity of the nation and the authority of the 
state.196  
       Greater economic autonomy enjoyed by the liberalization of the economic system 
altered the power balances in the society and contributed to the emergence of new 
civil societal groups, among them women, veiled students, ecologists, feminists and 
homosexuals, bringing new issues into the public sphere.197 What fueled this trend 
was paradoxically the decision of the military administration to dismantle the 
corporatist system and leave economic matters to the representatives of the civil 
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society.198 Swift continuation of the structural adjustment program expanded the 
managerial and professional groups in society and strengthened the urban bourgeoisie 
in search of an autonomous public sphere separate from the state. Pragmatic approach 
of MP to economic and political affairs shifted the main focus of politics from 
ideology to policy so that in the 1980s the search for utopias that resulted in 
ideological combativeness and confrontation came to an end.199 Shaken by the 
authoritarian practices of the September 12 coup period and the dramatic political 
events that followed, many political activists in these ideological movements came to 
embrace democracy and the importance of civilian rule.   
2.4 Unorthodox Liberalism             
         Aiming to rapidly transform the Turkish economy into a full-fledged market 
economy along the lines of influential neo-liberal thinkers such as Buchanan and 
Hayek, advocating the limitation of the power of representative institutions in order to 
make addition room for the functioning of the free market, Ozal preferred to rule 
based on cabinet decrees even in very important policy matters.200 His government 
style, reminiscent of Latin American presidents, contained strong elements of 
personal rule through decrees based upon the use of populism and had the tendency to 
underestimate the necessity of developing a strong legal and institutional 
infrastructure for a well-functioning market economy.201 His distaste for classical 
bureaucracy with its etatist mindset and anti-reformist bias202 resulted in a high 
number of intra-bureaucratic conflicts and persuaded him to recruit US-trained 
Turkish specialists living abroad and appoint them to key positions in the public 
sector in an attempt to generate loyalty among bureaucrats.203 As a result, the reform 
process came to be associated with a weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus without 
substantially reducing the considerable control state had over economic affairs. 
                                                
198
 Heper, The State Tradition, 140 
199
 Gole “Toward an Autonomization”, 213-222 
200
 Onis, Turgut Ozal and his Economic Legacy, 13 
201
 Ibid., 2-3 
202
 On Ozal’s criticisms of the Turkish bureaucracy, see Turgut Ozal, Turgut Ozal’in 
Anilari, pp. 115-118 and Aytekin Yilmaz, ‘Turk Burokrasi Gelenegi ve Ozal’, in 
Sezal and Dagi (eds.), Kim Bu Ozal? Siyaset, Iktisat, Zihniyet, p. 89-101 
203
 Andrew Mango, The Turks Today, London: John Murray Publishers, 2004, p. 85  
 43 
       In contrast to the rhetoric of economic liberalism that dominated the political 
process in the 1980s, Ozal’s policies contained a number of unorthodox elements204 
such as weak commitment to democracy, rule of law and privatization. Instead of 
being constrained with the orthodox policies of the neo-liberal economic program, 
MP governments considered deregulation, privatization and market liberalization not 
as ends in themselves but primarily as means to strengthen the state fiscally and to 
revive the public sector enhancing their political objectives.  Arising from the 
particular socio-economic and political conditions of Turkey in the 1980s, MP had 
failed to carry out all aspects of the new-right agenda and could only transform some 
elements of the Turkish polity. Destatism and debureaucratization were not taken to 
its natural limits and in fact state’s power to create advantages and enhance the 
positions of individual business groups has been more extensive in this period than 
any other before under the protectionist/interventionist phase. Faced with a weak 
domestic capital205  market in the absence of small investors, Ozal could not resort to 
popular capitalism as in developed countries to promote privatization and rely on the 
electorate to carry out his neo-liberal agenda.206 Moreover, aside from the limitations 
of the Turkish economy, Ozal was possibly concerned with the social consequences 
of privatization as no theory of labor markets can predict the extent and length of 
unemployment following privatization programs.207   
       Some of the earlier cases of successfully implemented privatization programs 
were experienced in countries under military regimes such as Chile and Bangladesh 
but in the late 1980s that option was no longer viable in Turkey. Established during 
the early republic years, SEEs were highly popular among the bureaucratic elite, who 
saw them as a part of the broader project of national development and a heritage of 
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the Ataturk era. Hence, state enterprises were supported by a wide coalition that 
contained the organized labor, managerial and civil service elites and even some of 
the prominent members of the private sector. Members of the state-led import-
substituting industrialization coalition whose entrenched interests were harmed by its 
replacement with a relatively liberal economic regime centered on the export-oriented 
strategy such as the established labor unions, state managers and civil servants were 
the primary supporters of SDPP and shaped the economic policies of the party. 
Nevertheless SDPP seen as the party of the state could not gain any momentum but 
instead seemed as the conservative party when compared with MP which under the 
leadership of Ozal used the motto of ‘skipping to a new age’ (cag atlamak) and gained 
the support of the masses by presenting a new vision. A passion for economic growth, 
rapid technological upgrading, new opportunities created within the society and the 
disdain towards the political polarization and ideological conflicts of the 1970s, 
summarized by Can Kozanoglu as “English, computer, fear and dream”,208 ensured 
the continuation of MP administration despite many allegations of corruption and 
patronage for nearly a decade. In other words, lacking this pragmatism necessary to 
come to power and unable to follow the techno-economic developments around the 
globe, SDPP could not achieve the opportunity of testing its ideology in practice and 
continued to be associated with the economic failure of the RPP-led government 
between 1978 and 1979. As a result it could be purported that SDPP in 1980s and 
even in 1990s was more cultural than ideological and more tactical than strategic.209 
DLP, on the other hand, felt the need to differentiate itself from SDPP and moved 
away from the “old-fashioned” principles and views in economic policy.210  
         While some minor programs often associated with privatization such as the 
liquidation of publicly owned assets, the sale of minority shares in private enterprises 
owned by the state and the deregulation of private activity were undertaken by MP 
governments, mostly at the insistence of Turgut Ozal himself, full scale privatization, 
translated as the transfer of ownership from the public sector to private hands of state 
companies, could not be accomplished. The primary achievements of the structural 
adjustment program was limited to reducing the budget deficits incurred by state 
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enterprises in accordance with fiscal austerity measures and, thereby, restrain the 
heavy burden previously placed on the Turkish economy.211 Therefore, arguably there 
was no urgent need for leftist parties to fully adopt social democratic ideology in 
opposition to MP because full scale industrialization was only a very recent 
phenomenon and its exploitative aspects on working masses have been tamed by the 
legal requirements of the patrimonial state in the past.212 In other words, as Ismail 
Cem eloquently puts it, the socio-economic conditions of social democracy did not 
exist in Turkey at the time.213 Thus the quest for developing a social democratic 
movement then could not be based on objective material conditions but instead on its 
moral and practical necessity. As a result RPP-SDPP tradition has been historically 
more concerned with the goal of preserving the superstructure, containing all the 
political and cultural reforms of the republican era but failed to materialize their 
socio-economic requirements.214 This was a primary factor behind the orthodox 
attitude of these parties seen in their inability to develop pragmatism that came to 
characterize DP-JP-MP/TPP tradition.215  
         The social costs of the stabilization program, which managed to reduce the 
inflation rate by slowing down the economic growth, turned out to be very severe for 
some segments of the society.216 In the 1980s workers have experienced significant 
declines in their standard of living due to reductions in their real wages despite the 
fact that productivity level and interest payments rose proportionately similar to many 
other developing countries going through structural adjustment programs with the 
supervision of IMF.217 Hence, thanks to the restrictive labor environment and MP 
government’s pursuit of the neo-liberal paradigm which subscribe wage restraint to 
raise international competitiveness, the flourishing bourgeoisie scored large gains 
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against the workers. This was, as Boratav notes, “the counter-attack of the capital” 
long waited by the urban bourgeoisie.218 Lacking the organizational resources to resist 
the neo-liberal policies of the government, most of the labor unions during this period 
resembled corrupt shells with their highly hierarchical and corporatist structures and, 
thus, have been noteworthy for their absence.219 They were unable to protect the 
benefits of social pacts which were previously established without any serious 
confrontation with the private or public employers in the 1970s. Moreover, highly 
bureaucratized process of collective bargaining and the strike procedure as well as the 
restrictive environment overseen by the 1982 Constitution broke their resistance.220  
       The disintegration of import-substitution model did not by default reduce the 
dependency of the labor unions on the corporatist framework of the state, which, as 
the main employer of union members, could still distribute a huge array of benefits at 
its disposal. The commanding position enjoyed by the state in the economic arena 
furnished the governments with ample opportunities to secure the political support 
and loyalty of the working masses by offering them employment and wages higher 
than the level of the private sector.221  Therefore labor unions could not easily tolerate 
opposing the government. This had stripped the unions from the possibility of 
developing radical tendencies and contributed to the continuation of bread and butter 
unionism which concentrate efforts on economic issues, namely job security and high 
wages, and hampered the development of the political consciousness of the working 
masses. This had created a labor sector which “was co-opted, controlled and induced 
to stay out of high politics, and which gave priority to job-unionism”.222 Enjoying its 
dominance over the unionized workers thanks to legal and political restrictions on 
other unions, Turk-Is, for example, preserved its cordial relations with the MP cabinet 
following the 1983 elections, making special efforts to not exceed the boundaries of 
legalism in its activities.  
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      In that sense throughout the decade SDDP leadership sought the reversal of Ozal’s 
policies that limited the political and economic functions of the state and aimed to 
recover the ground taken by the bourgeoisie at the expense of workers and civil 
servants. However due to the existence of the patronage system, which established 
dependency between, on one hand, the state and the unions and, on the other, the 
union leader and the workers,223 SDPP did not enjoy the full support of the labor 
unions and had to wait until the end of the 1980s to experience a huge inflow of 
workers into the ranks of the party. The close relationship enjoyed between RPP and 
the labor unions during Ecevit’s term could not be repeated within SDPP. As a result, 
party elites tried to develop individual links with union leader and even incorporated 
some union leaders, such as Abdullah Basturk, Fehmi Isiklar and Cevdet Selvi to its 
ranks, hoping that this would raise the electoral chances of the party. 
         Following the early years of the Ozal period when economic decisions tended to 
be based on market signals224 and were not dictated by large degree of patronage225 
and clientelist demands of the constituencies as in the previous decades of the multi-
party era, visible from the weak link of MP to the localities,226 patronage politics 
inevitably returned in response to multi-party competition from the end of the 1980s 
onward. Indeed this was the general norm of Turkish politics characterized by party-
directed patronage227 in which the success of the political elites, then, was primarily 
based on their ability to represent the particularistic demands of their constituencies228 
and allocate public resources to keep them supportive of the governing coalition. 
Especially the return of the former party leaders to active politics and the growing 
mobilization of the trade unions in response to the high inflation level signaled to the 
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MP that it could not survive for long with its current policies.229 Therefore Ozal began 
to increase the overall weight of the public sector in the economy230 which enabled 
him to incorporate a broad coalition of social classes and interest groups by offering 
trade231 opportunities in the international markets to win the support of the business 
sector while simultaneously offering public discretionary funds to attract urban 
masses. 232 Thanks to this catchall strategy, MP had success among the urban migrants 
and in provinces where the percentage of wage earners and employees was highest.233 
Thus in the 1980s MP was characterized as the party of the central column of the 
society, consisting of lower-middle and middle classes and bourgeoning informal 
sector interests.234  
         Turkish version of popular capitalism through such measures as mass housing 
projects, sale of revenue sharing certificates and the politically motivated allocation of 
the extra-budgetary funds235 aimed to incorporate a broad segment of the population 
as stake-holders in the economic program.236 Apart from enhancing the domestic 
support for the emerging capitalistic economy, however, Ozal wanted develop 
compensatory programs and allocate public funds to neutralize broad segments of the 
population negatively affected by his economic policies.  Onis describes such policies 
to be associated with the neo-liberal populism237 Ozal possessed that enabled him to 
instigate some elements of neo-liberal reform package while legitimizing it in a 
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populist fashion in the eyes of a broad segment of the society.238 This enabled MP to 
establish a minimal winning coalition consisting of approximately 35 % of the 
electorate by neutralizing some strategic blocks of organized labor, supplying key 
private-sector interests and providing them with economic incentives and distribute 
benefits to geographically disperse constituencies.239 According to this analysis, the 
center right coalition would pursue liberalization, privatization and export-drive to 
enhance economic growth, while, at the same time, borrowing heavily to finance 
large-scale public programs.240 Government’s economic policy involved a mixture of 
opening up of the capital market, tariff reform and macroeconomic instability caused 
by expansionist public policies, which led political rationality to come progressively 
into conflict with market rationality. One major problem faced by the SDDP 
leadership was that MP pursued policies that succeeded in attracting the support of 
groups that were harmed from his adjustment program. This significantly reduced the 
chances of SDDP to effectively build a coalition of various sections of the society and 
challenge the MP government. This created a vicious cycle in left politics as SDDP 
was now left with no choice but to court the urban dwellers closely aligned with the 
state which in turn distanced it further from the masses. 
       By the end of the 1980s, after winning two successive elections, thanks to the 
unfair and disproportional electoral system, MP governments got into difficulties as 
they run out of resources to distribute to their supporters and deal with the enormous 
social and economic costs of the rising inflation rate which sabotaged the stabilization 
program. At first Ozal and his entourage did not fully realize the full effects of 
inflation for the society as well as its inhibiting consequences for the long-term 
economic growth and preferred to tolerate it in return for generating high growth rates 
in the short run.241 Moreover MP was now being challenged not only by SDDP, 
becoming an increasing attraction for the workers, state officials, intellectuals and 
urban masses hurt by the liberalization of the Turkish economy but, more importantly, 
by True Path Party headed by Demirel who was determined to reassume his position 
as the leader of the center-right. Granted that TPP was coming from the DP-JP 
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tradition, it enjoyed an advantage over MP in garnering the support of the provincial 
bourgeoisie and the peasants who were the losers of the new era. It seemed as if Ozal 
was to crumble in the coming years, it would be another center-right party that would 
pick up the pieces of this coalition and come to power. 
        In addition to the surmounting political challenges, MP had to manage some 
elements within the uneasy coalition which preserved its electoral chances. The 
cooperative relationship between the MP administration and Turk-Is, for example, 
began to break down in 1987 as Turk-Is became concerned about the economic 
policies of the government and the fact that none of their suggestions were taken 
seriously. What triggered the union leaders to reconsider their attitude were the high 
inflation and the inability of the government to compensate workers for their reduced 
purchasing power.242 Faced with the danger of losing the support of majority of the 
members in the organization, the leadership realized that it could no longer ignore the 
enormous pressure coming from the rank-and-file to take an opposing stand against 
the MP government.243 Initiating a new round of activism including a general strike 
against the government, Turk-Is made it clear that it would not support MP in the 
coming elections which boosted the electoral chances of SDPP and improved its share 
of votes in 1987 general and 1989 local elections. Following the 1987 election, even 
the inner coalition formed within MP between Islamists, liberals and nationalists 
showed signs of disintegration since each group began to emphasize their own 
agendas and attempt to dominate the local organizations of the party. Against the will 
of Turgut Ozal, a coalition of nationalist and Islamist groups with an anti-liberal and 
anti-Western agenda, also known as the Holy Alliance, came close to winning most of 
the top administrative positions in the 1988 MP national convention.244 Faced with the 
challenges MP had to relinquish its goal of establishing an expansive hegemony and 
settled down with efforts to transform it into a passive revolution.245  
2.5 Turkish Left Triumphant 
          The most important event following the formation of the party has been the 
come-back of the former RPP top rank officials after the lifting of the ban on their 
political activities in the 1987 referendum. The former RPP cadres quickly established 
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a very strong faction within SDPP and ensured the election of their leader Deniz 
Baykal,246 a well known pre-1980 deputy and minister, as the Secretary General in the 
1988 Party Congress. In the Congress, Inonu has rigorously criticized the government 
of failing to alleviate poverty, reducing income disparities and solving the inflation 
problem and linked policies of Ozal to the new-right politics in US and Great 
Britain.247 With this settlement, the ranks of SDPP seemed more united and energetic 
than ever, as the party officials turned their attention to the upcoming local elections 
and to the task of defeating the Motherland Party. In the following months, Inonu-
Baykal team managed to receive support from the masses, as SDPP began its march 
to power thanks to those social classes that were concerned with the rapid changes in 
society. Growing public disenchantment with the management of the economy and 
numerous corruption allegations,248 involving some prominent bureaucrats and 
politicians associated with MP, harmed the electoral fortunes of the party especially in 
the 1989 municipality elections.249  Indeed, the dramatic setback of MP which 
received 21 percent of the votes and became the third party at the polls marked the 
end of Ozal era and contributed to the political fragmentation of the coming years.250 
         Despite the relatively good results obtained in 1989 local elections, SDPP has 
never really gained an increasing vote mass from center-right and win the support of 
the groups that were negatively affected by the neo-liberal policies of MP 
government.251 1989 election victory in which SDPP won more than 650 
municipalities was more a punishment of MP by the voters at the polls than a success 
for SDPP and contains the early signs of the ideological crisis SDPP would face in the 
coming years.252  This might be taken as the inadequacy of the SDPP ideology and 
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should be attributed to three main reasons. First, as explained above, Ozal was able to 
put together a winning coalition consisting of those social groups which were mostly 
negatively affected by his policies and thereby should be expected to become the 
natural constituency of leftist parties. Second, faced with the new-right hegemony, it 
was difficult for center-left parties to resist the tide as seen in many other countries in 
this period. The lack of the existence of a Marxist historical background and ties to 
radical labor movements in the RPP-SDPP tradition left the party without the 
necessary ideological source to generate new strategies.253 The third was the 
insistence of SDPP to defend the neo-etatist principles instead of developing 
alternative economic policies and strategies that could more successfully address the 
developments in global economy since the 1970s. In that sense, after more than a 
decade of being away from power, social democrats, using Mannheim’s terminology, 
held to a utopia rather than an ideology as they got more and more separated from the 
reality of Turkish politics in the post-1980 period.254  
          While the favorable election result was attributed to the compromise between 
Baykal followers and Inonu group, aiming to unite the old RPP cadres with the new 
grassroots SDPP activists before the coming local elections, it also dramatically 
proved to be the beginning of fragmentation in the party. Baykal’s pseudo- 
authoritarian measures to control all the local organizations and his exclusionary 
approach, especially towards Kurdish and Alevi groups within the party generated 
serious resistance among party members and was a major faction behind the 
formation of the faction of Reformists.255 The latent conflict occurring between these 
factions came to surface in the aftermath of unsuccessful results of a local election in 
1990 with the clash between the Chairman and the Secretary General. Following the 
election, Inonu has called the Party Congress to discuss the causes of the dramatic 
loss of vote in the recent election and re-elect the Chairman but the timing of the 
gathering was wisely picked for an early date to force a reluctant Baykal to become a 
candidate before getting any stronger. In his speech, Inonu accused Baykal of 
developing a very small clique and sabotaging the activities of the party 
administration for political ends.256 Hence Inonu was hoping to eliminate his rival in 
                                                
253
 Kahraman, Sosyal Demokrasi Turkiye, 17 
254
 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia Collected Works, vol. 1, 1935, p. 1-53 
255
 Kahraman, The Making, 211-2 
256
 Erdal Inonu, Kurultay Konusmalari, İstanbul: Boyut Kitaplari, 1998, p. 285-315 
 53 
this congress so that he could focus on the upcoming elections with a unified party 
organization behind him. The Congress elected Inonu though not with a substantial 
majority, encouraging Baykal for running against Inonu in the coming years for two 
more rounds.  
        In this polarizing environment of the party, gradually but surely a new group of 
Reformists, consisting of people such as Ercan Karakas,257 Ismal Cem258 and Asaf 
Savas Akat259 emerged in the political scene, seeking more voice in the party 
administration. Their common claim was the necessity of taking Turkish social 
democracy beyond its statist, centralist and anti-democratic origins and aligning 
SDPP more closely with the universal social democrat parties.260 Although they first 
gathered as a response to the anti-democratic policies of the Baykal-led party 
administration, beginning with the Fifth Small Congress of 1989, they were also 
motivated by the fall of the authoritarian regimes and centrally planned economies 
around the globe.261 Their main aim was to address the structural and organization 
problems of social democracy in Turkey and manage to incorporate democratic and 
pluralistic elements to SDPP. However as a strategy they preferred to mostly ignore 
the ongoing Kemalism debates which will be discussed in the final chapter of this 
thesis and focus on technical issues such as membership structure, education and 
participation that were of primary importance for a social democrat party.    
          Deniz Baykal once again became a candidate against Inonu in the Third Party 
Congress held on July 27-28, 1991 but this time managed to devise a well-prepared 
program to supplement his leadership claims together with Ismail Cem, who joined 
Baykal forces shortly before the 6th Extraordinary Congress. Deniz Baykal and Ismail 
Cem, as the ideologue of the movement, made numerous speeches in the party 
meetings to situate the New Left on an ideological basis and generate support from 
the grassroots activists.262 While Baykal developed the concept of organized market 
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economy to account for the changes brought by the hegemony of the new-right 
ideology, Ismail Cem, in the articles he wrote for Sabah daily, adopted the approach 
of the French Socialist Party and made some references to the left of center and 
democratic left debates in the 1970s.263 Indeed new left became the first ideological 
opening within the left politics in the post-1980 period.264 On the other hand, Inonu 
responded back by accusing the Baykal team to act like a second party administration 
to criticize and harm their party and split the party members with partisan politics.265 
Inonu was hoping that this congress would finally settle the leadership challenge and 
enable him to concentrate his forces on the requirements of being the opposition 
leader and rally the party ranks for the next challenge. In order to manage this, he was 
willing to cooperate with some prominent members of the reformist wing of the party, 
particularly Ertugrul Gunay and offer them a few pragmatic concessions to gain their 
crucial votes during the congress. However, this did not amount to a policy change on 
behalf of Inonu who remained committed to the view that SDPP was the successor 
and inheritor of the legacy of RPP so that Turkish social democracy would continue to 
be shaped with the principles of the National Struggle period and the Kemalist 
reforms. Nevertheless Inonu managed to once again defeat Baykal by a small margin, 
thanks to the support he received from the reformist wing of the party, namely 
Ertugrul Gunay and Ercan Karakas who managed to tip the scales in favor of Inonu. 
2.6 New Politics for New Times 
        In Turkish politics early 1990s became a period of rupture with the military coup 
and its political framework and witnessed the development of new coalitions and 
emergence of new political movements also in the right of the political spectrum. 
While center-right parties adopted pro-market policies and came to embrace 
democratic and pluralist principles to match the economic order that transformed 
them into pseudo-liberal parties, a romanticist and anti-capitalist response was being 
generated in the ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties against the neo-liberal agenda.266 
MP’s shift to the liberal territory, following the 1991 party congress that elected a 
liberal candidate, Mesut Yilmaz, to party leadership alienated the nationalist 
conservatives taking refuge in the party and paved the way for a new restructuring in 
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radical right politics with the formation of the RP-MCP-IDP electoral coalition.267 It 
seemed as if despite the intra-party conflicts a totally new field was opening for the 
Turkish left, in general, and SDPP, in particular, as all parties situated themselves in 
the new political scale.   
        1991 national elections, however, turned out to be a major setback for SDPP as it 
could not retain even its vote share in the previous election let alone raise it to become 
the first party.268 First, it did not go unnoticed by the electorate that SDPP was 
running for the conventional statist model, a position that was becoming ever more 
obsolete with the electorate as a more liberal understanding of state was being put 
forward by other parties. This is related to the fact that SDPP relied on the classical 
RPP tradition with no concrete social democratic basis and ignored the universal 
social democratic culture that kept the party away from a real ideological opening.269 
As the party associated with strong state just as center-right parties were surpassing 
the existing state model, the voting base of the party mostly consisted of white collar 
workers, bureaucrats, state officers, intellectuals, students and employers.270 Hence 
organic ties with the state precluded SDPP from demanding more liberalization and 
greater autonomy for social groups so that party elites have mostly stayed on the 
defensive while MP, in accordance with its goal of incorporating Turkish economy 
into world markets, managed to abolish the articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Penal 
Law, becoming champion of democratization.  
        In addition, TPP, under the leadership of Demirel, resorted to the strategy of 
appealing to the suburban vote by continuing liberal-urban based policies of MP and 
incorporated liberal and democratic promises to its campaign strategy by taking into 
consideration the global developments and the relative liberalization in domestic 
politics during the late 1980s. It is a remarkable phenomenon that with this election 
campaign center-right parties, not least TPP itself, began to at least rhetorically 
demand all the civil liberties and democratic conditions to a greater extent than the 
center-left parties. According to Ismail Cem, the poor election result for SDPP should 
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be attributed to the fact that recent democratization proposals of center-right parties 
removed the major difference between the center-right and center-left parties, leading 
many voters to question the relevance of SDPP in Turkish politics since it lacked the 
tradition of being associated with the interests of labor, the fundamental criteria for a 
leftist party.271 In addition to losing support among the urban bourgeoisie increasingly 
switching to center-right parties, SDPP did very poorly among the working masses 
and failed to achieve a satisfactory score in big cities two years after its victory in 
1989 local elections. On the other hand SDPP’s fall has played into the hands of DLP 
which gained some votes from SDPP especially among blue collar workers, 
unemployed and retired thanks to its populist rhetoric.272 
        Deniz Baykal has used the poor result received by SDPP in the 1991 national 
elections as an excuse to once again challenge Inonu and managed to collect enough 
signatures to convene the Party Congress for the third time in the last 14 months. This 
time, Baykal team managed to put together a new report which attributes the decline 
of SDPP to the fact that the party remained in the past by not being able to reconstruct 
its identity on the basis of new concepts and lack of an ideology.273 Instead he 
suggested an ideological renewal through transformation into a social party which 
would put individual in its center and argued that the choice in the upcoming 
chairman elections would be between the status quo and change.274 Some of their 
suggestions and the methods they used during the convention reminded of the left of 
center movement as Baykal team aimed to devise a new vision for the party and 
published and distributed a book among the delegates to publicize these views. In 
response to Baykal’s attacks, Inonu mostly relied on the fact that despite the loss of 
votes SDPP was finally in power as part of a historical coalition that reached a mass 
support from both sides of the political spectrum.275 While admitting defeat in the 
recent elections when compared with the results obtained in 1987 national and 1989 
local elections, he asked for an objective analysis of the outcome not losing track of 
the damage given to the party by the endless congress process caused by the 
                                                
271
 Cem, Soldaki Arayis, 95-103 
272
 TUSES, Turkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin, p. 43 
273
 Tikanan Parti ve Cikis Yolu: 20 Ekim 1991 Seciminin Degerlendirilmesi ve 
Gelecege Donuk Oneriler, İstanbul: Filiz Yayincilik, 1991, p. 7-36 
274
 Deniz Baykal and Ismail Cem, Yeni Sol, İstanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1992, p. 157-
162 
275
 Inonu, Kurultay Konusmalari, 359-62 
 57 
challenges of Baykal the previous year.276 Hence Inonu managed to defeat Baykal one 
more time mostly by exploiting the benefits of being in the government and accusing 
him with partisan behavior. The third clash between Inonu and Baykal turned out to 
be the final and decisive round as Baykal bowed out of the race and accepted the fact 
that he would not be able to defeat Inonu within SDPP.   
           The end of the Inonu-Baykal clash ironically put an end to the ideological 
debates that were taking place since most of the views put forward were addressing 
the delegates before the congresses. In sharp contrast to the left of center movement 
within RPP in late 1960s and early 1970s, the reformists could not attract a mass 
following among the grassroots activists of SDPP and failed to even unite amongst 
themselves. Arguably, reformist wing of the party was divided into three different 
groups, consisting of those who wanted to reject the RPP legacy and build a new 
ideological framework for SDPP base on universal social democratic principles, those 
who remained ambivalent on the issue and did not favor such a radical policy shift 
and those who remained indifferent to these debates and instead restructuring the 
party base on a new membership and organizational model under a new party 
name.277 This fragmentation within the reformist camp made it highly unlikely for 
them to exercise much influence in the party debates and reduced their power to 
determine the party policies. Instead they became relevant to the candidates only 
before the Party Congresses and diverted their cause to the pragmatic political 
calculations of the party elites.  
        The fortunes of SDPP did not fare any better once in government because of the 
deep-rooted socio-economic problems confronted by the party immediately after 
assuming power. Some of these problems were a direct consequence of the neo-liberal 
policies of the previous government but regardless came to haunt SDPP. The 
premature decision of the Motherland government to liberalize the capital account 
system278 rapidly integrated Turkish financial system into global markets and 
transformed the country into an attractive place for international investors willing to 
tolerate high risks in return for high returns in the short run. However it also exposed 
Turkish economy to the high level of risks and volatility experienced in the global 
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scale without precautions and instigated the country on the path towards a pattern of 
debt-led growth extremely vulnerable to speculative attacks and financial crises.279 
Incorporation of the Turkish capital market into global financial networks had a 
profound impact on Turkish politics by raising the cost of pursuing populist and 
clientelist policies for the governments.280 Unable to make the long overdue reforms 
in the tax and social security, TPP-SDPP coalition governments resorted to borrowing 
from the domestic and international markets to finance costly public programs, which, 
in return, raised the level of interest rates and made it increasingly difficult for 
governments to sustain these policies in the long-run.281 This kind of debt 
management based on short-term capital inflows became the primary reason for the 
high degree of instability experienced in the Turkish economy in the 1990s thanks to 
huge budget deficit, high interest and inflation rates and weak currency.282 This 
economic policy however was nothing short of an income-transfer from wage-
laborers and peasants to domestic rentiers and greatly damaged the very segments of 
the society close to SDPP.  
 2.7 The Struggle for Survival 
      Once in power it became clear that SDPP elites did not have a clear economic 
agenda and a new program. Prominent SDPP members and even the Chairman 
himself relied on a strategy of trying to reestablish a kind of statism under the cloak of 
social state taken together with social security within the market economy and put 
state-led industrialization as the first priority to solve the unemployment problem.283 
Moreover, going back to Calp’s famous stand against Ozal on the issue of 
privatization of the Bosporus Bridge the social democrats ran against the privatization 
of the state economic enterprises and ignored the general direction of the world 
economy.284 These policies have relegated SDPP to the opposition status against the 
center-right dominated political climate in the past decade and prevented it from 
taking the initiative even after becoming a coalition partner. The economic 
                                                
279
 Onis, Turgut Ozal, 28-9 
280
 On the paradoxial developments in the Turkish economy in the 1980s, see Mine 
Eder, ‘The Challenge of Globalization and Turkey’s Changing Political Economy’, in 
Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multiregional Power, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 189-215 
281
 H. Tukel, “Waiting for Macroeconomic Stability”, Private View 1(2) 1997, p. 27 
282
 Onis, Turgut Ozal, 19 
283
 Inonu, Kurultay Konusmalari, 268, 310-1 
284
 Kahraman, The Making, 233-4 
 59 
policymaking remained under the strict control of TPP under Ciller, first as the 
economic minister and later as the prime minister and SDPP had to bear the 
consequences of her economic policies without the chance of objection. In a matter of 
a few years, SDPP has eroded its popular support from all its constituencies as it lost 
its character within the government, accused of being skewed to the right.             
       The economic conditions of the low-income groups, particularly fixed-income 
earners, worsened even further with the 1994 economic crisis caused by the decision 
of Prime Minister Ciller to engineer a reduction in the interest rates through Central 
Bank operations which backfired and triggered a stock market crash followed by a 
massive capital flight. Hence, Ciller government’s intervention on behalf of achieving 
a political objective resulted in the breakdown of the economic system and paved the 
way for the biggest recession since the WWII period. The mainstream political 
parties, in general, and the governing parties, especially after Demirel’s rise to 
presidency, in particular, were not able to develop the necessary policies to tackle the 
economic problems and address public concerns. As a result of this period center 
parties became unresponsive to the societal demands and distanced from large 
segments of the electorate, contributing to the high levels of cynicism prevalent 
among the masses.285 The aforementioned policies have worsened income disparities 
already existing in the Turkish society and threatened the very basis of the political 
order by reinforcing sectarian and ethnic loyalties to become identities alternative to 
citizenship.286  The economic setting was ripe for populist politicians to flourish 
during this era, establishing vertical and unmediated relationships with atomized 
masses in this fragmented society.287  
        The inability of the successive governments to successfully manage the 
economic situation and address the Kurdish separatist terror and political Islam 
created a political vacuum, which was subsequently filled by hardliners in state 
security agencies and the military officials, seeking to defend the state.288 As the 
vision of Turkey, serving as a bridge between the capitalist world and the Central 
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Asian republics and a model of prosperity and democracy to the Muslim states, gave 
way to the painful and stubborn reality of a country facing economic challenges and 
political problems, the pseudo-liberal political environment began to change. The 
optimism visible in the statements of prominent politicians only a few years ago were 
replaced by an official paranoia that considered Turkey to be threatened by a number 
of adversaries surrounding its borders such as Greece, Syria, Iran, Armenia and 
Cyprus and challenged by the growing Islamist and Kurdish separatist movements. As 
Stephen Kinzler rightly noted, PKK had come to embody the most terrifying Kemalist 
nightmare: the conspiracy of foreign powers that would organize local opposition 
groups to aim at dismembering the Turkish state.289 These threats have generated a 
counter response from the nationalists who gained a prominent place within the 
center-right parties, using public events and civil societal organizations to perpetuate 
the nationalist and state-centric discourse.290 With Ciller’s rise to the prime ministry, 
TPP has adopted a hardline approach with regards to the Kurdish issue and let 
security officials close to the party, such as Unal Erkan, Mehmet Agar and Hayri 
Kozakcioglu to designate policies.  
         After Inonu’s decision to not seek another term as the chairman of SDPP, 
Karayalcin, the successful mayor of Ankara Municipality, emerged as his successor in 
the Fourth Party Congress on September 11-12, 1993 by defeating the more 
conservative candidate and party loyalist, Aydin Guven Gurkan. The ascendancy of 
Karayalcin with his bureaucratic background to the top was a very symbolic and 
significant political development, partly because it signified the influence of the 
bureaucratic elements within the party and the Turkish social democracy at large. In 
order to strengthen his image as a new and young leader in leftist politics, Karayalcin 
asked his team of advisors from the municipality, including prestigious names like 
Yigit Gukoksuz, Ilhan Tekeli, Hursit Gunes, Yakup Kepenek and Hasan Bulent 
Kahraman, to prepare a manifesto that would stand as the basis of a new party 
program. The manifesto, titled as the Social Transformation Project, reminiscent of a 
section of the speech delivered by Inonu in the 1988 Party Congress,291 addressed the 
effects of globalization and targeted the attainment of a total democracy, economic 
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growth and just income distribution.292 As a document critical of the single-party era, 
the manifesto calls for a democratic solution to the deep rooted problems of the 
country and recommends a pluralistic social model for laicism and Kurdish issues.293 
Moreover, it also suggests that the social groups and classes who vote for the social 
democratic parties should be reconsidered to observe the recent socio-economic 
developments and evaluate the emerging social groups.294 
        Karayalcin Manifesto reflected the attempts of a group of SDPP members to 
reshape the party in response to the recent changes occurring around the globe and 
once again reminded the intra-party debates on the necessity of situating social 
democracy on universal grounds, distancing it from its bureaucratic, centralist and 
elitist roots. However the rise of neo-nationalism within the center-left and center-
right parties in response to growing Kurdish separatist terror attacks and the economic 
difficulties at the time reduced the popularity of Karayalcin within the party and 
prevented him from successfully make an ideological opening within SDPP. Faced 
with Gurkan’s opposition at the SDPP parliamentary group, Karayalcin could not 
even secure much support even among his colleagues in parliament.295 Moreover the 
corruption scandals that plagued SDPP municipalities and the resulting defeat in the 
1994 local elections pushed the party into a deep crisis from which it could not 
recover. 
        The post-1980 period witnessed the disintegration of the Turkish social 
democratic movement when faced with the rise of the New Right hegemony. SDPP, 
with its strong links to the intellectuals and urban elites, contained a growing faction 
of reformists who were willing to challenge the dominant party ideology and put 
together the premises of a new political agenda. However a programmatic revival that 
would develop the party as a credible alternative to the center-right parties as seen in 
other advanced industrialized societies did not take place. Theoretical arguments and 
ideological debates gained prominence within the party only during the leadership 
contests and, thus, was overshadowed by the Inonu-Baykal clashes. It became clear 
that both candidates were not interested in undertaking a renewal of the party 
ideology and were concerned only with these debates for pragmatic reasons. As a 
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result, Turkish social democracy exhausted all chances of constructing itself on the 
universal principles of social democracy and transforming its ideological outlook in 
accordance with the changing state-society relationship. As will be further explained 
in the coming chapters, faced with the challenge of globalization, the social 
democratic left has returned to its origins with the reestablishment of RPP and 
adopted pro-state and nationalist policies with regards to the most discussed issues of 
the period, such as human rights, democracy, Customs Union, secularism etc. This 
however is not only a consequence of the symbiotic relationship between the state and 
the party going back to the RPP period but also a result of the strong connections 
between the party elites and the dominant understanding of modernity revolving 
around the primordial tenets of Kemalism. 
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                                                   CHAPTER 3 
                          THE CRISIS OF TURKISH MODERNITY AND  
                                     THE ATTEMPTS OF RENEWAL 
 
        In a country where modernity was introduced in the form of a project296 by the 
political elites searching ways to save the state, the demise of statism inevitably 
caused a radical questioning of the state-led modernization.297 The multi-dimensional 
changes brought by economic liberalization in the 1980s contributed to the rise of 
new social groups, seeking recognition for their ethno-cultural and sectarian 
differences not represented in the homogenous citizenship model. It was primarily by 
exploiting the socio-economic and political opportunities of the post-1980 period that 
these groups increasingly participated in the political sphere, social spaces and 
cultural zones. This led to the emergence of a more heterogeneous electorate which 
could not be addressed within the tight boundaries of the Turkish modernization 
project and the ensuing ethno-cultural and sectarian divides translated into daily 
politics in the form of kulturkamps, urban, Alevi and secular versus Sunni and 
traditional and Turkish versus Kurdish nationalist voters in the early 1990s. This 
chapter explores the political dynamism of the post-1980 period, especially by 
focusing on Kurdish radicalism and Alevi revivalism and how their rise come to 
challenge SDPP which were unable to comprehend these changes, still being tied to 
the state-led modernization schema.   
3.1 Turkish Modernization 
          The fundamental problem faced by the intellectuals in non-Western countries at 
the turn of 20th century was to find a systemic way to understand, analyze and, more 
importantly, relate to the rapid socioeconomic and political transformations taking 
place in the West. It was, they realized, only a matter of time that their local customs, 
traditions and values would be threatened by the Western supremacy either through 
war, conquest, trade or diplomacy. As a response, they have predominantly accepted 
the universal validity of the Western model and, in consequence, borrowed  western 
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institutions, ideas and manners in order to develop their societies. This was also the 
case for the Ottoman elites, for whom modernization became synonymous with 
Westernization.298 Turkish case indeed became an early and radical experiment with 
modernity in this fashion following the deliberate rejection of the Ottoman ruling 
elites some traditional aspects of the Ottoman legacy.299 Through their close links 
with the upper echelons of the Ottoman military and civilian bureaucracy, the 
republican elites inherited all the modernizing elements of the late Ottoman period 
and continued the reforms put in place and, in some areas, undertook more extensive 
projects, leaving a Kemalist imprint.300  
        Granted that the political, economic and ideological prerequisites of modernity 
were imposed from above by the Kemalist elites, modernization in the Turkish 
context took the form of a social engineering project, well designed in accordance 
with the purpose of reaching the contemporary level of civilization. The making of 
modern Turkey required establishing its political, economic and ideological 
prerequisites by creating a nation-state, undertaking economic development and 
constructing a secular national identity that would prove to be the backbone of a 
modern society.301 The fundamental aim was to transform community-based and 
religiously-motivated traditional Ottoman society into a modern nation with a secular 
and national identity and supplement it with modern institutions. Road to progress, 
seen as attaining the level of the civilized world, could only be achieved by removing 
the traces of the traditional order from the political system and replacing it with 
institutions that would be congruent with reason. This is inherent from the fact that 
the republic emulated the educational institutions and cultural practices of the West 
without realizing that they were only a result of the complex effects of modernity 
rather than cause of Western development.               The conceptual schema employed 
by Weber to analyze the complex patterns of change initiated by modernizing 
societies which emphasize the multi-faceted change in sources of authority with a 
shift from patriarchal to legal relations best captures the mindset of the political elites 
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in this period.302  The conceptualization of the Turkish modernization as the transition 
in the political system of authority from patrimonial rule to impersonal rules and 
regulations, the adoption of positivist and rational thinking replacing divine law and, 
as noted above, transition from a religious community to nation-state303 clearly 
indicates that Kemalist elites have accepted the Weberian answer to the riddle of the 
‘European miracle’.304  
       The formation of the nation-state proved to be the constitutive element of Turkish 
modernization because it enabled the political establishment to introduce national 
sovereignty distinct from the authority of the sultan and also facilitated the 
implementation of secular reforms by associating them with national identity. The 
goal of the leaders of the Turkish Republic was to create a national citizenship based 
on a single language by promoting and, at times, constructing a shared Turkish culture 
and identity305 so that alternative loyalties were mostly silenced or forced to relegate 
to the private realm.306 The elites had feared that the plural cultural legacy of the 
Ottoman society could threaten the national identity they aspired to construct around 
the republican ideal. This led them to ignore and, in some cases, even suppress the 
multiple identities visible in the Ottoman-Turkish polity and silence the alternate 
histories of various groups that were forced to only cherish their individual identities 
in the private sphere. This national identity, then, revolved around the organic unity of 
the secular non-class based society which clearly ignored the existence of alternative 
sub-cultures and socio-economic classes with their own goals of constructing 
identities.307 1920s witnessed the implementation of wide-scale reforms, such as 
adoption of the Latin alphabet and a civil code, secularization of the education and 
legal systems, literacy drive, hat revolution, and measurement scales, which aimed at 
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enlightening the people and encouraging them to adopt a modern pattern of life.308 
These reforms were derived from the two problems which Kemalist elites considered 
to be the key factors behind the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: arbitrary rule of the 
sultan and conservative Islamic identity, both acting as obstacles to progress in 
Ottoman society.309  
        At the end of three decades of elite-driven political reforms, Turkey was hailed 
by many Western students of Turkish politics as a successful example of rapid 
modernization that could be imitated by other developing countries. Two very 
influential books about Turkey written during late 1950s and early 1960s by two 
prominent Western scholars, namely Bernard Lewis310 and David Lerner311 both 
described the Turkish modernization process in a very positive manner. The first 
crack, however, appeared in late 1960s and 1970s with the rise of Marxist 
intellectuals, especially in prestigious Turkish universities, who shifted their focus 
from the elites to the masses and analyzed economic structure of the society rather 
than political institutions.312 These intellectuals began to emphasize the deficiencies 
of Turkish modernization by arguing that its effects were mostly in political origin 
and had an impact on a very limited segment of the society.313 In other words, the 
main driving force of social change has been political reforms that were confined to 
the cultural realm or, in other words, the superstructure, in a totally opposite fashion 
to the Marxist interpretation of historical change.314 It is primarily through their 
contributions that negative aspects and limitations of elite-driven modernity were 
brought to the attention of students of Turkish politics. Deconstructing the monolithic 
understanding of modernity, they argued that the reforms of the mono-party regime 
were of cultural origin and played very little, if any, impact on the lives of the masses 
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as the divide between the Turkish center and the periphery remained intact. Lacking 
the means to undertake a full-scale land reform and improve the conditions of the 
Anatolian peasants, the republican elites could only develop ties with local notables 
and landowners in the country. Without extensive links with the mass of civil society, 
the effects of the modernization project, however, could not spread to the peripheral 
groups that remained under the grip of conservative and traditional forces.315 As a 
result, in its quest for reorganizing the Ottoman-Turkish society, the reforming elite 
got distanced from society at large and became a close-minded and inward-looking 
ruling class.316  
        A full project of modernity, thus, could not arise because masses were sidelined 
during this reform process and remained passive throughout the early years of the 
republican era. This created a very ambiguous picture of the society as it experienced 
some effects of modernity in solidarity, especially in the political domain, while 
majority of the people as individuals remained mostly unchanged in their traditional 
settings.317 As Tim Jaboby argues, these policies coupled with “continuing ideological 
pre-eminence of a loyally secular intelligentsia, led to a narrow, state-stipulated 
definition of modernization, a highly monist view of citizenship and an intensive 
brand of nationalism largely restricted to the urban professionals and large-estate 
farmers of western Anatolia”.318 It was only after the 1950 election, signifying the 
transition to multi-party political rule, which enabled the mobilization and 
participation of the peasants in the political system en masse that a large segment of 
the Turkish society came to experience the substantive effects of modernization. 
Therefore, various scholars, not only of Marxist origin, began to distinguish between 
political modernization that occurred during Republican People’s Party administration 
between 1923 and 1950 and technological modernization which transformed the 
economic conditions of the peasants following the 1950 elections.319 
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        Until the rise of the right-left political cleavage in the early 1960s, Turkish 
political landscape was defined on the basis of the secularist-anti-secularist axis,320 
fully congruent with the center-periphery cultural cleavage of the Ottoman-Turkish 
polity. Indeed, during this period, even the radical elements of the Turkish left 
subscribed to Kemalism at least pragmatically, if not wholeheartedly, for its anti-
imperialist, populist, etatist and, more importantly, modern aspects of the will of 
civilization inherent in Kemalism. Hence, many intellectuals within radical left gave 
tacit support to the Kemalist elites with the hope that their reforms would establish the 
foundations of a modern society and create the necessary conditions for a 
revolution.321 However, this naive view led many Marxist and socialist groups to be 
assimilated among the Kemalist cadres and deprived the Turkish left from a Marxist 
tradition. In time, Kemalism has assumed a hegemonic control over the leftist 
ideology by managing to incorporate those radical elements that complied into its 
framework and eliminating and suppressing the others if necessary. Moreover being 
incorporated by Kemalism left the legacy of a Jacobinist, anti-democratic and 
authoritarian tradition that distrusts the organized struggle and mobilization of labor 
unions and peasants.322 As late as 1960s, radical groups such as MDD and Yon 
movements were advocating a coalition between the progressive elements of the 
society and army officers as the best way to develop the country. Thus, Workers’ 
Party of Turkey, Yon (Direction) and Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic 
Revolution) movements, despite their differences, as Murat Belge notes, adopted a 
“left-Kemalist substitutionalism” that committed them to act for the people, in spite of 
the people.323 
         Only in the polarizing environment of the late 1970s with the emergence of 
Kurdish radicalism and ideological student movements together with the growing 
militancy of the labor unions, some radical elements of the Turkish left, especially 
those in academic circles, experienced a break with Kemalism if only for a short 
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period of time.324 However, during the tumultuous period of the 1970s, for  many 
intellectuals, as the economic and social pressures caused by the rapid economic 
transformation outdated the conditions that defined the early years of the Republican 
era, the Kemalist paradigm began to be exhausted325 though not yet replaced, no 
longer serving as the main ideology that shaped the worldviews of the rising elites.326 
The Six Arrows of the RPP came under considerable strain as various social and 
political groups made them the subject of political debate and fundamental 
disagreement327 and went so far as to make revisions to adopt them to their own 
particular political positions. Granted that Ataturkism remained as the official 
ideology of the state guarded by the civilian and military bureaucracy committed to 
uphold the orthodox version, every political group in the Turkish political context 
began to use it as a cover to their ideas and ideologies and interpreted and revised 
Ataturkism to suit their own purposes.328 
            The strong and authoritarian state tradition in Ottoman-Turkish polity together 
with the Kemalist tendency of preserving solidarist tendencies and a corporatist 
configuration of the society have led military officers remain alert towards the rise of 
social groups with autonomous demands from the society. The traditional coalition of 
bureaucrats, officers and intellectuals have previously organized coup d’états to 
restructure the political sphere whenever new social groups emerged to transcend the 
carefully designed boundaries of the system and effectively mobilize the masses, 
alarming the state elites. As already stated, rising social and political groups no longer 
limited themselves within the ideological framework of state-led modernization, 
relying upon the Kemalist will to civilization through its political, economic and 
cultural aspects. The continuation of the democratic rule, then, could have further 
severed the civil unrest and, moreover, challenge the very basis of the order which the 
military was decided to protect.  
3.2 1980 Coup as a Kemalist Restoration Project 
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       Thus in the late 1970s the military officials, who have successfully managed to 
stay aloof from the cleavages of the society, came to the conclusion that they should 
act to assume their guardian role329 of preserving the state mechanisms against the 
growing autonomy of social groups and ensure peace and stability for the citizen 
body. Their primary goal, not surprisingly, was to de-politicize the entire society and 
limit the extent of mobilization and participation in social and political networks with 
the hope that this would end the debilitating pluralism of the multi-party period, 
particularly the late 1970s, and reorganize the political system along the lines of a 
corporatist framework.330 This would set the stage for the reproduction of the 
hegemony of the transcendental state vis-à-vis the interest groups and strengthen the 
solidarist understanding of national identity. It can then be argued that 1980 coup was 
the last attempt of the Kemalist elites to restore the state-led modernization model 
envisaged by the founding fathers and organize the society without much regard for 
ethnic, religious, class differences and sectional interests. 
        The 1980 coup, which came following a systemic crisis, containing elements of 
civil unrest, economic breakdown and challenges to the official ideology,331 
represented a radical rupture in republican period, more so than in any of the previous 
coups not only due to the dramatic shifts of the economic poliy but more importantly 
for the political developments it triggered. One of the distinguishing features of this 
coup was the determination of the military to stay for a longer period of time compare 
to the previous coups and undertake a more comprehensive reconstruction of the 
political order. In order to accomplish the aforementioned goals, generals have 
radically de-politicized the society and eliminated any alternative power sources by 
banning all activities of political leaders, dissolving political parties and censoring all 
political activities. This proved to be relatively easy as the political parties had already 
lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the staff generals who accused them of no longer 
following Ataturkism and becoming hotbeds of strife instead of entailing the general 
                                                
329
 For a discussion of the historical role played by the military, see George Haris, The 
Role of the Military in Turkey, in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, p. 168-9 
330
 Kahraman, Turk Milliyetci, 134 
331
 Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey, 
Comparative Politics, 1983, p. 17-33 
 71 
will.332 The generals embodied the conservative nature of the military that was first 
seen in the 12 March period333 and sought to undo the work of their predecessors in 
1960 coup by curbing, revising and, even, eliminating what they considered as the 
excesses of the 1961 Constitution.334 In response to the widely shared view that social 
awakening superseded the economic conditions and potential of the country, they 
managed to reverse some of the key socio-economic and political gains experienced 
by the social groups, particularly the working classes.335  
      Unlike the previous coup, the generals aspired to fundamentally reconstruct the 
entire political system, economic order and the state mechanism to make them 
compatible with their determined agenda. In order to achieve this goal, they went to 
great lengths that included first closing down and then remaking important institutions 
which were associated with some leftist intellectual circles in the pre-1980 period 
such as Turkish Language Foundation and Turkish History Foundation.336 Moreover, 
granted that they considered the main weakness of the mentioned constitution to be 
the unnecessary rights and liberties given to citizens,337 the officers oversaw the 
creation of a new constitution which restricted the inalienable rights by references to 
national security and indivisible integrity of the state.  
       The pattern of military interventions in Turkey is determined by the vanguard 
role of the army in Turkish politics and its relations with the state bureaucracy in 
accordance with the traditional coalition of republican history.338 However, following 
the ascendancy of the democratic left movement in RPP, which was considered by the 
staff generals as a sign of the weakening of Ataturkist tenets in the party, there was a 
rupture in the aforementioned grand coalition between the military, bureaucracy and 
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RPP. 339 Therefore, coup leaders have undertaken the task of restoring Ataturkism to 
renew its hegemony in society and construct a new political ally that would prove to 
fill the void caused by RPP’s ideological shift in the 1970s. This led the army to break 
its links with RPP and the civilian bureaucracy since they came to be seen as 
obstacles on the path to the economic development.340 The political ally is crucial for 
the effectiveness of military interventions because the military prefers to take action 
behind the scenes, staying away from active politics and direct involvement in the 
process. It was in this period that the ideological approach of the military officers 
came to resemble those of a new group of Kemalist bureaucrats who, in response to 
the rising socialist values among the intellectuals, came to think that the main 
premises of Kemalism was under attack. The growing activism of many leftist-
oriented students, workers and intellectuals around the ideological framework of 
socialism and the success of the left of center movement within RPP in the late 1970s 
generated a counter-response from the bureaucratic elites whose conservative attitude 
came to overshadow their radical goals.341   
        RPP’s shift to the left was an alarming development as it radically altered the 
power configurations and led them to align themselves more closely with the state and 
become transformed into conservative ideologues with regards to progressive 
developments in the Turkish society. This group of “republican conservatives”, such 
as Turhan Feyzioglu342, Coskun Kirca343 and Aydin Yalcin, graduates of Istanbul and 
Ankara Law Faculties have personified themselves with the cherished goal of 
preserving the hegemonic power of the state and wanted to perpetuate the paternalist-
elitist bureaucratic approach.  In time they formed the right faction of RPP and later 
resigned from their posts when they were sidelined from the decision-making 
processes in successive party congresses during the late 1960s. They were 
instrumental in the formation of, first, the Trust Party and, after its merger with 
Republican Party, the Republican Trust Party in order to defend the corporatist and 
non-ideological elements of Kemalism. 
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        It was mainly through the efforts of these ‘republican conservatives’ under the 
body of the Republican Trust Party that a rapprochement has taken place between the 
rightist parties taking part in the National Front governments and the military. This 
process became the backbone of the modus vivendi of the 1980 coup with which the 
nationalist and conservative aspects of right Kemalism were incorporated the neo-
liberal policies and thereby constituted the primary political agenda of the era. 
Granted that in the Turkish context the army wanted to receive a wide coalition which 
support the coup and its policies, the September 12 generals realized that Republican 
Trust Party, aligned with the rest of the republicanist conservatives,344 had a little 
mass appeal and thereby felt the need to seek the cooperation of the nationalist 
conservatives associated with mainstream center-right parties and organizations 
subscribing to right Kemalism in the 1970s. In other words, the civilian wing of the 
new administration consisted of a synthesis of ‘nationalist conservatives’ and 
‘republican conservatives’ who together devised new economic policies that 
introduced strong state and strong market economy aspects of the new-right 
hegemony to Turkish politics.345  
        In search of receiving broad political support from the masses, the generals 
began to use Islamic references and themes in their speeches to popularize their 
restoration project and replaced the militant secularism of the republican elites with a 
more conciliatory secularism.346 Moreover, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed 
by conservative members of the Hearth of Intellectual Association was adopted by 
generals347 who wanted to incorporate conservative segments of the society to the 
center and open up the domestic market to Islamic capital.348 During this period, the 
military administration approved greater religion instruction in the secular track 
system and integrated the new curriculum into its political agenda of seeking a closer 
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interaction of Turkish nationalism with Islamic elements.349 This education system 
emphasized soldier-statesman aspects of Ataturk and contained a nationalist 
interpretation of Islam that has reached its climax during Vehbi Dincerler’s term as 
Minister of Education. In response to the decline of Ataturkist ideology, coup leaders 
had begun a reconstruction process that revolved around the cult personality of 
Ataturk, using his centennial and promoted a pragmatic but yet nationalist attitude.350 
        The greatest damage in this period was inflicted on the leftist groups which were 
repressed, persecuted and disintegrated as a result of the authoritarian policies of the 
period.351 In addition generals attempted to reverse the social and political awakening 
experienced within the RPP in the pre-1980 period by sidelining bureaucrats, 
policymakers and politicians associated with the left of the center movement. It was 
for example hoped that the new center left party formed with the auspices of the 
generals, Populist Party, reminiscent of the Trust Party, would be able to generate 
support among the traditional RPP factions for the policies of the military coup, while 
any other genuine leftist parties formed in this era were banned from participating in 
the elections. Their goal was to seek a synthesis of Kemalism with leftist views to 
tame the radical elements that came to surface with the rise of left of the center 
movement and thereby position Populist Party as the loyal opposition to the post-1980 
political settlement. Social Democratic Party was formed as a response to this 
political plan and carried, at first, successfully the democratization and de-
militarization demands of the leftists. However the legal framework of the post-1980 
period significantly restricted the boundaries of the political system by limiting the 
political influence of civil associations and depoliticizing society and thus came to 
hinder the further development of social democratic parties. Due to the legal 
restrictions of the 1982 Constitution, for example, the very groups that would support 
a social democratic party such as university students, workers and civil servants were 
excluded from taking part in the political process. 
        This restoration attempt was, however, destined to fail from the beginning due to 
the contradictions inherent in the project designed by the coup leaders. The neo-
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liberal economic policies pursued by the military administration and continued by MP 
governments were contradictory to the Kemalist understanding of the organic state 
because they have gradually but surely eroded the ability of the state mechanisms to 
determine power relations within the society.352 By shifting the economic 
policymaking to the politicians and other economic agents along with the new-right 
hegemony around the globe, the generals contributed to a process that have not only 
increased the dynamism of the market forces but also strengthened civil society as an 
unintended consequence and thereby paved the way for the disintegration of the 
corporatist nature of the Turkish state. The possibility of preserving the state-led 
modernization was eliminated with the rise of a functioning market economy in which 
various social groups could find their own voice.   
         As the universal claims and aspirations of the modernization theory undergo 
significant criticism, the Turkish modernization project “with its singularity, austerity, 
and paternalism, appears woefully inadequate both as a source of inspiration and as a 
mechanism of control in economics, politics and cultural production”.353 Thus the 
locus of modernization rapidly shifted from the hands of the bureaucracy and the 
political elites to the rest of the society as individuals were no longer regarded as 
passive objects of a project but subject of their own history and capable of 
determining their individual lives.354 The aforementioned socio-economic 
developments have challenged the dominant state-centric discourse, undermining the 
Turkish modernization project but also caused a rupture within the constitutive period 
of the national culture in the early 1980s. 355 The efforts of the Turkish intelligentsia 
of understanding the local traditions of the Anatolian masses and “retrieving a Turkish 
identity” 356 from these folk elements357 were replaced by the post-modernist openings 
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of a new generation of authors.358 Deconstruction of the romanticist and modernist 
foundations of the national literature paved the way for the rise of new groups and 
new topics, associated with the emergence of identity politics in the political sphere, 
ranging from the underground poetry359 to feminist novels. 360   
3.3 Identity Politics 
         In light of the liberalization process, the Turkish political landscape in the 1990s 
witnessed a clash between the secular national identity as the bearer of the Turkish 
modernization project and the new social and political groups with their use of the 
language of difference to draw upon their identities.361 The point of demarcation was 
the change of political agenda from the grand strategies of modernization to identity 
politics,362 a process triggered by the rise of socio-political and religious groups with 
communitarian claims to identity. 363 As the emerging private media managed to 
eliminate the state control on the flow of information and raise the power of public 
opinion in a matter of few years, alternative political, cultural and religious groups 
representing “the other but real Turkey”364 found opportunities of expressing their 
views and bringing to light issues previously considered to be unacceptable by the 
political elites, involving questions of ethnicity, religion, laicism, minority status, 
cultural rights and norms of citizenship.365 
       These groups began to create and develop their own definitions and versions of 
history and undertook the task of deconstructing the official legitimacy of the political 
order.366 The rediscovery of history in Turkish society in this period brought attention 
to the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and encouraged the study of the oral 
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history of various different groups and facilitated the reemergence of their submerged 
identities. Many minority groups, even those ones which had initially supported the 
Kemalist modernization project, such as Alevis, women and non-Muslims, became 
increasingly disillusioned by their conditions in the society and detested the fact that 
they continued to be perceived as potential outsiders in Republican Turkey.367 As 
Keyman rightly notes, the tendency of Kemalism to develop, either a cultural or an 
ethnic-based understanding of national identity as part of its efforts to undertake 
modernization has ignored the multiplicity and relationality of the identity formation 
process368 and thereby excluded many groups whose identities were not deemed 
acceptable by the Kemalist elites who made modern Turkey in their own image. 
         The process of identity-formation in Turkey indeed encompasses a long time 
period whose origins could be traced back to the emergence of multi-party politics,369 
which mobilized the latent ethno-cultural and sectarian solidarities through the multi-
faceted interaction between the politicians and their voting base.370 It was however 
only with the 1980s that discourses of identity based on ethnic and religious 
distinctions have become more important than the economic struggle as the defining 
factor in the Turkish political context.371 This political phenomenon occurred mainly 
as a result of the growing number of migrants who managed to strengthen their own 
authentic cultures as part of a contest perceived to be one of identity. Rapid migration 
provided primordial identities with a new breeding space in the metropolitan areas 
due to the extensive social networks established among particular groups. Rather than 
adopting the associational networks provided in the modern setting of the city, the 
newcomers have most developed their own value systems as they were distanced from 
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their traditional roots.372 In the following sections, the emergence of identity politics 
in the Turkish political landscape tied to the Kurdish and Alevi movements are linked 
with the intra-party developments in SDPP during late 1980s and early 1990s, while 
the issue of resurgance of political Islam is more throughly discussed in the next 
chapter.  
3.4 Kurdish Radicalism 
          The Kurdısh community in Turkey have always had an uneasy relationship with 
the centralization and modernization efforts of, first, the Ottoman, then the Turkish 
state. Starting from the mid-19th century, the power and authority of decentralized 
social and political groups were seen as an obstacle to modernization and were tried to 
be curtailed through administrative reforms. However, as the power of these tribal 
elites couldn't be replaced by the state power, sheiks come to be the major political 
and social elite in the Kurdish regions. In reaction to the centralization efforts and 
partly with the effect of the emerging nationalism ideology and movements on the 
Ottoman territory, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism coincided with the demise of 
the Ottoman state, paving way to various rebellions and political movements led by 
tribal leaders and sheiks. Following the crush of these rebellions, Kurdish nationalist 
ideology survived particularly among the social elites and usually as an intellectual 
movement.373  
           Anytime the Turkish political elites sought to penetrate into the politics of the 
Kurdish region and ally with the political actors there, they did so through allying 
with the tribal leaders and sheiks in the region. This was also the case for Mustafa 
Kemal and his cadres leading the nationalist struggle. The temporary alliance between 
the Turkish and Kurdish political elites was broken right after the Independence War. 
This was primarily due to the changing character and ideology of the newly 
established nation-state. The transformation from the Empire to the nation-state 
implied the total destruction of the Ottoman "implicit contract"374 (zimni mukavele), a 
process which has been going on since the 19th century, and led to the politicization 
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of the Kurdish nationalist movement, which was primarily a cultural movement to 
that date. 
          The earliest rebellions of the Turkish Republic, and particularly the 1925 
Sheikh Said Rebelion alarmed the Republican elites against the threat of the Kurds 
and Kurdish nationalism to the new state and led to an intensification of the efforts to 
build a homogeneous Turkish national identity. Kurdish nationalism and identity was 
perceived as a threat to the Turkish state over the pre-modern character it was taken to 
represent, as a reactionary and fundamentalist movement which has close links with 
the tribal structure, provoked by foreign actors in an underdeveloped region.375 The 
perceived character of the Kurdish problem was particularly what the Kemalist 
Revolution wanted to eliminate through its modernization project. The ongoing latent 
conflict between Ankara and the Kurdish tribes in the eastern region, however, was 
gradually incorporated into the political system with the emergence of a multi-party 
regime. In order to win the elections, all the political parties, even the ultra-nationalist 
ones though to a limited extent, penetrated into the region and made considerable 
efforts to integrate Kurdish feudal leaders to the political networks of their parties. As 
the tribal ties was used for the integration of the Kurds into the Turkish political 
system, the tribal structure of the region remained intact. 
          Starting from the 1960s, Kurdish nationalist movement started to ally with 
leftist movements and to use a leftist discourse in line with the self-determination 
theory, which added a universal dimension to the nationalist ideology of the Kurdish 
intellectuals. In parallel with the polarization of the political environment, the Kurdish 
nationalist movement, which demanded the recognition of cultural, social and 
economic rights until the end of 1960s, became more politicized and started to use 
violence as a method for the fight to gain political rights for the Kurdish 
community.376 Primarily urban and educated, the Kurdish political elites also stressed 
the underdevelopment of the region, which can be overcome through the socialist 
system. Thus the Marxist intellectuals mostly perceived the issue from an economic 
perspective, arguing that the primary cause of the underdevelopment of the region is 
the feudal land structure worsened by the exploitative nature of capitalism and 
Turkish imperialism. The alliance with the Turkish left provided a political platform 
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for the Kurdish nationalism to voice and to express the political demands of the 
Kurdish community during the era. Nevertheless, Kurdish issue was never directly 
addressed by the political parties, save some extreme left groups and organizations, 
among them Turkish Workers Party and Turkish Revolutionary Worker and Peasant 
Party,377 which felt the need to stay committed to the official policy of ignoring the 
issue of Kurdish ethnicity and considering the problems to be derived from feudal 
origin. Political mobilization of the Kurdish people, however, came to a halt during 
the September 12 era, when all political parties were closed down, and all civil, ethnic 
and leftist political activities were paralyzed. Despite many restrictions placed upon 
any forms of organized political activity by mainstream political associations, let 
alone Kurdish ones, the Kurdish mobilization proved to be enduring. The coercive 
policies implemented by the military administration along with deteriorating 
economic conditions, however, alienated the local population and increased local 
support for the PKK movement.378  
            The existence of traditional links between the political center and the Kurdish 
periphery, benefiting mostly the feudal and tribal elements of the region, were 
gradually undermined with Kurdsh migration to the big cities and the creation of a 
micro-space for Kurdish politics in the Southeast Anatolia. While the early Kurdish 
migrants were already assimilated into the Turkish society and confined to the use of 
their cultural practices in their homes, many others began to place more emphasis on 
their ethnic and cultural identity based on their interactions with other groups. 
Coinciding with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the rise of identity politics in 
the world and in Turkey, this trend paved the way for a new urban and more radical 
Kurdish movement to flourish among the young generations whose members took 
more active roles in political, economic and cultural aspects of the urban context. On 
the other hand, the impact of the Kurdish intellectuals in the European countries in 
raising awareness about the Kurdish identity, both within the Kurdish community and 
among the European public, increased the political pressure on the Turkish state 
regarding human rights and particularly for more democratization to recognize the 
social, cultural and economic rights of the minorities.                              
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         The greater awareness of the Kurdish identity can also be attributed to the size 
of the Kurdish population and the active efforts of various Kurdish groups that have 
taken advantage of the new political and cultural spaced offered to them in the urban 
context. The rising radicalism inevitably had a deep impact on Kurdish political actors 
by forcing them to take more active positions on the Kurdish issue and make demands 
from the Turkish governments. According to Bozarslan, urban radicalism created a 
junction with Kurdish political actors who were integrated into the political system. 
As the Kurdish radicalism gained dominance in the urban centers and spread to the 
various parts of the Kurdish electorate, the Kurdish politicians in mainstream political 
parties could no longer remain indifferent to pressures.379  
        Helped with the improvement information technologies, both the PKK and the 
legal Kurdish parties could enjoy a level of support both in the urban and rural areas, 
that couldn't be gained by any other Kurdish movement before. Partly counting on 
this level of support, these movements could present themselves as the unified voice 
and even, at times, the sole representative of the Kurdish community in Turkey. 
Homogenization of the ethnic identity and centralization of the political and social 
networks, in this regard, imply a modernization process among the Kurdish 
population, alongside the Turkish modernization and in challenge to that. Indeed, 
these political movements have also stressed the underdevelopment of the region 
which is primarily due to the feudal structure of the Kurdish society, to them, that 
remained intact to date. Both the Turkish state and the tribal leaders allying with the 
mainstream Turkish political actors are held responsible for the continuation of this 
structure by them.                    
        In response to the rising political activism of Kurdish groups in search of carving 
space for their movement in the Turkish political landscape, Kurdish issue once again 
became an important element of Turkish politics in late 1980s. The demands of these 
groups for more cultural rights and local democracy could no longer be controlled by 
the mainstream political parties in the tight boundaries of the 1982 
Constitution..During this period some extreme-left groups occupied themselves with 
this issue, calling it a problem caused by the political restrictions introduced by the 
Turkish state and sought closer cooperation with the Kurdish movement to challenge 
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the political status quo.380 Following these demands within leftist circles for lifting of 
the current restrictions and more democratization, SDPP gradually recognized the 
ethnic element in this problem381 and thus became the first mainstream Turkish party 
to break apart from the state policy of attributing all opposition movements in the 
region to the pre-modern and tribal nature of its inhabitants.382 An off the agenda 
speech in parliament concerning the conditions and status of Kurds in Turkey 
delivered by Mehmet Ali Eren, SDPP Istanbul deputy, who argued that laws were not 
applied equally in the western and eastern parts of the country was sufficient to 
generate a political crisis within SDPP. His statement actually matched with the party 
policy of seeking cultural and political rights and a democratic settlement for the 
Kurdish people, living in the south-east region and was at first defended by Inonu. 
However, later, the mounting criticisms led Inonu to switch his position and go as far 
as to recommend him to be sent to the disciplinary committee.383 His statement should 
be taken within the context of the emergence of a group of leftist and Kurdish SDPP 
deputies who began to oppose the language ban and other political restrictions 
imposed on the Kurdish citizens in the name of democracy and human rights, a 
position also accepted by the party leadership albeit in more moderate terms.  
         This position was endorsed by a group of leftist deputies within the party and 
somewhat tolerated by the Inonu administration which was seeking ways to develop a 
synthesis between the RPP tradition and the social democratic ideology. On the other 
hand, the former RPP cadres, organized around the leadership of Deniz Baykal 
aspired to return SDPP to its roots by transforming SDPP with the principles and 
tenets of Kemalism to look alike with the old RPP.384 Coming from the RPP tradition, 
SDPP had difficulty managing these radical elements385 among its rank and file, 
mostly associated with Kurdish and Alevi groups and came close to disintegration due 
to the emphasis of sectarian and ethnic differences that caused a counter-response 
among Baykal loyalists. As migrant Kurdish and Alevi groups began to increase their 
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influence in the local organizations of the party, thanks to their cooperation and close 
bonds, there emerged, as Ayse Ayata observes, “a latent but serious conflict between 
groups representing old style clientele networks and those directly representing or 
collaborating with urban-based eastern ethnicity”.386 This group made its stand 
against Baykal loyalists in the 1988 party congress but failed to prevent Baykal from 
getting elected as the general secretary.  
         The more serious Kurdish crisis within SDPP, however, occurred in 1989 when 
seven Kurdish deputies were sent to the disciplinary board for going against the party 
discipline by attending an international conference on Kurdish national identity and 
human rights and, as a consequence, were expelled from the party. This was a 
controversial decision that polarized the party as a third of the SDPP came to the 
defense of these Kurdish deputies and urged the disciplinary committee to not give a 
punishment any severe than a simple warning. There were a lot of rumors that Baykal 
was behind the decision as those who favored the expulsion were all names close to 
him.387 Sensing a policy shift among the leadership cadre on the Kurdish issue, a 
group of leftist deputies388 had resigned in a defiant mood, protesting the party 
administration for resorting to anti-democratic means. The Kurdish deputies together 
with the leftist group who had also resigned from SDPP established the first-ever 
legal Kurdish party, People’s Labor Party, thereby creating a precedent for Kurdish 
political legalism and contributed to the development of a tradition of pro-Kurdish 
parties which would bring issues long silenced and ignored by the ruling elites to the 
political sphere. 389    
        In an effort to renew ties with the Kurdish electorate and alleviate the damage 
experienced by the party in the aftermath of the Paris Conference incident, SDPP had 
issued a comprehensive policy report on the Kurdish problem which surpassed in its 
tone any of the previous documents written by a mainstream party. Referring to the 
ban on the use of Kurdish as primitive and a tool of assimilation, the report called for 
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rescinding the ban on Kurdish language, abolishing the village guard system and 
ending the state of emergency in the region.390 Though seen by some intellectuals as a 
pragmatic move by the leadership of SDPP to regain some of the support it lost in the 
region following the expulsion of Kurdish MPs,391 many others have hailed this report 
as a very positive step in Turkish politics392 and argued that it signified the admittance 
of SDPP of the failure of the military measures in the Kurdish question.393 Following 
these conciliatory steps taken by SDPP and the decision of the Turkey’s Supreme 
Electoral Board to refuse to allow PLP to compete in the coming elections, leadership 
cadres of PLP and SDPP sought rapprochement and made an election coalition which 
would carry some pro-Kurdish politicians to the parliament. SDPP administration 
hoped that this deal would not only constitute a positive step in addressing the 
problems of the region but also gain them the necessary votes to substantially defeat 
DLP and possibly force Ecevit out of politics in the coming election. Inonu believed 
that this would not just be an electoral alliance but also give a clear message to the 
Kurdish citizens that SDPP was open to them.394  
       It should be noted that there were many within SDPP who opposed this merger 
lest it would generate a backlash among the voters in other parts of the country and 
come to harm the party in the long run. Fearing radical elements of the Kurdish 
movement to penetrate into the candidate lists of SDPP, many deputies in executive 
committee asked the party administration to exert more control over the candidate 
selection process and pick Kurdish candidates closer to the RPP tradition.395 Their 
fears turned out to be well founded as many PLP-origin candidates elected from the 
SDPP list were younger, more radical and less experienced than the old generation 
Kurdish politicians who were aware of the boundaries of the political system and 
were sensitive to the mainstream Turkish public opinion.396 The extensive ties 
between some of the Kurdish deputies, namely Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana and Sirri 
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Sakik and Kurdish radical movements, in particular PKK humiliated Inonu as the 
broker of the merger deal and harmed the party. The merger was skillfully exploited 
by Ecevit who accused SDPP leadership of harboring separatists and carrying their 
members to the parliament for political gain.397 Targeting the conservative and 
marginal segments of the society, Ecevit has juxtaposed his populist discourse to his 
nationalist views and emerged as the candidate in the left of the political spectrum 
which could develop similar positions to the official ideology.  Especially, following 
the Gulf War, Ecevit began to perceive the Kurdish problem as the biggest threat to 
the Turkish state and began to openly challenge those favoring a democratic 
settlement to the issue on the basis of granting cultural rights to the Kurdish 
citizens.398 
         Post-Cold War years have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of ethnic 
conflicts some of which occurred in close proximity to Turkey and brought the salient 
issue of ethnicity, long ignored by the political elites in accordance with Ataturkist 
nationalism, to the attention of the public opinion. These conflicts that involved Turks 
living in other countries such as the refugee problem in Bulgaria and the violent 
ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan or Muslims such as the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and 
the civil war in Chechnya deeply affected a wide segment of the Turkish society. 
Media coverage of the conflicts coupled with the active foreign policy pursued by the 
Turkish statesmen, who began to make references to the greater Turkish world, 
exposed Turkish people to a different world and a new political discourse.399 
Similarly, two waves of Kurdish refugees, fleeing from Saddam Hussein’s brutal 
actions and policies in 1988 and 1991, facilitated open discussion in the media and the 
political circles of the Kurdish issue, which was a taboo subject in the immediate 
years after the 1980 military coup.  
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        The social and demographic changes and the ongoing liberalization of the 
political system had prepared the conditions for a change of Turkish state’s official 
position on Kurdish issue. Especially in early 1990s, there was a growing consensus 
among mainstream politicians that new policies needed to be formulated to address 
the concerns, problems and grievances of the local population. The decisive step came 
when Ozal, immediately after he was elected as the eighth president of Turkey, 
asserted that he had Kurdish blood, and later repealed the ban on the Kurdish 
language. There was willingness among the coalition partners to devise a new 
approach to the Kurdish issue and introduce democratic elements to the region, 
shifting from the official policy that perceived Kurdish question as a domestic 
security problem. The coalition had made a promising start as Prime Minister Demirel 
went on record to say that he recognized the reality of the Kurdish population and 
Deputy Prime Minister Inonu urged that cultural identity of Kurdish citizens should 
be recognized.  
        In sharp contrast to the hope generated by the coalition partners, the new 
government failed to take substantive steps in solving some of the severe political and 
socio-economic problems in the region. All the promises given by Demirel and Inonu 
for the creation of a new democratic era did not materialize to the dismay of many 
Kurds in the region which eventually played into the hands of the hardliners. This 
rising Kurdish sentiment has reached its peak under TPP-SDPP coalition government 
during the 1992 Nawruz celebrations during which harsh treatment of the security 
forces resulted in a general riot that left 92 dead and 341 wounded, serving as a final 
blow to the emerging relationship between moderate Kurdish nationalism and liberal 
political actors.400 In response to the surmounting challenge posed to his government, 
Demirel has decided to abandon the south-east policy to the military, removing the 
possibility of attaining a democratic settlement in the region. In response to its failure 
to reduce the tension in the region and develop ties with the Kurdish deputies who 
resigned in the aftermath of the Nawruz disaster in protest of the security forces, 
SDPP began to steadily lose support of the Kurdish groups. Inonu’s plans of 
incorporating Kurdish political actors to the political system by giving them a legal 
space within his party to voice their views, suggestions and concerns over their 
problems had all but failed.  
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       The sudden death of Ozal in 1993 and Demirel’s plans to become his successor 
followed by Inonu’s decision to not seek leadership of SDPP for another term and 
bow out of politics left a vacuum in Turkish politics. During this transition period in 
Turkish politics, the escalating violence in the southeast and the harshness of the 
armed conflict that followed reinforced the exclusionary attitude of the Turkish 
political actors and facilitated the Turkish nationalist discourse to establish itself as 
hegemonic in the political arena.401 In response to the strength of PKK which has 
grown to dangerous proportions and has become strong enough to challenge the 
governmental authority in the region, there was a wave of extra-juidicial killings, 
especially during Ciller government, targeting no fewer than 64 Kurdish community 
leaders and activists402 whose murders are believed to be carried out on the instruction 
and under the knowledge of the intelligent service of the gendarmie, JITEM, and 
carried out by confessants, village guards and Hizbullah guerrillas.403 In this dark 
period, some elements within the security forces resorted to illegal measures to 
counter the PKK forces and were gradually incorporated to the mafia-politics 
connections by taking part in casino and drug deals.404 These developments 
stregthened the power, influence and prestige of hardliners in Turkish politics; 
contributed to the rise of neo-nationalist movements and thereby inhibited the 
consolidation of legal and democratic policies towards the region within Turkish 
politics, advocated by some circles within SDPP. 
       Ciller’s decision to lift the immunity of the Kurdish deputies and get them 
arrested with media coverage as part of her plans to boost the electoral chances of 
TPP by appealing to the nationalists was a disaster for SDPP as it decisively lost the 
support of the Kurdish constituencies who switched mostly to Kurdish parties in the 
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coming elections. More importantly the break of the Kurdish group within SDPP 
deprived the leftist group from a very crucial electoral base and facilitated the shift of 
the party policy by emphasizing a more nationalist discourse in line with the political 
developments. Thus the uneasy coalition between leftist intellectuals and union 
leaders and Alevi-Kurdish groups that made up SDPP came to disintegrate, thereby 
eliminating the plural elements of the rank and file. The paradox occurring from the 
coexistence of the bureaucracy oriented party members with close ties to the RPP 
legacy and ethnic, sectarian and cultural groups was finally settled by the exclusion of 
the latter but as will be clear in the coming pages this would not prove to be a solution 
to the deep rooted problems of SDPP.  
3.5 Alevi Revivalism 
        Based on the religious traditions of Shiite Islam, Zoroastrianism and Shamanism, 
Alevism is a syncretistic heterodox identity that have eased the conversion process of 
Turcoman tribes to Islam in the initial period of Anatolian conquest and thereby 
reached a large following among Turkic tribes.405 Despite the fact that the eclectic and 
multi-layered beliefs and practices associated with Alevism is considered to be 
heterodox by some Sunni believers, the size of the community ranges from 15 to 25 
percent406 and thereby constitutes a significant part of the Turkish Islamic community. 
Alevi groups constituted a counter-culture all throughout Ottoman history, as they 
resisted the sedentary life imposed by the Ottoman authorities and thereby preserved 
their cultural and religious identity, albeit in a parochial fashion.407 Their seclusion 
and alienation from state mechanisms in this period enabled Alevis to retain their 
cultural specificity and distinct form of Muslim practice. As a result, Alevi opposition 
against the urban, Orthodox Sunni and Ottomanist center based on a nomadic 
peripheral unit became the basis for the overwhelming support given to the Turkish 
Republic for breaking down the Sunni hegemony.408 The relationship of the Alevi 
groups with the state, however, is ambivalent due to the mixed results the Republican 
period has generated for the Alevi community. Alevis have been enthusiastic 
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supporters of the republican reforms and in turn greatly benefited from them, as they 
had received an equal status with the Sunni groups and could live in peace away from 
state persecution.409 Moreover Turkish Alevis have been in sympathy with the secular 
culture and humanistic historiography developed in this period.410 Nevertheless they 
have never been explicitly acknowledged in state policy which has skewed towards 
the Sunnis with the transition to multi-party democracy.411 
         Rapid migration into big cities since the early 1960s began to change the highly 
traditional and parochial culture of the Alevis, who have historically lived in distant 
and secluded Anatolian villages, secure from the reach of the Ottoman military forces. 
In time Alevis managed to form distinct cultural zones scattered across cities, 
developing a line of Alevi communities all the way from Turkey to European 
countries. While showing signs of politico-cultural and socio-economic dynamism, 
they have also witnessed the decline of the religious appeal of the traditional 
institutions and authorities such as dedes and pirs, especially among members of the 
younger generation, in response to growing levels of education and urbanization.412 In 
addition, it was no longer possible to avoid interaction with Sunni groups, as members 
of both communities entered a competition for jobs, houses, credits and all kinds of 
other necessary urban resources.413  
       The ensuing enmities whose origins go back to centuries old hostilities and 
prejudice between members of the two groups came to correspond to the existing 
ideological cleavage that resurfaced in the liberal environment of the 1961 
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Constitution.414 Especially during the polarizing environment of the 1970s, Alevis 
together with Kurds have mostly participated in the leftist movements and mostly 
associated themselves with RPP, following Ecevit’s rise to power. Majority of the 
community, however, preferred to stay out of the political conflicts and sought better 
opportunities for education and greater access to wealth and power.415 Many 
hometown associational networks were formed to function during this period as a 
protective safety net and enabled many Alevis to preserve their communal ties with 
their friends and relatives in the villages. 
        In terms of their political preferences, Alevis mainly associated themselves with 
the RPP-SDPP tradition out of loyalty to the republican reforms even though at times 
some overtly Alevi parties emerged to receive the support of the community, such as 
the Union Party in the 1970s and Peace Party in the 1990s. Both parties, however, 
failed to attract the support of majority of the Alevi community which remained 
committed to the tradition of Republican parties.416 Following the 1980 coup, many 
former socialist activists within the Alevi groups took refuge in social democratic 
politics and participated in the democratization attempts of the SDPP opposition. In 
time, they came to be overrepresented among SDPP cadres, particularly in Ankara 
where they constitute a quarter of the population417 and hold 4 out of 6 SDPP 
affiliated municipalities.418 Apart from the sheer size of the Alevi community, this 
strong involvement and overrepresentation in SDPP politics could be attributed to the 
strong solidarity networks developed by Alevi migrants who prove highly effective in 
terms of using their organization skills and contacts to mobilize voters. 
      1990s witnessed an ever-growing number of publications covering diverse aspects 
of Alevi society, their cultural and religious beliefs, relations with the state and 
history. Though there have been previous attempts of discovering the Alevi identity, 
the significant feature of this period is that these works were mostly written and 
published by Alevis in an attempt to take advantage of the new environment for 
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expression of opinion and identity formation.419 The past decade has also seen a rapid 
rise in the number of Alevi cultural associations, national, regional and local radio 
stations,420 periodicals, books, conferences and festivals organized by the Alevi 
community devoted to the exploration of Aleviness.421 This phenomenon paralleled 
the revival of Alevi identity422 and restoration of its cultural traditions within the 
urban space that carried this long persecuted group to the public sphere. 
      In accordance with these developments Alevi tradition became more openly 
celebrated and politicized in order to address and reflect upon the concerns of the 
members of the community. 423 This has legitimized the Alevi identity with the 
development of a ‘multi-public sphere’424 in which issues, values, people, institutions 
and ideologies that were considered unacceptable or illegitimate by official policy 
came to be represented. Mainstream Alevi associations such as Cem Vakfi, among 
others, presented some demands to the official authorities and successive 
governments not only asking for cultural recognition but also some changes in state 
policy. Furthermore, Alevis have greatly benefited from the secular media networks 
against the rise of Islamic groups and used them to publicize the demands of the 
community from Sunni groups.425 In fact as a response to the rise of Islamic 
movements in the 1990s, it has become an unofficial state policy to appeal to the 
Alevis who are especially courted by politicians from center-left parties. Haci Bektas 
Veli celebrations being held in Haci Bektas town of Kirsehir became a familiar site 
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for party leaders, such as Deniz Baykal, Erdal Inonu, Mesut Yilmaz and Suleyman 
Demirel who have participated in the activities in the previous years. Thus, a 
substantial number of secular journalists, bureaucrats and politicians see Alevism as a 
life jacket to protect the secular and Kemalist image of the country.426 Indeed they 
were considered by Kemalist circles as a natural ally in their struggle against political 
Islam and a guarantee that Islamic parties would never gain majority support to 
reverse the contributions of the republican regime.427 
      As the power and influence of the left further eroded during TPP-SDPP, the 
cordial relations between the Alevis and the left-wing political parties became less 
prevalent. This decline of loyalty towards the RPP-SDPP tradition has been mainly a 
response to the ineffective policies pursued by this party in the aftermath of the Sivas 
incident and Gazi demonstrations. Sivas tragedy signaled Alevis not only the rising 
trend of Islamic movements in Turkey but more importantly the inability of SDPP to 
provide them relief and security from the hostile forces. While many Alevis continued 
to support SDPP and take active part in its activities, nevertheless DLP, thanks to its 
charismatic leader, emerged as a serious contender for their votes.428 This separation 
from the ranks of SDPP was more pronounced in the case of Alevi Kurds among 
whom there was a shift from religious to ethnic identity in 1980s so that there was a 
growing wave of support given to the People’s Democracy Party since mid 1990s. As 
a result, following the Sivas events, Alevis became more assertive in pronouncing 
their cultural identity and increasingly disillusioned with the state authorities as well 
as the mainstream political parties, including the SDPP, which were unable to protect 
them against the resurging Sunni tide. This prevalent and growing Sunni mood led 
some state officials and officers to harshly treat Alevi peasants in Sivas and Tunceli 
by accusing them of collaborating with PKK terrorists and forced them to evacuate 
their villages.429  
       The recognition demands of the newly emerging groups could only be satisfied 
by instituting politics of difference and designing the institutions of the republic more 
flexible, democratic and pluralistic in accordance with the modernity critiques put 
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forward in the late-modern times.430 However the paradox is that modernity has not 
been yet a completed process in the Turkish context as the rural life and relations are 
not fully transformed into a properly urban dominant industrial society.431 The project 
of modernity, if not in the Kemalist model, has still not been exhausted and therefore 
parties possessing the impetus of change have the only chance of winning elections. 
On the other hand, state-led modernization could no longer resume since the 
globalization process renders it impossible for particular social groups let alone the 
entire society to be kept under control by a state-centric and authoritarian regime. This 
however poses a significant challenge to the constitutive modernist discourse, which 
set the parameters of Turkish social democracy.432 Modernity is not yet a completed 
process in this country as it did not fully manage to transform rural life and relations. 
If the elimination of peasantry is taken as the primary determinant for developing a 
liberal democratic regime,433 then, Turkish society is still far from achieving this goal. 
        The ideological boundaries of Turkish social democracy could never transcend 
beyond the romanticist and modernist understanding of the Enlightenment ideals and 
remained locked in a utopian episteme towards the rest of the society. Party elites 
continued to perceive members of the society as subjects who could and, more 
importantly, should be transformed in accordance with the progressive views. Mango 
is indeed right to conclude that even though class basis of SDPP was uncertain, its 
cultural identity resembled the free-thinkers in the 19th century context.434 The failure 
to admit that social groups were no longer in the infant stages of modernity prevented 
the party elites from fully noticing the socio-economic, political and cultural changes 
experienced in the 1980s, thus distancing them from the newly emerging and active 
segments of the society. As a consequence SDPP could not prevent the radicalization 
of these identity groups within its constituency due to its failure to develop 
multicultural and democratic policies that could satisfy their demands. This fettered 
SDPP’s merging with the new social cleavages and constituted a roadblock in its 
efforts to become a social democratic party in its fullest sense.  
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          In conclusion, the crisis of social democracy in early 1990s was caused by the 
impossibility of revising and transforming some of the structured aspects of 
modernization, particularly its nationalist and radical secularist components even 
though the newly emerging social groups were in the process of deconstructing this 
framework. Turkish social democracy has reached its epistemological limits by the 
turn of the century, arising from the crisis experienced by state-centric modernization 
model that served as the constitutive agent of center-left parties. Indeed in early 1990s 
SDPP would resemble a loose coalition of urban middle classes and union groups 
mobilized through ethnic and religious identities than a party, segmented among 
particular cliques and factions. Thus, in early 1990s social democratic movement has 
reached the epistemological boundaries of its parochial ideology and experienced 
structural limitations to generate a revival of its agenda; instead, as will be clear in the 
coming chapter, it became conservative in light of the recent development and more 
importantly reactionary towards these groups.    
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                                                CHAPTER 4 
1990s AND THE CRISIS OF KEMALISM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW 
PARADIGM 
 
       The growing inadequacy of the state to account for the complex politico-cultural 
and socio-economic developments in Turkish society, as discussed in the previous 
two chapters, eroded the particular formation of modernization, shifting the focus 
from the state to the society and, more importantly, put a heavy strain on the official 
ideology. Hence, the polarized debates on the Republican historiography and 
significance of the Turkish national identity facilitated various social groups to 
challenge and undermine Kemalism’s traditional hold on society.435 The rapid social 
and economic developments caused by integration of Turkish economy into the 
international markets outdated the conditions which have defined the early decades of 
the Republican era and exhausted the Kemalist paradigm. Following the demise of 
statism as an effective economic model and the rupture of Turkish modernization 
contributed to the emergence of critical accounts of Kemalism in early 1990s, 
especially targeting its secularist, statist and nationalist tenets. The crisis experienced 
by Kemalism and the neo-Kemalist response it generated inevitably affected Turkish 
social democracy which considered Kemalism to be its constitutive variable. This 
chapter explores the liberal and Islamic challenges to Kemalism and analyze how they 
came to shape the ongoing ideological struggle within SDPP and social democratic 
politics at large.  
           Kemalism first emerged as a Weltanschaung par excellence, epitomizing the 
decision of the republican elites to yield to the idea of transformation and radical 
rupture with the past. In time, however, the charismatic rule of Ataturk was 
routinized436 and supplemented by the bureaucracy mainly under the Inonu 
administration and turned into an ideology to strengthen the dominance of the state 
vis-à-vis the weak social and economic groups.437 Kemalism was formulated in the 
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conditions of the early republican period in order to rapidly modernize a largely 
peasant society, lacking means of participation and mobilization in the political order 
and thus it could only survive as long as this condition prevailed. Incorporation of the 
rural masses into the political process through free elections and, more importantly, 
urbanization have created practical problems for Kemalism and shifted its axis to the 
right of the political spectrum in the multi-party period. It managed to survive in the 
1923-1980 period not rather but because of its hegemonic position over the society 
thanks to its acceptance by the state elites as the official ideology. As long as it 
retained this status in the eyes of the civilian and military bureaucracy, all political 
parties so far, even those claiming to be against Kemalism, interpreted it in a distinct 
manner to suit their own political agenda. However, arguably this was the main 
reason for its inability to adjust to changing conditions and become a conservative 
epistemology despite its initial progressive openings. Progressive elements of 
Kemalism gradually lost their pace and came to be interpreted as the preservation of 
the institutional arrangements and reforms enacted in the early years of the 
republic.438   
4.1  Liberal Challenge 
       Turkey in the 1990s has begun to build up a new social discourse in line with the 
neo-liberal developments of the previous decade in an attempt to get out of the 
existing statist discourse, both with its political elements and economic 
implications.439 The prevalence of state on all aspects of the Turkish society and the 
content of the existing democracy were discussed, revolving around the debates 
known as the Second Republican debate in the early 1990s. Second Republican group, 
consisting of very prominent journalists, politicians and scholars, an uneasy coalition 
of mostly old Marxist revisionists and former socialists, but also some liberals and 
Islamists, united by their opposition to the Kemalist order, came to embody the 
liberalization and democratization demands of the era and proposed an alternative 
political agenda that was planned to complement the economic liberalization of the 
previous decade.440 On the other hand, some Islamist intellectuals and politicians who 
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sympathize with some of the second Republican criticisms refrained from associating 
closely with them due to their Western orientation.441 Their political views and 
arguments with their emphasis on an Islamic identity will be discussed more 
thoroughly in this coming chapter. Suffice it to say here that search for new politics 
on a more liberal and democratic basis gained pace in the early 1990s and 
increasingly targeted the Kemalist character of the political regime in a unified 
fashion.  
         Second Republicans have depicted Kemalism with its elitist, Jacobin and 
authoritarian heritage that facilitated the state at the hands of “the triple bureaucracy” 
i.e. the affluent class, bureaucracy and the military to act in the name of its citizens as 
the main obstacle over the democratization process. Based on the priority given to 
republican values over democracy, elected bodies representing the will of the majority 
were always less powerful than the appointed official, not least the military enjoying 
an influence over politics unseen in democratic countries.442 Moreover, the alleged 
threat posed by Kurdish nationalism and religious fundamentalism, which could be 
solved through democratic channels, according to the aforementioned group, has been 
manipulated by the republican elites over the decades to frighten the masses. They 
have directed their criticisms to various aspects of the regime, ranging from the 
condition of the State Economic Enterprises to education and health systems, pointing 
out the deficiencies and limitations of the current order mostly due to its low regard 
for individuals.  
       As an alternative to the Kemalist republican model, they proposed the creation of 
a new democratic constitution in a different fashion than the previous constitutions, 
all prepared by the military or under its control, and establish the socio-economic and 
legal framework for creating a more pluralist and democratic political structure in 
which popular sovereignty reflected in a properly functioning parliament would be the 
basis for the new regime. They opt for a liberal capitalist society with its individual 
oriented politics in a Lockean sense and emphasize the primacy of the 
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democratization process against the dominant republican features.443 Surmounting the 
existing regime deadlock could be achieved by sidelining the Kemalist heritage and 
setting the foundation of a pluralist democracy based on rule of law, decentralized 
political authority,444 liberal secularism similar to the British tradition and protection 
of civil liberties.445  
        The second Republican debates have found an echo among a group of leftist 
intellectuals, aspiring to bring a more liberal approach to Turkish social democratic 
tradition in the early 1990s. Their views are crucial not only to understand the 
relatively liberal environment at the time but also to analyze the intra-party 
discussions and the soul searching process taking place within SDPP.446 Some of the 
discussed ideas would repeatedly come up in the SDPP party meetings and 
conventions, mostly associated with the new left group and their attempts to create the 
framework of a post-Kemalist order. Aside from the socio-economic developments 
surrounding the Ozal era, these liberal leftists were deeply influenced by the rising 
liberal movements within the social-democratic parties in various European countries 
such as France, Sweden and England in response to the dominant new right agenda.447 
While these liberal readings of leftist ideology448 have emerged most specifically to 
address the retreat of the social democracy against the new-right paradigm,449 in the 
Turkish context, the main purpose was to diminish the power of the state vis-à-vis the 
civil society and criticize the anti-democratic aspects of Kemalism. 
        The division between state and civil society constitute the primary political line 
of demarcation for the left intellectuals who have considered the strengthening of civil 
society as a necessary condition of the democratic regime and thus the basis for the 
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continuation of liberalization and economic growth.450 Hence, at the center of their 
arguments is the notion of civil society as the embodiment of sectional interests of 
social groups and individuals, running counter to the corporatist and authoritarian 
tradition of the Ottoman-Turkish polity. They argued that the existence of a strong 
state tradition enhanced by the authoritarian and elitist principles of Kemalism 
hindered the development of civil society and limited the power of the civic 
associations against the state. The central importance given to the notion of civil 
society in the views of the leftist liberals could be traced back to the writings of Idris 
Kucukomer who managed to clearly show the limitations of the elitist approach to 
Turkish politics451 and argued against the generic opposition towards civil society and 
democratic rule among the intelligentsia.452 
        Instead of criticizing Ozal administration as fashionable within the leftist 
political spectrum, these intellectuals have generally embraced the outward-oriented 
growth model enacted with the 24 January economic decisions and came to recognize 
its positive aspects. They realized the realities of the new globalization age that brings 
an end to economic sovereignty453 and autarchy and advocate new policies that differ 
from traditional leftist still loyal to the statist development model and etatist economic 
principles. When they did criticize the government, it was mainly on the grounds that 
it did not go far in eliminating the scale of state interventionism and protectionism 
inherent in Turkish economy but also emphasized the social costs and political risks 
of the growing poverty and income disparities.454 Leftist liberals supported economic 
liberalization despite its socially destructive results with the hope that the corporatist 
state structure that imposed its will on social groups would disintegrate. Moreover, 
they believed that democracy could only survive with a free market economy as long 
as the necessary political and legal framework is established.455       
         Although they went to great lengths to emphasize that they were neither a part 
of the Second Republicans nor directly cooperating with them, these leftist liberals 
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shared the basic arguments of the Second Republicans and openly called for further 
democratization of the political system.456 Their primary task was to continue the 
liberal reforms introduced by the Motherland governments and shift them mainly to 
the political sphere with the purpose of completing the economic revolution of the 
1980s,457 albeit using a more leftist approach. Some of the policies proposed consisted 
of creating regional parliaments and elected mayor positions, strengthening the civil 
society, granting cultural rights and autonomy for minorities, undertaking 
privatization, and protecting civil liberties against the arbitrary control of the state.458 
Rather than rejecting the Kemalist reforms implemented in the 1920s and renouncing 
the political legacy of founding elites, Akad, for example, argued the necessity of a 
social democratic party that would distance itself from the authoritarian measures of 
the era.459 
         The liberal leftist challenge against Kemalism was not only confined to the 
ideological debates concerning prominent intellectuals among the upper ranks of 
SDPP but also involved many other media outlets, political organizations and 
communities linked to the party. Probably the most well-publicized and provocative 
of these debates took place within the Cumhuriyet, a Kemalist daily, where a younger 
generation of journalists has attempted to reform the management and administration 
of the newspaper and revise some of its publishing policies. The liberal trio in 
Cumhuriyet, namely editor-in-chief Hasan Cemal, Okay Gonensin and Emine 
Usakligil, wanted to bring a less-ideological and more liberal and professional 
approach to journalism and refrain from too closely associating the daily with SDPP, 
especially its orthodox Kemalist wing.460 Over the recent years, old guards such as 
Ilhan Selcuk, Ali Sirmen and Ugur Mumcu have openly supported SDPP even though 
allegations of misconduct were surfacing in many SDPP controlled municipalities. 
This was indeed a daring attempt on behalf of the liberal faction, not only because 
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Cumhuriyet, from the first day of its publication, has been very closely associated 
with the Kemalist reforms and the republican ideal, going at times as far as to serve as 
the unofficial spokesperson for the regime, but also due to its unchanging opposition 
to liberalism over the decades. While its adoption of a leftist agenda was rather a 
recent phenomenon, going back only to the 1960s when left Kemalism was on the 
rise, its support for Westernization, national developmentalism, and anti-liberalism 
was unwavering since its establishment. 
          The disagreement that led to the liberal putsch against the Kemalist faction 
arose over a column written by Osman Ulagay who, unlike rest of the Cumhuriyet 
columnists, openly advocated a center-right grand coalition between True Path and 
Motherland Parties, following the 1991 general elections.461 Ilhan Selcuk, relying on 
the support he received from other columnists, accused Ulagay of attempting to 
prevent the possibility of SDPP to come to power and accused him of being a 
spokesperson for the bourgeoisie.462 When his column was not removed by Hasan 
Cemal as demanded by the Kemalist columnists, the traditional Kemalist cadre had 
decided to resign en masse, arguing that the policy of the newspaper is been skewed 
towards the interests of the bourgeoisie. This break caused the eruption of a long and 
heated debate that mostly resumed in newspaper columns, involving personal attacks 
and allegations going back and forth between Kemalists employed now in major 
dailies such as Hurriyet, Sabah and Milliyet and liberal leftists in Cumhuriyet. 
Following the resignation of the prominent Kemalist columnists, a number of leftist 
journalists and scholars mostly associated with the liberal faction of the Turkish left, 
such as Sahin Alpay, Ilter Turan, Caglar Keyder, Ilkay Sunar and Seyfettin Gursel, 
replaced the resigned columnists and joined the writing crew.463  
        Although the liberals seemed to have the upper hand in the beginning, since they 
gained the control of the newspaper and began to create a new team of columnists, 
their cause was not supported by a substantial number of the readers of the 
newspaper. Faced with a surprisingly successful embargo by its readers that reduced 
the circulation number to around 60,000 from its climax slightly over 110,000, 
Cumhuriyet went into serious financial problems; could not pay its dept and came 
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close to bankruptcy.464 With the bleak financial situation and an unfavorable decision 
at the Board of Directors meeting, the liberals had no choice but to resign from the 
newspaper and make way for the return of the Kemalist columnists. Their come-back 
to the newspaper in triumph, following the resignations of the liberals in the 
administration, was clearly a dramatic victory for the Kemalists, who not only gained 
the control of the newspaper but also gained a free hand to shift the publishing policy 
in line with the rise of the neo-Kemalist movement, discussed more thoroughly in the 
coming section. Hence, in the coming years, the publishing policy of Cumhuriyet 
would begin to emphasize its statist and nationalist roots in response to the rise of 
Kurdish radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism, sometimes in a contradictory fashion 
with its leftist tendencies.  
          What is unique about this period is that for the first time in the history of 
Turkish social democracy, a growing number of intellectuals associated with 
RPP/SDDP tradition made efforts to reshape the ideology of the party to transform it 
along the lines of universal principles of its counterparts in European countries. Even 
during the climax of the left of the center movement within RPP in the 1970s, there 
was never an attempt to amalgamate the revolutionary aspects and the Kemalist 
principles of the party with Marxist ideas to develop a genuine leftist movement 
linked to the universal ideals of social democracy. Indeed, for this reason, 
emphasizing his opposition to Marxism on rather Popperian grounds,465 Ecevit 
frequently made use of the term democratic left instead of social democracy to 
describe the ideological position of RPP which accepted a democratic left program466 
in its 1974 statue convention.467 Unable to break free from its populist, nationalist and 
republican roots,468 left of center movement, despite its revolutionary aspects in terms 
of reorganizing the party ranks, in practice, has become a futile attempt to combine 
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the statist/centralist/populist ideology with the Ahi/lonca tradition with no room for 
socialist openings.469  
         The Second Republic debates immediately resonated among leftist intellectuals 
linked with the social democrat movement and profoundly affected the course of the 
ongoing intra-party struggle for determining the political agenda and ideological 
framework of SDPP. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, former cadres of RPP were 
divided on the question of the role of Kemalism in Turkish social democracy. After 
resigning from his post, Ecevit refused to act together with his former colleagues 
since he wanted to remove himself from the traditional RPP circles. Hence he has 
rejected the RPP heritage, arguing that RPP as a party failed to reach the masses 
because of its defects inherited from the single party era. Instead, he adopted a new 
organization structure by excluding the former cadres, politicians and intellectuals 
from his party and relied on his charisma to gather votes.470 This populist strategy, 
however, in time, led him to be prone to center-right and even conservatism471 with 
his emphasis on a national left model.472 
       Most of the former RPP politicians, on the other hand, gathered around Inonu to 
establish Social Democratic Party, which served as an alternative to the pseudo-leftist 
Populist Party formed by the permission of the military administration. No party other 
than SDP had ever used the concept of social democracy alone to represent its 
political philosophy and agenda473 and in that sense the institutional character of the 
party represented an attempt, at least on the part of some of its rank and file, to 
distance from the RPP legacy and employ new ideas and concepts in its political 
journey. However after the merger with Populist Party, the party elites gradually 
returned back to the parochial character of social democracy and distance themselves 
from the activism observed in the early months of the party.474 From its founding 
SDPP identified with the basic tenets of Kemalism and came to endorse the principles 
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of the Six Arrows in the absence of RPP. This is reflected in all the official party 
documents and programs in which the Six Arrows is mentioned as The Six Principles 
to be Followed in Achieving the Task and the historical legacy of RPP is incorporated 
under a section called Our Historical Piers that refer to the National Struggle Period 
and the War of Independence as well as Erzurum and Sivas Congress.475 
         In the aftermath of a few years of Motherland rule and neo-liberal hegemony, 
however, a growing faction within SDPP began to point out the necessity of their 
party to reconsider its Kemalist roots and advocated a renewal of the party agenda by 
breaking with the established principles of the RPP tradition. Indeed, the entire history 
of SDPP consisted of these endless intra-party debates, revolving around the issues of 
RPP heritage, Six Arrows and Kemalism, which split the party into two factions, 
namely the old guards in the party administration such as Inonu, Kumbaracibasi and 
Fikri Saglar but also Baykal and his RPP team versus a growing reformist group of 
party activists and union leaders, close to the aforementioned leftist intellectuals of 
the period. These reformers realized that due to the recent political changes and 
economic development, Kemalism could no longer serve as the basis of a political 
party faced with multi-faceted problems. Their goal was to disassociate the left 
ideology from its elitist, statist and anti-democratic roots and settle accounts with 
Kemalism through a rupture with the past.476 Only then, would the social democrats 
be able to become the driving force of democratization and catalyst for building a 
democratic consensus upon which a new political regime could be established.477  
         In order to manage this, some attempts were made to undertake the ambitious 
task of showing the incongruence of social democracy with Kemalism and create a 
new ideological base for strengthening the social democratic culture in Turkey.478 It 
was argued that the populist elements of Kemalism constitute a solidaristic 
formulation of social relations and organize the society through corporatist 
arrangements in a uniform fashion that leaves no room for a class structure.479 In that 
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sense, historically, Turkish social democracy movement lacked a class element, thus 
remaining closed to the Marxist tradition which served as the main ideological source 
of universal social democracy. Hence, Turkish social democracy since its inception in 
1965 with the rise of the left of center movement paid special attention to remaining 
within the confines of a strict legalism, refraining from challenging the legitimacy of 
the political order and remained closed to the radical elements. It was in this light that 
universal principles of the social democratic ideology and a Marxist tradition have 
been rejected, thereby never playing even a limited role in shaping the political 
process.480 In addition, the authoritarian and centrist structure developed during 1930s 
hinders the formation of a liberal democratic tradition and are inadequate to provide 
the basis of a social democratic party.  
        The reformist faction was opposed by many orthodox members who, building on 
the tradition of left Kemalism, insisted that Kemalism, not least with its modernist 
epistemology and revolutionary and anti-imperialist character, should be taken as an 
epiphenomenon in the development of social democracy which, they believed, could 
not be conceived without the satisfaction of this condition.481 The radical 
modernization and anti-imperialist aspects of Kemalism, together with its solidaristic 
overtones, were taken as the constitutive variable of social democratic ideology, 
originating from petite bourgeoisie radicalism in the Turkish context. The party 
administration, especially Erdal Inonu was rather uneasy about this prolonged debate 
since he is of the opinion that Turkish social democracy has evolved from the Turkish 
national liberation movement so that there was no incompatibility between social 
democracy and Kemalism.482 
         The reformists wanted to transform SDPP into a mass party of labor with close 
ties to the progressive segments of the society and a defender of democratic principles 
for developing a pluralistic society. Against the authoritarian and restrictive political 
system created by the military administration, they thought SDPP should become the 
main agent of democratization, gathering all the liberal, pluralistic and democratic 
forces of the society behind its political agenda. Fearful of these attempts that sought 
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to reformulate a new social democratic model not resting on Kemalist tenets, which 
would clearly open into question their role and function in the party, members in the 
Baykal faction tried to situate SDPP on the RPP tradition and resume their mission 
which was interrupted by the 1980 coup.483 In the views expressed by some Baykal 
loyalists, who were also members of the party executive committee, such proposals 
would harm the unitary state and distance the party from its political and moral roots 
since social democracy is only one of the tenets of SDPP. The party administration 
was rather ambivalent on the topic as it attempted to reach a synthesis of the 
arguments of both groups, hoping to preserve stability and unity within SDPP. In spite 
of the fact that Inonu accepted the legacy of RPP without any objections, he also 
noted that each party must change; thus SDPP was a new version of RPP that went 
under transformation in light of the recent socio-economic developments.  
          The main difficulty for the reformist group arose from the fact that they could 
not reach a consensus among themselves let alone formulate a consistent and effective 
ideology to facilitate change in SDPP. While a group within the reformist faction, 
including, among others, names such as Ismail Cem, perceived Six Arrows as an 
obstacle for the development of a social democratic movement and called for a clear 
break with RPP tradition,484 another group, mostly organized around Ertugrul Gunay, 
emphasized the positive elements of Kemalism and wanted to take this period as the 
origin of their progressive movement.485 This view was supported by many close to 
the Inonu administration as well as Gurkan486 group. Remained somewhat out of these 
debates, another group, which has constituted the core intellectual body of SDP in 
early 1980s, represented by Karakas and his Istanbul team, found such discussions to 
be futile since a new social democrat party should mainly focus on its organizational 
structure, membership profile and ideological framework.487 Adopting a social 
democratic character could only be accomplished by establishing intra-party 
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democracy and reforming the organizational identity of SDPP to make sure that its 
membership and cadre profiles would skew towards the working class instead of the 
petite bourgeoisie.488 
        In the first party congress following the lift of the ban on pre-1980 politicians, 
Deniz Baykal has formally returned to politics and assumed his prominent position 
within SDPP, thanks to the support of the former RPP cadres. Against the opposition 
of the reformist group, Baykal managed to get elected as the general secretary and 
rose to the second highest position in the party albeit with only a slight majority.489 As 
the general secretary of SDPP, Baykal was accused by many for his anti-democratic 
tactics with which he tried to remove local party branches close to the reformers. 
However after including Cem in his entourage before the 1990 Party Congress, 
Baykal changed his strategy and appealed to the reformist wing of the party by 
initiating the new left movement. The new left movement sought ways of 
reconstructing a different ideological model that rested on the primary principles of 
universal social democracy and wanted to create a more democratic and pluralist 
political system instead of the existing one.490 Hence, in time, Baykal would use some 
of the arguments of the reformists in his challenge against Inonu and come close to 
winning the leadership as the rank and file of the party was becoming increasingly 
open to new ideas and the notion of change. Nevertheless, arising from the fact that 
Baykal has placed the leadership issue to the center of his claim, the mandate for 
change became irrelevant once Inonu managed to defeat him. In that sense SDPP 
program has not undergone a drastic change despite the early demands of the leftist 
group to have a clear break with the RPP tradition. Overall, SDPP program has 
reflected an eclectic character by combining its tacit references to the liberal leftist 
ideas that were voiced by intellectuals closely linked to the party at the time and a 
New Left understanding with the Ataturkist principles and emphasis on Six 
Arrows.491 This could also be attributed to the fact that the resurgence of Islamic 
groups after the Mumcu assassination, Sivas incident and Welfare victory in 1994 
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local elections changed the parameters of Turkish politics. Therefore, it is at this point 
necessary to look at this process before returning to the issue of the intra-party 
factions of SDPP. 
4.2 Islamic Resurgence 
          In many sociological studies, Turkish society is considered to consist of three 
sorts of people: a number of militant secularists who are mostly associated with leftist 
parties, a big size of moderates who preserve their faith while recognizing and 
accepting the secular character of the state and a much smaller group of clericals who 
call for a religious oriented political system.492 Indeed, throughout republican history, 
Islam could only play an instrumental role in Turkish politics so that religiously-
inspired political movements did not enjoy much success until the 1990s. Therefore 
the favorable election results achieved by the Welfare Party in local and national 
levels during the last decade is a very important academic phenomenon that needs to 
be explained for understanding the primary factors of Turkish politics, in general, and 
the recent developments within the social democratic movement, in particular.  
        Since the 1980s with the rise in the number of works on Islam, many scholars 
began to criticize the militant secularist policies of Kemalism for cutting off the non-
institutional links between the elites and the masses provided by Islam and creating a 
cultural void that could no be filled by resorting to the Enlightenment ideas and 
secularism.493 Many social scientists indeed argue that the rise of Islamist groups is a 
response to the radical secularist policies of the Kemalist regime, which has perceived 
secularization to be a telos rather than a process.494 Failing to provide a “social ethos” 
495
 or a “shared moral language”,496 Kemalism could not appeal to the hearts and 
minds of the masses and provide ontological security and thereby established the 
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foundations of its own undoing in the coming decades.497 Therefore, resurgence of 
political Islam after decades of secularization process could only be understood within 
the particular context of the secularist discourse prevalent among Kemalists.498 
However, these views do not take into account the very complicated and 
multidimensional interactions between the state and Islam achieved during the 
Republican era and the extent of the growing tacit support given to religious 
movements by state authorities. One cannot forget that even the RPP has not taken a 
very radical oppositional stance against the religion. It was taken for granted that the 
people had a religious practice and religious life was left outside the sphere of high 
politics, although, at the same time, controlled and directed by the ruling elites as they 
saw appropriate. A short discussion of the parameters of this interaction, then, is 
necessary before dwelling into the resurgence of political Islam and its effects on 
SDPP in the 1990s.  
         During the single-party era, religion was discredited in the eyes of the political 
elites; kept under close supervision and had lost the public and societal role it 
assumed during the Ottoman period.  Kemalist elites distinguished between two 
Islams, namely a secular-official and a reactionary Islam, and did not restrict the 
practice of the former as long as it remained within the official control of the state 
institutions.499 Nevertheless, republican elites did not hesitate to make use of the 
official Islam represented by the Presidency of Religious Affairs to generate public 
support for their political and cultural reforms.500 With the transition to multi-party 
system in the late 1940s, religion regained its dominant cultural status, especially 
within the rural settings, providing the peasants with the political vocabulary 
necessary for mobilization. However, under Democrat Party rule, Islam did not 
become a primary component of Turkish politics not least due to strong support given 
by DP elites to the secular reforms of the republican regime.  
         Following the rise of Justice Party to power after the 27 May military coup, 
however, Islam once again assumed a new ideological role in the growing anti-
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communist sentiment in the country and became the mechanism with which masses 
were mobilized by successive center-right governments against the alleged threat of 
communism. Islamic movements proliferated in the 1960s as a response to the rapid 
socio-economic changes occurring in Turkey501 but the functional cleavage between 
Islamists and secularists remained subordinate to the functional cleavage between the 
left and the right that polarized the society for the following two decades. Islam and 
Turkish nationalism were simultaneously used by the state elites in the struggle 
against communism but also exploited in the election campaigns against RPP, due to 
its disdain for religious populism.502 Even the rise of MSP, despite its frequent use of 
Islamic references, could be contributed to its success in voicing the concerns and 
grievances and defending the interests of the Anatolian petite bourgeoisie503 against 
the rising commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in big cities. Indeed Erbakan’s call 
for state-led heavy industrialization within an Islamic framework,504 especially in less 
developed Anatolian provinces has received more attention than his religious 
messages.505   
        The relatively insignificant role played by religion however began to change 
following 1980 coup as the policies in this period began the process of converting 
Islam from a convenient operational code into a political discourse. Perhaps the most 
striking development in Turkish politics following the 1980 military coup then has 
been the reassertion of the country’s Islamic identity.506 This was mainly caused by 
“Islamization of secularism”507, through which coup leaders hoped to cement the 
Turkish nation and thereby put an end to the ethnic, sectarian and political differences 
in the society against the communist threat. Granted that Kurdish and Alevi groups 
were aligned closely with Marxist organizations, the generals combined Turkish 
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nationalism with Islam to create a Turkish-Islamic synthesis,508 as an alternative to 
militant secularism, reinforcing a version of right Kemalism.  
         Religious associations, foundations and orders in this period greatly benefited 
from the economic liberalization in a fashion reminiscent of the Protestant ethnic and 
managed to establish their own firms, printing companies and media outlets with 
which they could carve out their own Islamic identities.509 Serving as informal 
networks for raising capital and promoting the business interests of its members, 
religious orders have also played a very important role in facilitating the rise of Islam 
as a political force within center-right parties.510 These Islamic organizations 
effectively used their growing economic power to take advantage of the deregulation 
of the government-controlled media and developed the necessary communication 
networks through which they could spread their political and religious views. Hence, 
growing opportunities of education and communication, two powerful tools 
previously employed by the republican elites in accordance with the secularization 
process, began to be successfully manipulated by these groups to challenge the 
official ideology and, as Michael Meeker puts it, “to reinvent local and oral Islam in 
Turkish urban life”.511 The expansion of print Islam transformed the production and 
dissemination of the Islamic knowledge by freeing Islam from the control of religious 
officials on state payroll and precipitated the emergence of a new group of 
intellectuals who, using the aforementioned Islamic networks of communication, 
began to voice their ideas and concerns about the contemporary problems of the 
Turkish society to a large audience.512 The emerging Islamic media and schools, 
mainly through the use of printed text, were instrumental in transforming the 
primordial religious identity visible in traditional form and context into a modern 
political identity by shifting Islamic knowledge from the private to the public sphere. 
Largely through their efforts, an Islamic discourse came into existence that began to 
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influence the hearts and minds of especially the young high school and university 
students and paved the way for the development of an Islamic ideology that would be 
used by Islamist politicians in the coming decade.  
        This Islamic discourse is very critical of the Kemalist reforms, which was 
accused of weakening the authentic Islamic culture and submitting the Turkish society 
to the immoral and positivist practices of the West, a recurrent theme in the cultural 
debates between the modernists and Islamists in the late Ottoman period513 and in 
MSP campaigns.514 Reminiscent of the European conservative movements, these 
intellectuals criticize the Enlightenment tradition and its Kemalist interpretation for 
their devotion to progress and economic growth and ignoring the crucial moral and 
social issues.515 The feeling of inferiority towards the West, stemming from the wrong 
practices of the political elites, they argued, could only be overcome by placing more 
emphasis on Islam. These intellectual works have led many young people with 
conservative backgrounds to become disillusioned by the political order and question, 
what they define as, the blind emulation of Western life styles. The growth of the 
Welfare Party was partially triggered by the quest of this Muslim community to form 
an identity separate and, in many ways, autonomous from the West as a result of their 
“search for an alternative Islamic life politics and new social order”. 516  
        After losing most of its electoral base to MP in early 1980s, Welfare Party began 
to regain its supporters with the return of the pre-coup cadre to active politics and the 
favorable political environment caused by the socio-economic consequences of 
shifting from a highly protectionist economy to an export-oriented model through 
neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s which intensified income disparities and increased 
the unemployment rate to unprecedented levels. The process of neo-liberal reforms, in 
accordance with global developments, undermined the foundations of the 
developmental state and limited the size and extent of public programs designed to 
meet the social state provision. The steady inflow of migrants from less developed 
central and eastern Anatolian provinces into metropolitan centers could not be 
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adequately absorbed into official sectors of the economy and excluded from most 
aspects of the urban life in the slums, springing up across the major cities.517 In 
addition, economic conditions of the masses, mostly earning fixed income, were 
further exacerbated by the chronically high rates of inflation, especially during the 
TPP-SDDP coalition government.518 Intense alienation and helplessness caused by 
cultural shocks and socio-economic problems deeply affected the newcomers and 
made them a natural constituency for political movements and ideas critical of the 
neo-liberal socio-economic order which they considered as the cause of their 
multidimensional problems. Faced with these challenges, the new migrants continued 
to rely on their traditional contacts and associations to ease the difficult transition 
period and thus became excellent targets for the clientelist politics of the Welfare 
Party.519 Nevertheless, it was only in 1991 national elections that the party managed 
to pass the electoral threshold and enter the parliament, thanks to the merger done 
with MCP and IDP.   
         In this manner, global and domestic developments in line with the growing 
hegemony of the neo-liberal economic policies and new right politics left little room 
for maneuver to the social democratic parties, already in a deep crisis for similar 
reasons, and increasingly made them look indistinguishable from center-right 
parties.520 Deteriorating economic conditions during TPP-SDPP government and its 
failure to cushion some of the socio-economic problems led many urban voters to 
become disillusioned with center parties. In that sense, Halul Gulalp rightly argues 
that Islamism is a consequence of the failure of the Westernist modernization to 
deliver its promises.521 In this suitable environment, when center-right and center-left 
parties were unresponsive to the demands and needs of the masses but were instead 
plagued with allegations of corruption and political wrongdoing, Erbakan, thanks to 
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his colorful yet effective rhetoric, could succeed in blaming the Kemalist order and all 
the systemic parties associated with the regime for the escalating problems and offer 
an alternative to the electorate within the framework of his Islamic program.522 The 
‘Just Economic Order’, 523 possessing elements of capitalism and socialism, came to 
be associated with social justice and was considered as a third way between the two 
ideologies, promising communitarian solidarity and relief from the material concerns 
of the masses.524 The ensuing Islamic civic organizations worked to produce tangible 
results to indicate that Islam can better address the problems, needs and grievances of 
ordinary people than the secular institutions and organization of the state.525  
        In accordance with its long walk to power, Welfare Party began to approach to 
the political center and open its ranks to center-right and liberal candidates transferred 
from Motherland and True Path parties. In addition, reflecting the liberalization of the 
Islamic movement with the rise of Islamic intellectuals such as Mehmet Metiner526 
and Ali Bulac,527 making efforts to open dialogue with other segments of the society, 
Bahri Zengin, leader of the liberal faction, has put together a new party program, 
more appealing to the electorate.528 In addition to this new strategy, beginning with 
the 1991 elections, campaign themes of the Welfare Party mostly focused on the 
issues and problems, involving the oppressed groups in the society such as veiled 
students, unemployed people, new migrants and workers529 and adopted a rhetoric 
that sounded very close to one that could be used by a traditional leftist party, 
especially with its emphasis on growing income disparities and poverty.530 These 
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campaign themes resonated very strongly among the new migrants in large cities who 
were grappling with the difficulties cause by separation from collective entities.531  
        Taking advantage of the new opportunities provided by the global 
communication network through the Internet, cable television, fax machines and the 
spread of telephones, the reformist faction in the party began to devise new strategies 
to attract new voters to the party and opposed the old guards with the goal of 
transforming Welfare Party into a mass party532  from a cadre party status.533 Their 
effective campaign strategies based on a network of independent volunteer support 
groups, scattered across the country, spread the party’s message to the urban masses 
and gained substantial support from poor districts of metropolitan areas. As a result of 
the growing Islamic movement and the highly organized and effective work of the 
party members, Welfare Party managed to capture 19.8 percent of the national vote in 
the 1994 local elections and won in 29 out of 76 municipalities as well as in around 
300 towns. This was indeed a sociological shift in the voter base of the Welfare Party 
with a substantial increase in the amount of votes received from urban areas and the 
working classes, those groups that have traditionally voted from left-wing movements 
and social-democratic parties.534 In other words, while NSP drew most of its support 
from towns and small cities in the less developed eastern and central Anatolian 
provinces in the 1970s,535 the following two decades, especially 1990s, witnessed the 
growth of support given to the Welfare Party in major cities.  
          As a result, the party that was mostly severely affected from the rise of the 
Welfare Party was SDDP, as it lost a substantial part of its electorate that has 
delivered the party an impressive election victory in 1989 local elections. Ties that 
were developed between SDPP and the poor masses in squatter districts were 
damaged because of the mediocre service provided by many SDPP controlled 
municipalities and, more importantly, the increasing number of corruption scandals in 
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which SDPP members took a central role. Moreover, the recent economic reforms 
coupled with devolution of power from central authorities to local governments, 
following the municipality reform in early 1980s created new opportunities to local 
authorities, such as allocation of public lands and issuing construction permits. The 
growing influence of the local organizations within SDPP backed by a delegate 
system, which became highly corrupt during the intra-party conflicts and successive 
party congress fed the corruptive and clientalistic nature of politics.536  
           As already noted, the dissatisfaction of the urban masses excluded from the 
benefits of the economic liberalization of the last two decades was a major factor 
behind the rise of the Welfare Party. While social democrats refrained from directly 
challenging the economic order and failed to provide relief to the needy in the 
municipalities they controlled, plagued by corruption, political misconduct and 
embezzlement allegations, Islamists established social service organizations and 
clientelist networks funded by conservative businessmen.537 In their hopes of 
defending the achievements of the republican regime and the benefits of a modern life 
style, SDPP came to be associated with the rest of the center parties in the eyes of this 
electorate. In other words, social democrat politicians were so tied up to the modernist 
rhetoric that they could not relate to this constituency and assume a radical and highly 
critical discourse against the political and economic order.  
       On the other hand, Welfare politicians developed an anti-systemic rhetoric that 
managed to capture the hearts and minds of these voters and gave them hope for the 
future as well as a new discourse and promise for a new regime, ‘just order’. This 
Islamic discourse attributed the grievances and miseries of the masses to the secular 
regime itself rather than the mediocre politicians and the overall direction of the 
economy. In their minds, god and society was on one side and the secular and corrupt 
state was on the other.538 The narratives of progress and prosperity in defense of the 
rising consumer culture used by the mainstream media sources was countered by the 
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Islamic media that focused on the growing inequality between rich and poor and 
various economic hardships that the masses had to overcome. 539 
       A segment of the urban dwellers who tend to distinguish themselves from the 
newly migrants with a set of secular values and culturalized lifestyle choices540 
reacted to the rise of the Welfare Party with growing fear and worry. These fears were 
crystallized immediately after 1994 local elections when they were confronted with 
the reality of being directly governed by Islamic politicians in their municipalities and 
was forced to recognize that Islam constituted an irreplaceable part of their fellow 
compatriots’ life.541 Considering the growing influence of Islam in society as 
reactionary and fanatical542 in accordance with Kemalist tradition, they became highly 
sensitive and reactionary, especially after Mumcu assassination and 1994 local 
elections. These developments provoked the emergence of a Kulturkampf between the 
secularists and Islamists who began to use distinct discourses, images, representations 
and stories to oppose one another. Moreover there was a return to Kemalist laicism, as 
people united around the cult of Ataturk whose image became more visible and 
pronounced in the public sphere with hundreds of thousands of Ataturk framed 
posters, badges, pins, portraits, photographs and statues circulated around. Hence, 
growing influence of Islam in the political system generated a counter-response and 
paved the way for the subsequent rise of Kemalism but now in a more civic form. 
4.3 Kemalist Response 
          The liberal, ethnic and religious challenges in the two decades following the 
1980s coup, also discussed in the two chapters of this thesis, propelled Kemalism into 
a legitimacy crisis as a state-focused ideology and undermined the very basic 
foundations of the Turkish republic. Growing hegemony of the neo-liberal agenda and 
the ensuing globalization process in the 1990s with their reflections observed in the 
rising liberal challenges towards the state and the rise of Islamic revivalism together 
with Kurdish radicalism persuaded many Kemalist intellectuals that Kemalism was 
under serious threat. In addition, due to the high number of Islamists joining the ranks 
of the state bureaucracy, especially during the Motherland period, state officials could 
                                                
539
 Ibid., 91-2 
540
 Sencer Ayata, The new middle class and the joys of suburbia, D. Kandiyoti and A. 
Saktanber (eds.), Fragments of Culture and the everyday of Modern Turkey, New 
Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 2002, p.30 
541
 Ibid., 44-73 
542
 Ahmad “Islamic Reassertion, 755 
 118 
no longer be trusted to give overwhelming support to the Kemalist ideals.543 
Moreover, recent ideological debates taking place within SDPP, indicating that many 
members were ready to abandon etatist policies discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, made them concerned about the ability of the social democrat parties to 
defend Kemalism.544 All of these developments led Kemalist intellectuals to organize 
a civilian initiative with which they could restore the hegemony of Kemalism by 
using the democratic mechanisms at hand, since the state was no longer willing to 
officially assume this task. Hence, 1990s witnessed the emergence of a civic version 
of Kemalism which have characterized Turkish politics in the 1990s, particularly for 
the mainstream leftist parties.  
         The first group, consisting of very prominent scholars with a legal background, 
developed a revisionist approach to Kemalism, arguing the possibility of establishing 
a democratic regime in Turkey with Kemalism-oriented values. These intellectuals 
share the view that Kemalism is not a totalitarian project in par with the socialist and 
fascist regimes occurring in the same time period as Kemalism; rather it is an 
authoritarian ideology that developed the necessary political, economic and social 
conditions for establishing a democratic regime.545 Indeed, they pointed out that the 
pragmatic and flexible policies of the period, coupled with a relative tolerance for 
pluralism546, though implemented in a monist and authoritarian fashion came to 
develop the modern and rational citizen model that would become the building block 
of a democratic order in the coming years.547 For those arguing that Kemalism is an 
elitist project, imposed from above to all segments of the society, Tanor selected the 
democratic aspects of the early stages of the National Struggle Period and emphasized 
the high level of participation and mobilization that surrounded the rise of Kemalism 
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in this period of liberation.548 This was a civil society model absent in the Ottoman 
polity and a clear indication that only the democratic regime could solve the deep 
rooted socio-economic problems of the Turkish society.549   
         They were also highly critical of the oppressive, elitist and rigid policies of the 
single-party era, especially after the consolidation of the RPP rule in the early 1930s, 
and saw them as wrong examples that were set for the coming military coups in the 
following decades. They argued that Kemalism should be saved from the tutelage of 
the civil and military bureaucratic elites, who, distrustful of the masses, relies on a 
notion of statism adopted from 1930s. Ozbudun considers the corporatist character of 
the Turkish polity, inherited from Gokalp’s populist tradition, as the fundamental 
obstacle over the development of a pluralist culture and a democratic regime.550 On 
the contrary, the consolidation of Turkish democracy depends upon a peaceful 
resolution of the existing dichotomies in society and recognition of alternative 
political, cultural and ethnic identities by means of abandoning the monolithic cultural 
policy of Kemalism.551 Advocating adoption of a more liberal version of secularism, 
abandonment of tutelage of bureaucratic authorities in favor of civil society and full-
scale democratization, they hoped that it would be possible to regain legitimacy of 
Kemalism on democratic grounds and thereby achieve Ataturk’s goal of establishing a 
democratic regime in Turkey.552 Indeed, these intellectuals have analyzed the 
responsibility of the Kemalist tradition in the poor conditions of democracy in Turkey 
in a critical manner unseen among mainstream Kemalists, though not personally 
dissociating from the ideology itself and took it upon themselves to reinvent 
Kemalism in accordance with the democratic paradigm.553 However these attempts of 
reframing Kemalism in a liberal and democratic manner did not generate much 
support among the Kemalist circles and were mostly shadowed by the rise of a more 
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conservative, nationalist and reactionary interpretation of Kemalism with, of course, 
serious consequences for the reformist and leftist elements within SDPP. 
        The second group however directly appealed to the society and engaged in civic 
activities to raise awareness for the growing threats facing Kemalism and generate 
support from the masses. Hence, a public call was made to the society, inviting all 
those who discovered the Mustafa Kemal in themselves to participate in this process 
and assume an active role in defending the achievements of the republican regime.554  
A group of Kemalist intellectuals, headed by Muammer Aksoy, established the 
Association of Ataturkist Thought555 in Ankara in 1989 with a similar organization 
under the title the Association of Support for Contemporary Life being opened in 
Istanbul during the same period. Kemalists from all occupations and age groups, but 
especially Kemalist women, who considered Islamic revival as a fundamental threat 
to their status in society assumed a primary role in these organizations and took active 
part in their occasions.556 They argued that this is a continuation of the ‘Anatolian 
Enlightenment’ by civic associations, resuming the task of raising modern citizens, 
who would be ready and capable to defend the reformist and nationalist epistemology 
of the regime. 
         On political matters, a very cautious approach is taken towards Kurdish and 
Islamist groups and any liberal initiative is usually considered to play into the hands 
of these groups and thus passionately opposed. One country, one flag, one official 
language are the absolute boundaries for political and cultural freedoms that could be 
granted to political groups in society.557 It was argued that under no circumstances 
Islamist and Kurdish political associations could be tolerated as part of the civil 
society because they posed a significant threat to the republican regime and the 
democratic order. If formal rules of democracy call for such tolerance, then, they 
should not be considered as democrats.558 This is in fact a clear indication of the 
instrumental role denoted to the democratic regime by Kemalists who were ready to 
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use authoritarian political and legal measures to defend the regime.559 Moreover, a 
“platonic love for the state” is eminent among members of these associations since 
they have not yet abandoned their emotional bonds with the state but also cannot 
openly express them due to the cold response most of the state authorities give to their 
cause.560 Members emphasize the importance of establishing organic ties between 
their associations and state mechanisms, arising from their “statolatry”.561  
        Recent global developments have made it necessary for neo-Kemalists, as 
Kahraman puts it, to rejuvenate the Kemalist-Republican ideological roots and 
revitalize the nation-state model with the traditional Kemalist epistemology, 
overseeing a cohabitation of the party and the state.562 Indeed, the emergence of neo-
Kemalism has been largely a reaction to the retreat of the nation-state model and 
Keynesian version of developmental state propelled by the developments and 
concepts produced in the period of globalization. It should then not come as a surprise 
that an emphasis on the primacy of national sovereignty and anti-imperialism 
distinguish neo-Kemalism from its earlier forms.563 Nationalist left, aiming to 
amalgamate the Kuvayi Milliye spirit with egalitarian principles, developed as a 
response to the hegemonic crisis faced by Kemalism in the 1990s and became an 
ideological framework for the social democratic parties.564 This reactionary attitude 
has been one of the major obstacles for the postponement of the democratization and 
liberalization process in the early 1990s and has grown the influence of the 
conservative faction within the SDPP.  
4.4 The Return to Roots 
        In the midst of heated Kemalism debates, those adhering to the Kemalist 
principles wanted a political party that could directly assume the task of defending 
Kemalist heritage. Indeed following the constitutional change that allowed pre-1980 
parties to be reopened, RPP was reestablished by the former ranks of the party and 
initiated an aggressive strategy towards other center-left parties, especially SDPP, 
whose mission was argued to be completed with its return to Turkish politics. A 
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paradoxical situation was caused by the fact that the very group which was critical of 
the traditional ideological structure and the radical modernist discourse of RPP was 
also assuming the task of, first, reestablishing and, then, assuming the control of the 
party. An energetic and ambitious Baykal, eager to become the leader of the left, has 
passionately used the strategy of pushing the SDPP administration to the corner by 
inviting them to merger talks without any preconditions,565 knowing that the heritage 
of his party would constitute a source of attraction for those disappointed by policies 
pursued by SDPP after becoming a coalition partner. Indeed his entire strategy was 
based on the emphasis made by him on the importance and meaning of RPP which he 
though would appeal the SDPP base not least the grassroots members. Inonu managed 
to resist to these demands by arguing that the roof of RPP existed within SDPP which 
contained many former RPP politicians as well as majority of its rank and file.566 
Following Inonu’s quit from politics, Karayalcin was unable to control his party ranks 
and when faced with mounting pressure coming from the leftist public opinion as well 
as many of his rivals, including, among others, Gurkan group, an uneasy Karayalcin 
realized that he could no longer ignore or delay the merger between the two parties.567  
         After the assassination of Ugur Mumcu in January 24, 1993 and in response to 
the resurgence of Islam and growing Kurdish nationalism, there was a spontaneous 
upsurge of the traditional Kemalist ideology albeit in a civic form. For Kemalist 
masses, the numerous political assassinations on Kemalist intellectuals was an 
indication of the inability of the political elites to preserve the secular character of the 
regime which gave them all the more reason to stand firm and hold on to their ideals. 
The prevailing mood among the urban and secular electorate, constituting the support 
base of SDPP-RPP tradition, contributed to the growing popularity of traditional 
Kemalist values and the return of SDPP to its roots, thereby eliminating the possibility 
of a social democratic transformation. In this environment, attempts of reviving 
Turkish social democracy by breaking with the RPP heritage and developing a new 
ideological framework that would incorporate the universal principles of social 
democracy lost their appeal for the rank and file of the party. There was a growing 
protest against those who favored opening into question the manner and style of the 
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Kemalist reforms. Hence, second Republicans were accused of acting under the 
guidance and initiative of CIA with its own agenda over the region so that those 
affiliated with such ideas in leftist parties lost their hopes of generating support from 
the party members. Indeed, the growing concerns of the urban dwellers that the 
republican regime and their modern and secular life style was in danger which was 
being fueled by the civic-oriented activities and public campaigns of the neo-
Kemalists made it highly unwise for the RPP leadership cadre to break with the 
Kemalist heritage and adopt the new left philosophy as the new party program. While 
the 1993 program of RPP contained an ambiguous ideological position going back 
and forth between the abandonment of the traditional ideology and its reinvigoration, 
Baykal team gradually assumed an increasingly traditional Kemalist, nationalist and 
radical secularist position.568  Republic and secularism assumed a more important role 
in the lives of the RPP voters in the period following the rise of Islamic politics and 
became the main priority of this constituency.569 
        As already shown in the second chapter, Karayalcin Manifesto revealed the 
intention of a part of the leadership cadres to shift to a more liberal and pluralistic 
understanding of politics breaking with the centralist and statist tradition in response 
to the emergence of new economic, political and social realities. However the 
dramatic turn of events would lead him to, first, tone down some important elements 
in his program and, later, pull the party under his hand during the merger talks, 
resulting in his political isolation. Indeed, come the merger, not only the institutional 
existence but also the ideological formulations of SDPP would be abolished. 
Moreover, after the unification of the two parties, prominent SDPP politicians who 
were already out of touch with their constituencies after numerous scandals in power 
would begin to lose their influence in the new party in what would follow as the 
capture of SDPP by RPP. The overwhelming victory of Baykal, who campaigned on 
the theme of devotion to the historical cult of RPP,570 against Karayalcin in the first 
congress after the RPP-SDPP merger on September 9, 1995 thus signaled the end of a 
chapter in Turkish politics, for the era of SDPP as well as SDPP originated politicians 
had come to an end.  
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         In this chapter, it is argued that rapid socio-economic and political changes in 
the post-1980 period brought a radical reevaluation of the constitutive ideology, 
namely Kemalism and, with it, the Kemalist-originated Turkish social democracy. 
The analysis showed that Kemalism was put under scrutiny by intellectuals from all 
segments of the society, including a newly reformist group within SDPP. There were 
indeed numerous attempts among SDPP ranks to reinvigorate the social democratic 
ideology by breaking with the Kemalist heritage and six Arrows, unseen in previous 
periods. However the rise of Islamic movements  together with brutal attacks on 
secular intellectuals gave the impression that secularism and the republican order 
were under threat, precipitating a wave of Kemalist resurgence, overwhelmingly 
supported by the secular and urban communities. In response to the anti-Kemalist 
developments in the post-1980 period, many Kemalist intellectuals managed to revive 
the existing link between Turkish social democracy and Kemalism to reemphasize 
Kemalist elements within Turkish left. In other words, rank and file of SDPP have 
assumed the task of defending Kemalist reforms and principles at the expence of 
strengthening the importance of universal social democrat values within their party 
program. The reestablishment of RPP fueled this process as it generated a race among 
leftist politicians on the issue of who can best protect and preserve the secular 
character of the republican regime. Following the merger between SDPP and RPP, all 
previous attempts of the reformist faction to convince the party grassroots to 
undertake transformation along the lines of western social democracy had to be 
dropped in this new environment. 
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                                           CONCLUSION 
 
       On the night of February 18, 1995 SDPP delegates gathered at a convention hall 
in Ankara to dissolve their party that has become the main represantor of the social 
democratic movement for approximately a decade. Only a few hours ago, with around 
a three hundred vote margin, the majority of the SDPP delegates accepted RPP as 
their new home, following the merger between SDPP and RPP. A sad-looking and 
exhausted Karayalcin, as the last chairman of the party, made a dramatic speech, 
congratulating each and every one of the delegates for their services in SDPP and 
asked them to continue similar work in their new party. These words marked not only 
the end of SDPP but also a chapter in Turkish politics, since in the coming years RPP 
reemerged with its monist structure, putting an end to all attempts of the intra-party 
factions in realizing a social democratic transformation.  
        Social democracy is a concept that has emerged, rather lately in Turkish politics, 
in the early 1980s, pronounced politically and epistemologically by the leadership 
cadre of the new center-left party that was founded, namely Social Democratic Party. 
In the previous decades, even center-left or democratic left movements that 
challenged some of the policies of the single-party era did not aspire to use the social 
democratic discourse. Indeed, Turkish social democracy has never been closely tied to 
and influenced by the universal norms of the European social democratic and socialist 
parties but instead relied extensively on the Kemalist ideological framework. 
          In accordance with the liberalization of the political system and the rise of new 
social groups, however, according to the argument put forward in this thesis, a 
growing faction of reformists, consisting of the intellectuals, ethnic and sectarian 
groups and union leaders in SDPP managed to challenge the ideology of the party and 
argued in favor of its structural and ideological renewal. A number of intra-party 
factions developed new programs which carried the ambitious goal of transforming 
the traditional and parochial Turkish social democracy and breaking with its Kemalist 
origins to assume a more universal character. Given the popularity of these alternative 
programs and the publicity they generated in the media, it is surprising that such a 
programmatic revival failed to materialize. This thesis thus aims to explain this 
phenomenon by focusing on intra-party discussions as well as the socio-economic and 
political developments of the period. 
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          Efforts of some intra-factions to seek ideological and structural renewal have, 
unfortunately, coincided with the rapid decline of SDPP due to the political conjecture 
and leadership and cadre problems. The mass support for SDPP significantly went 
down during the coalition years in response to ineffective government response to the 
Sivas and Gazi events, economic crisis and Kurdish issue. It is also the case that these 
debates mostly gained importance among delegates mainly during these leadership 
contests and, thus, were overshadowed by the Inonu-Baykal leadership race. 
Important as they may be, this thesis displayed that this inability to renew the 
ideological structure of the party must be attributed to the crisis of statism that 
challenged the source of legitimacy of the party, crisis of Turkish modernity that 
distanced the party elites from their constituent groups and crisis of Kemalism that 
hindered the search for universal norms of social democracy in SDPP. 
         The epistemological inadequacy of the Turkish social democracy, as already 
argued, mainly originates from the extensive ties developed between the state and 
SDPP, as the party of the old establishment, standing in direct line of descent from the 
RPP. This has precluded SDPP elites from directly challenging the state and accepting 
the wrongdoings of the ruling elites, even if that meant compromising on the goal of 
demilitarization. While the party elites were critical of the coup generals and their 
actions, they were surprisingly hesitant to challenge the authoritarian policies of the 
state in the issues of 1980 coup, Kurdish problem and economic and political 
discrimination. In its role as the main opposition party in the 1980s, therefore, SDPP 
could not fully possess and lead the democratization demands of the large body of the 
Turkish electorate.  
        In response to the neo-liberal and new right policies of the MP government, 
SDPP ranks instinctively rallied behind the cause of defending the state and continued 
to advocate the notion of the mixed economy, not least denoting a primary function 
for state interventionism. This was a major reason for the inability of SDPP to offer a 
credible economic program that could serve as an alternative to the government 
policies. In addition, debureaucratization of the Ozal era raised the influence of 
bureaucrats who acted in their self-interest to seek the reversal of these policies within 
SDPP. It should however be noted that unlike the Western countries where statism has 
been perceived as an economic model, Turkish statism, as explained in the thesis, has 
a political and cultural element, frequently used for part of a social engineering 
project. Therefore, the demise of statism has driven center-left parties, not least SDPP 
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itself, to an ideological crisis rather than constituting an incentive for change as seen 
in western social democratic and socialist parties. 
       Secondly, Turkish political parties are delimited by the constitutive modernist 
approach in politics, deriving its legitimacy from the will to civilization depicted by 
the founding fathers of the republican regime since the goal of social transformation 
has not yet succeeded in developing a properly industrialized modern society. While 
politicians from the right of the political spectrum focus on the technologist 
transformation of the society and emphasize economic growth, those in the left 
prioritize cultural aspects of modernity and with their policies imposed from above 
cause a cultural divide to be developed between them and the masses. 
        This approach continued to influence SDPP administration, which formulated 
policies in accordance with this will to modernization and, thereby, reduced politics to 
a kind of functionalism in which social groups play a side role. In such a case, politics 
for SDPP cadres no longer assumed the participatory and communicative framework 
in addressing the problems, demands and grievances of the electorate but instead 
became imbedded in a normative structure that lacks a strong ideological component. 
Overall SDPP ranks stayed indifferent to the transformation taking place in society, 
especially in terms of the new groups flourishing with the rise of identity politics, due 
to the constitutive discourse of modernity, which provided the basis of the Turkish 
social democracy. As a result, the social groups that were most likely to adopt the new 
ideological approaches and support the transformation of SDPP along the universal 
principles of social democracy have abandoned the party in disillusionment. This 
weakened the strength and size of the reformist wing of the party and generated a 
monist and uniform membership structure which was not sufficient for undertaking a 
transformation of the party from inside.  
       The third and most important reason for the inability of SDPP to generate a more 
universal ideology arose from the symbiotic relationship between social democracy 
and Kemalism, which is the major constitutive element of Turkish social democracy 
and, therefore, determined the epistemological limits of the center-left parties. As 
already argued in the thesis, Kemalism is an inadequate source for a genuine social 
democratic movement because the populist elements inherent in Kemalism constitute 
a solidaristic formulation of social relations and organize the society through 
corporatist arrangements that leaves no room for a class structure.  
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        Only by disassociating the left ideology from its elitist, statist and anti-
democratic roots and settle accounts with Kemalism through a rupture with the past 
can Turkish social democracy become the driving force of democratization and 
catalyst for building a democratic consensus upon which a new political regime could 
be established. However the rise of political Islam and the Islamic revivalism together 
with brutal attacks on secular intellectuals gave the impression that secularism and the 
republican order were under threat, precipitating a wave of Kemalist reaction 
overwhelmingly supported by the secular and urban groups. This have played into the 
hands of the orthodox members of the party and hindered the development of a 
genuine and valid social democratic movement. 
        It is not astonishing to state that SDPP was still in an infant stage in terms of 
becoming a fully-fledged and organized party, which remained as an uneasy coalition 
of various social, political and identity groups, not able to reach a consensus on its 
programme and, thus, experienced difficulty in persuading the masses. The grassroots 
activists and the membership of the party as well as its cadres remained unsure about 
the direction of the party and its mission. MP’s adoption of a liberal political agenda 
and TPP’s emphasis on politics of redistribution in the early 1990s coupled with the 
reestablishment of RPP, challenged the legitimacy of SDPP by eliminating its 
mission. Unable to renew itself or develop policies that would adjust to the changing 
conditions of Turkish politics, the electoral and social base of SDPP eroded, leaving 
the option of merger with RPP inevitable.  
        To sum it up, the main contribution of this thesis is that unless these three 
important issues are settled satisfactorily so that the traditional and historical ties 
between the left and the state, its funding ideology and state-led modernization project 
are broken, it is not possible to transform Turkish social democracy. Any attempts 
falling short of this would once again generate unfavorable results since the orthodox 
elements would once again prevail in preserving the traditional structure of the 
Turkish left.  
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